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ABSTRACT 
Roger Saul Silverstone 
THE TELEVISION MESSAGE AS SOCIAL OBJECT: 
A comparative study of the structure and content of television 
programmes in Britain (excluding public affairs, children's 
television and shorts). The thesis will be both a theoretical 
and empirical examination of the applicability of the varieties 
of analysis of symbolic orders which have been advanced by such 
writers as Levi-Strauss and Foucault. 
The thesis is an exploration, through the study of the narrative 
structure of a series of television drama programmes, of the 
relationship between television, myths and folktales. 
Following upon work done principally by Claude Levi-Strauss and 
Vladimir Propp, but also others writing in the field of semiological 
and structural analysis, a detailed examination of the video-recorded 
texts of a thirteen part drama series is presented. 
It is argued in the context of an examination of, respectively, 
television and language, television and the mythic, and of the 
nature of narrative, that the television drama preserves the forms 
which otherwise might be thought of as particular to oral culture 
and communication. 
Television, in its preservation of these forms, and in its generally 
mythic character, gains its effectiveness thereby and must be under-
stood sociologically in such terns. The effect of such an understanding, 
it is argued, will be to challenge any comprehension of the medium 
simply as the particular product of a particular historical period 
and/or an imposition in culture of one world view on an other. 
The television message is both a collective product and a trans-
historical one. It is argued that on both counts it needs to be 
understood as a genuine expression of a social need, though in 
its expression of that need it does not necessarily simply act to 
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FOREWORD 
There are a number of disparate points that I must make. 
As far as the long title of the thesis is concerned, two things 
will quickly become clear: firstly that the empirical analysis 
is exclusively concerned with television drama - the comparative 
work involves reference to a number of separate episodes of a 
television drama series; and secondly, the theoretical framework, 
while it owes much to a reading of Michel Foucault, nevertheless is 
less specifically dependent on him than other so-called structuralist 
wri ters. 
Work done on and through the texts of Intimate Strangers was much 
helped by the kind cooperation of London Weekend Television, who 
produced and transmitted the programmes. They not only gave me 
permission to video-record them, but they provided me with copies 
of the scripts. Needless to say I am particularly grateful to them. 
Finally I would like to point out that some of my reading of the 
French texts discussed throughout this thesis was in translation; 
I refer in the footnotes to the sources I have consulted in the 
original and to those I have consulted in translation. 
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CHAPTER I 
Television and Culture 
Television is important. 947. of the population of the United Kingdom 
over the age of five has access to a television set. Each member of 
that population watches it an average of 16 hours and 27 minutes per 
week.* This much at least is certain and demonstrable. Less 
demonstrable, however, though equally certain, is that television is 
qualitatively important. 
I aim in this thesis to explore some aspects of this qualitative 
dimension, and to do so through analysis of the television message, 
and, in particular, its narrative structure. I will be concerned with 
television as language and television as myth. I expect to show that 
television preserves forms of cultural experience that were previously 
thought of as being the peculiar prerogative of 'primitive' societies 
and that in so doing it anchors our experience, historical, changing, 
uncertain into another which is relatively unchanging and more certain. 
The way the television presents its texts is the key to the discussion. 
The analysis of the television message and in particular its structural 
analysis is a relatively recent development. It is prompted by the 
inadequacy and inconsistency of many of the findings into the effects 
of television and correlatively the realisation that the study of effects 
cannot be undertaken in vacuo, that is in ignorance of the context, both 
social and cultural, of the supposed equation of message and action. 
And it is prompted by a recognition that television does not consist 
in a collection of isolated events to which individuals will react 
independently of what else is appearing on the screen. The significance 
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and meaning of its messages cannot simply be derived from a study of its 
2 
content. 
Similarly the production of the programmes, the relationship of 
the producing organisation to other institutions of society, while 
clearly being viable objects of study, do not reach the central questions 
3 
surrounding the nature of television. These questions are, I suggest, 
those that seek cultures significance in what Clifford Geertz calls 
4 
"the autonomous process of symbolic formulation" ; in the recognition 
that at the heart of any social process of communication lies a symbolic 
system of cognitive, affective, and evaluative messages - rich, complex 
and resilient. 
What is it that television is saying? How does it say it? These seem 
important and much neglected questions and they lead straight to an 
analysis of the message of television and to the ways in which its 
meanings are communicated. Other questions of course can and should 
be asked; for example, who is speaking, and to what effect? Both 
sets of questions are interdependent. Both are necessary. My choice 
is therefore premised on the perception both of a lack and an inadequacy. 
The lack consists in the relative paucity of any mature studies of the 
content of television and the inadequacy in the arguments, false as I 
hope to show, that television can only be understood in terms of the 
specificity of bourgeois culture and ideology, and as such is either 
distorting or transient or both."* 
In order to begin there is a need for a notion of culture, and then of 
myth and common sense. Each, of course, poses something of a problem 
and I can only sketch in this introduction what appear to be their 
most significant aspects. 
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In anthropology the claim for culture's autonomy as an object of study is 
itself dependent on the recognition of man's distinctiveness as opposed 
to animal. It is a distinctiveness grounded in man's consciousness, 
t 
his language and in his attempts to make sense of his world. The core 
of man's cultural activity lies in his capacity to generate meaning, 
to communicate, to transmit and to order those meanings; it lies in 
the creation of a specifically symbolic level of existence. Anthropol-
ogists have also argued, though with differing degrees of emphasis, 
that the culture of primitive societies, both the product and the 
condition of the relatively simple social structure with which it is 
associated, manifests a coherence which is systemic. Further, they 
suggest, that one measure at least of increasing social complexity is 
to be found in the increasing differentiation in cultural and social 
6 structure. 
The intellectual space occupied by culture in the analysis of primitive 
societies has been replaced by the concept of ideology in industrial 
societies. The boundaries are, of course, blurred. However the 
recognition of societies as historically conditioned, dynamic and 
changing has involved a rejection of the relatively autonomous, static 
and consensual notion of culture. This has been replaced by a stress 
on just those historical conditions, on social relations, on power 
and on the recognition that change and conflict are the new order of 
7 
the day. Needless to say primitive societies are neither static nor 
conflict free; but equally industrial societies are neither constantly 
o 
changing nor entirely conflict ridden. I would like to suggest that 
the notion of culture, so far only crudely drawn, has a place in the 
analysis of contemporary societies. I would also like to suggest that 
an important key to the understanding of culture can be found in the 
analysis of the mythic. 
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The mythic includes myth, folktale and ritual action and can be defined 
operationally; it mediates between a situation of pure nature, of no 
knowledge or understanding of the world and one in which, subsequently, 
that knowledge becomes more specialised, and becomes more scientific * 
or more philosophical. Mythic space is defined by its competence to 
set and articulate the boundaries of what passes for conventional 
knowledge in primitive society and by its capacity to articulate 
differences and similarities in what amounts to a developing but always 
complete cultural map. I suggest that this relationship of pre-cultural 
(natural), mythic, and as it were post mythic, can be formally introduced 
into an analysis of contemporary culture and the resulting model allows 
9 
the situation and function of television to be stated quite clearly. 
To do so involves the recognition that contemporary culture is highly 
10 
differentiated, much of it is inaccessible without mediation, to the 
majority of its members. In this situation the mythic does not define 
a particular stage in the transition from ignorance to knowledge, but a 
particular territory within which, simultaneously, the incompatibilities 
within contemporary culture are ameliorated. Within our society we 
are faced with different types of knowledge and experience which are 
both familiar and unfamiliar. The unfamiliar is of two kinds: the 
specialised and the nonsensical. The specialised consists in the 
particular forms of art, science and politics which we might call 
professional;
1
' they are complex and esoteric and they are produced 
and maintained by specialist and more or less exclusive groups. 
The nonsensical consists in what is rejected by a culture, the mythical i 2 
of earlier societies, but also the mythical, the alien or the phoney, 
of other, contemporary societies, as well as the distortions, unaccep-
tabilities and objects of fear that always bubble up beneath the crust 
of the safe and the acceptable. 
Between these two forms of knowledge, the one super-cultural, the 
other pre- (or anti- or even non-) cultural, lies the world of the 
everyday and the modes of communication which articulate everyday 
concerns; formally and functionally identically placed to the mythic 
in primitive society. Here, then, is the domain of the mythic in 
contemporary society, a domain in which for most of the time moat of 
us live, a domain where boundaries are constantly being defined and 
redefined. These boundaries are being defined and redefined both in 
relation to new developments in the particular forms of esoteric 
knowledge whose language, concept or aesthetic is of such complexity 
as to deny us access, and also in relation to the underworld of the 
threatening and incomprehensible, of that which we understand (or 
we think we do) but have rejected. In a technically advanced world 
this is the nature against which our integrity needs to be upheld; 
but this is the familiar, though often terrifying, nature and not the 
unfamiliar nature discussed and explored by science. 
Television like myth occupies the middle ground and in so doing defines 
in its particular way the basic categories and content of the culture 
of the everyday world. It is an important part of the argument of 
this thesis that television,supremely among the other media of mass 
communication, is coherently, systematically and centrally at work in 
the articulation of culture and in the mediation of alien bodies of 
knowledge and experience. To understand the nature of this activity 
it is not enough to argue in terms of reflection or effects; one 
must begin with a theory which seeks to encompass the complexity 
of the cultural system, and a methodology which allows for the 
analysis of its individual texts. 
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At the heart of such a theory must be the notion of the commensense 
world. "The everyday life world is the province of reality in which 
man continuously participates in ways which are at once inevitable and 
13 . 
patterned." This Schutzian vision of the daily world, a world 
dominated by the demands of practical rationality and by the recipes 
of taken for granted knowledge is a fruitful one. Albeit difficult 
to penetrate methodologically and perhaps theoretically impossible to 
justify, it is relatively easy to describe. Social life is characterised, 
and indeed is only possible because so much of what constitutes it can 
be taken for granted, can be unthought; we deal in typicalities, we 
make assumptions, predictions and choices in an 'all-things-being-equal' 
frame of mind. The everyday world is marked by its repetitiveness, 
its abstraction, its anonymity and the ever present possibility of 
J4 
transcendence. It is not a world of laws, nor even of probabilities, 
but of hopes and fears and of more or less adequately informed choices,'"* 
both programmed and unprogratnmed. Our choices, our unconsciously 
directed responses, are played against a backdrop of the typical and the 
unproblematic. By definition, as it were, commonsense is that to 
which no-one is excluded, nor is it transformed by an individual's 
practice of it. "It is perhaps the essential characteristic of our 
everyday lives that any problem which arises has as its tacit background 
the unproblematic status of the mundane reality which commonsense men 
share. However profound and far reaching the problem may be, it is 
a problem over and against that which is taken for granted; the validity 
of the world within which we come to inquire, no doubt to probe or to 
reflect."
1 6 
The unpredictable and the uncertain both surround and pervade the 
everyday world. They continually challenge the peace perhaps more 
devoutly to be wished than real. The world we know is encompassed 
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by that which we don't; the world we know and the security of that 
knowledge is constantly being pricked by the chance event, the encounter, 
the intrusion of the new and the unfamiliar. Our world, at least that 
} 
portion of it which we can take for granted is a kernel; we step out 
of it at our peril, and because it is chaos (the unknown and the 
unthought) which we fear most, we are constantly at work revising the 
limits of what it is that we can take for granted, constantly incorporating 
more and more within our own stock of knowledge.'^ This is both, of 
course, an individual and a social/cultural process, but the point is 
that our knowledge of the world, the knowledge which guides our everyday 
activities is bounded; there is an' horizon to experience. 
Horizons both define and limit, include and exclude; they are static 
in that they are always there, but dynamic in that their content is 
always changing. Things both come into view and then disappear, a 
disappearance the result of their incorporation into the familiar. 
As C.D. Burns notes: "On the horizon are facts or aspects of facts 
or events or situations - realities like any other in the fully 
experienced world, but different from those in that, as it were, we 
see them only from one side. Horizon facts are those whose connections 
with the fully experienced is clear enough, but not their connection 
18 
with what may still be experienced and is not yet." 
The everyday world of commonsense, then, has two horizons, the one of 
the particular sciences and arts (with their own horizons of the new 
and the unknown), the other of the general negations of what passes for 
the true and the acceptable. Where these three domains meet lie 
regions of ambiguity and uncertainty; of a lack of clarity about 
context and meaning, and a lack of clarity about the bases for choice, 
for decisions and for the consequences of future actions. 
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Our responses to the ambiguous and the uncertain will be many. As 
individuals we can be tolerant or intolerant, anarchic or staid. But 
we only know and recognise these various corrosions of meaning because 
we already know, consciously but more often unconsciously, the system 
of symbolic coherences which are the essence of our culture. On tfie 
one hand there are the events of the real world, intrusions of history 
as it were, the speech (parole) of the everyday; on the other the 
security of a structure, the guarantee of communication, the language 
19 
(langue) of the everyday; actions and events, rules and structure, 
interdependent of course and constantly changing, but each of a 
different order. Indeed the commonsense world in its language and 
in its beliefs and actions is the privileged site where langue and 
parole meet. The everyday world is simultaneously a world of rule 
and transgression; but no knowledge of it is possible, just as it is 
itself impossible, without an understanding of those rules. Hence 
we are led to its structure, to the grounds of its possibility, and to 
the identification of the syntax and semantics of its meanings. 
In this context, therefore, how are we to understand the cultural 
significance of television? It might be suggested that television 
is of the conmonsense world but at the same time distinct from it. 
Of necessity involved in that world, it must equally of necessity 
manifest more clearly, though not necessarily directly, the structures 
underlying it. Then it might be suggested that television both speaks 
to and speaks of the modes of thought and feeling that orient our 
actions in the daily round. It Is not so much a guide to action, or 
a guide for the perplexed, but rather a commentary, a more or less gentle 
mastication of the categories and boundaries of culture and an exploration 
of the ambiguities and uncertainties that are endemic to it. In order 
to understand how this might be it would seem essential to examine the 
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texts presented on television themselves, and to identify in what the 
discourse of television consists. In so far as television communicates 
something to each of us, and to all of us, notwithstanding the individual's 
processes of selection and interpretation which cannot for one moment 
20 
be denied, the messages that television transmits are common. Whether 
this commonness is genuine or whether it is an imposed structure, an 
Ideological form, is for the moment beside the point. 
The examination of the messages that are transmitted by television begins 
with their structure, understood in terms of the patterns of meaning 
which can be shown to exist within a series of texts and upon which the 
21 
specific meaning of a specific text is seen to depend. The problems 
are immense, for clearly even a superficial consideration of the nature 
of the televisual texts would be able to identify any number of different 22 
levels of coding, or of structuring:.' those both specific to the medium 
and dependent on its technical make-up and those more generally at work 
within many media including face-to-face interaction. 
Television is not one language but many. It is however coordinated, 
its various codes knitting together in a text which we, as viewers, can 
read and to which we respond. There are therefore a number of prelim-
inary observations which can be made about the nature of its communication. 
The first refers to the relatively restricted nature of its codes. 
No communication is without restriction; the freedom that we have to 
23 
construct always new sentences in speech is largely illusory; even 
in the most open of social contexts there are required forms of speech, 
just as there are different conventions and limitations of expression 
whether one chooses to write or to talk. L.S. Vygotsky for example 
notes some of these differences: "Communication in writing relies on 
the formal meanings of words and requires a much greater number of words 
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than oral speech to convey the same Idea. It is addressed to an absent 
person who rarely has in mind the same subject as the writer. Therefore 
it must be fully deployed; syntactic differentiation is at a maximum; 
24 
and expressions are used that would seem unnatural in conversation." 
In writing there are manifest differences between poetry and prose and 
as Roman Jakobson points out language itself is multifaceted and multi-
functional; different emphases as between the emotive, the referential, 
the poetic, the phatic, the metalingual, and the conative dimensions of 
language generate different types of text, and conversely different 
25 
types of text demand different forms of stress. In oral speech there 
seem to be differences between what Basil Bernstein calls restricted and 
elaborated c o d e s . ^ 
Television will be host to all or any of these many varieties of expression, 
but television Itself is a specific form of communication and imposes 
its own structure, rhetorically, on that which it transmits. We are 
familiar with what are popularly known as its formats; we recognise 
beginnings and endings and patterns of presentation. Television speaks, 
but it speaks anonymously and indiscriminately. Its messages are well 
defined and abbreviated but ephemeral. Programmes begin and end but 
27 
broadcasting itself is endless. Communication is relatively compact 
and condensed. It is repetitive. Television indeed shares with film 
a metalinguistic situation somewhere between the oral and the written, but 
compared to film television is much closer to the oral form. It is 
28 
nearer the everyday world, and its anonymity is ameliorated by the 
relative directness of its communication and by the familiarity which 
that engenders, a familiarity which video seems itself to engender. 
The video image seems closer, more real, than the equivalent on film. 
Television is, I suggest, a mode of communication with particular 
characteristics. To be Involved with it, as audience or as producer, 
is to be involved more or less passively in a communicative context 
which in its structuring alone limits what can be said and how. It 
has in this sense much in common with other forms of ritual communication 
which in their denial or restriction of the right of free response, and 
by their distance from the context of normal face-to-face communication, 
exercise a subtle but nevertheless real form of cultural control. I 
wish to suggest that the primary mechanism for this restriction in 
television's communication is narrative, and that it is through a study 
of this code, the rules according to which stories are told, both 
fictional and non-fictional, that much will be learnt about the nature 
of television as a whole. 
W.B. Gallie in his discussion of narration in history writes of stories 
in this way: "We follow a story across contingencies or accidents, 
coincidences, unpredictable events of all kinds, yet the story's general 
direction and continuous advance towards its final conclusion somehow 
29 
succeed in rendering these contingencies acceptable." It is in 
making the unacceptable acceptable, in clarifying ambiguity and 
strengthening resistance to uncertainty that the television narrative 
gains its significance. Generally the stories, from drama to news and 
to documentary are told according to consistent not to say traditional 30 
rules. Rarely for television the bold experiments and advances of 
modernism which were in part a precise and self-conscious challenge to 
just those structures of story-telling which seemed so restrictive of 
true creativity. Television story-telling is a craft. The texts 
themselves, the programmes, are the result of collective and often 
anonymous activity: producers, directors, cameramen, props, make-up 
artists, soenery designers and builders, technicians of all kinds, 
actors and writers, all together generate a coherent message. Within 
such an organisation pressures to conform, often interpreted in terms 
of giving the public what it wants, are rarely denied. 
The telling of a story is a deceptively complex act. On the one hand 
it depends on the culture which provides it with its specific meaning 
31 
through both content and context of performance. On the other it 
depends on • specific set of rules, the formal structure of narrative 
32 
itself. This itself can be meaningful, not only because the abstract 
narrative qode generates a statement of the kind "This is a story: 
understand it as such", but because the telling of a story - in a sense 
always once upon a time - is a social occasion of a particular sort. 
But having said this we need to make a further distinction still, and 
that between the temporal and the non-temporal aspects of narrative 
33 
structure, what I choose to call the chronologic and the logic. 
Opinion is divided as to the relative significance of each of these; 
Claude Bremond for example is quite adamant as to the primacy of the 
chronologic: "L'object du recit est le temps et non l'eternit^; l*enonce 
du devenlr du choses epuise leur sens proprement narratif. Qu' apres 
cela le recit puisse Stre asservi, par certains genres litteraires et 
par certaines ideologies, & exprimer un sense second, est que ce se 
sens second puisse a 1'occasion se redulre a un jeu d
1
antinomies 34 
conceptuelles, ce n'est pas douteux, mais c'est un autre problfeme." 
This is a position with both Claude Levi-Strauss and A.J. Greimas 
substantially, if not entirely, refuse. For them narrative consists 
in the systemic logic independent of the particular chronology of a 
35 
given text. I shall have occasion to turn to this distinction many 
times. " 
In its temporality narrative rewrites, as it were, the world. The way 
of its expression is not dependent on conventional experience or 
perception; narrative does not reflect or imitate. Its relationship 
to that world is, though in a very narrow sense, contingent, or unmotiv-
36 
ated. In the everyday world we may, Indeed we do, account for 
37 
ourselves and our own histories in narrative terms and in so doing 
we are creating a text which has meaning, a coherence, a significance 
in the same way as in a text which is publically communicated. The 
simple copula '... and then ...' is (like television) both of the every-
day world and not of it, and in the telling of a story the ambiguity and 
uncertainty of the world which surrounds it is progressively reduced. 
A story begins with a more or less arbitrary delimitation of what will 
be of potential significance both in events and context. As it unfolds 39 
the narrative reduces, to borrow an expression from elsewhere, the 
level of 'potential surprise'. So when we are surprised or shocked by 
an event in, for example, a Hitchcock story, that surprise is in a sense 
expected. 
But narrative is more than just a chronologic, its meanings are not 
just dependent on its formal temporal structuring. A significant part 
of the narrative, which I have already called the logic, consists in the 
patterned interrelationships according to which content is ordered, its 
synchronic arrangement. 
Central to an understanding of this way of perceiving narrative is the 
work on myth of Claude Levi-Strauss. He opens the first volume of 
his immense analysis of myth with the following often quoted words; 
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"The aim of this book is to show how empirical 
categories - such as the categories of the raw 
and the cooked, the fresh and the decayed, the 
moistened and the burned etc., which can only be 
accurately defined by ethnographic observation 
and, in each instance, by adopting the stand~ 
point of a particular culture - can nonetheless 
be used as conceptual tools with which to 
elaborate abstract ideas and combine them in the 
form of propositions..'I expect it to prove that 
there is a kind of logic in tangible qualities, 
and to demonstrate the operation of that logic 
and reveal its laws'.'
39 
For Levi-Strauss primitive culture is the product of the work of a 
mythical figure, a brlcole^p. who,faced with nature that is apparently 
systematic (the diversity of species) and also a previous set of equally 
concrete concepts, constructs a new building with the bricks of the old. 
Connections and more connections are made between the elements that 
make up the world of the'primitive's sensory experience and these 
connections are ordered within and by a logic which is in part dependent 
on their natural ordering and in part on the natural classifying 
capacity of the human mind. The result is culture. More particularly 
there results Levi-Strauss's own analysis of myths which seeks to 
identify the structures according to which they are organised; this 
analysis, in all its multi-faceted complexity is of an intrinsic logic 
of frog and Jaguar, of girls mad about honey and tapirs, and it depends 
for its understanding on an a priori (but at the same time concrete) pre-
logic of simple oppositions, the raw and the cooked, inside and outside 
40 
and so on. As the analysis proceeds the chronology of the narrative 
tends to disappear. Indeed there Is very little respect given to the 
integrity of the myths which he analyses and for this he has been such 
41 
criticised. But this lack, if such it be, can be mitigated If one 
recognises that different cultures will have different styles of story-
telling (of coutseeach culture will have many). While one style may 
stress the logic, the descriptive, another may well stress the 
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chronologic, it will be dense in the juxtaposition of events. Secondly 
Levi-Strauss's own concern is with his myths as carriers of information 
and as attempted solutions to the perennial dilemmas of man's existence; 
as such while this concern would lead him to recognise the chronology 
of the texts it does much more positively encourage him to seek their 
connections in the mythic system as a whole. 
The model of the narrative text has therefore three basic levels, 
distinct but obviously interrelated: the chronolglc, the logic and the 
content; the chronologic, which provides the narrative with its form, 
though as such it is not without semantic significance; the logic, the 
logic of sensible qualities, the logic of equivalence and transformation 
within whose mesh a specific set of cultural messages is' generated and 
regurgitated, and finally the content itself dependent on a categor-
isation of and in the lived in world, a categorisation which may be 
similar to or different from that generated in the narrated text. For 
example, a journey from home to work in a particular story can act as 
illustration. It will advance the action, bringing perhaps the hero 
nearer to his ultimate test; it will, in its opposition present a 
category which in conjunction with others,such as country and city, 
life and death, generates a particular foundation of meaning which it 
will share with other stories of the culture (and indeed other cultures) 
and finally it betrays in this opposition the lived relation in the 
culture and society as a whole. Home and work, city and country, will 
be meaningful only if they have meaning outside the text, and indeed 
they come to the text redolent of meaning. Investigation of narrated 
texts, myths or television programmes, demands in the final analysis 




The juxtaposition once again of myth and television as examples of 
narrated texts is deliberate. I have already suggested that they 
are, in a certain sense, formally equivalent, both at work in culture 
* 
in a similar way. The problem now is to determine in what ways the 
formal skeleton can be given flesh - in what ways the similarity of 
myth in primitive society and television in our own can be given 
substance. 
The mythical in contemporary culture has often been, and is increasingly 
becoming, remarked upon and d i s c u s s e d . T h e disenchantment of the 
world, the arrival of new technologies, continuing manifestations of 
what for a better phrase might be called 'secular ecstasy'
4 4
 have 
alerted students of the social and the cultural to the way the gaps in 
our over-rational universe are being filled. Attitudes to the connections 
that have been drawn are varied; the following from Donald MacRae is 
both prescient and among the more enlightened; it deserves to be well 
quoted: 
"Today the mass media of communication - press, film and 
television in ascending order of Importance from this 
standpoint - are all introducing new ways of seeing the 
world and human relations. They play tricks with time 
and space; they bring the far near, and make the 
familiar mysterious; they make the famous and the 
great accessible, and at the same time make all 
personality equal and grey and evanescent; they 
make all causal relations simple and yet, because 
nothing can be fully explained and everything must 
be clear, they bring causality back to magic; above 
all, they make chance and fortune in affairs as vast, 
mysterious and important as ever the case was when 
Fortune was a goddess inhabiting her own shrine. 
We may deplore it, but we live in a world where myth 
and magic, aided by the off-beat poetry of advertising, 
resume some portion of their ancient state in the human 
heart." ^ 
Perhaps what unites myth and the mythical as it is presented in 
primitive society and television as it is transmitted in our own, is 
the prestige accorded to the communication by those receiving it. 
While the nature of the legitimation in one society compared to the 
other has manifestly changed, still the weight of tradition, the 
embodiment of received wisdom, the oracular explanations of past, 
present and future and the assumed potency - the assumed capacity to 
effect changes - all conspire to identify structural and functional 
similarities if not identities. Secularization reduces the sacred 
to the prestigious - but the difference may only be in the word. 
Above all both television and myth act as mediators and although not 
just between the real and the cosmic, significantly so. Television 
technology extends our sensory perceptions in a way manifestly injurious 
to the linearity of the printed page; it introduces synesthesia, it 
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creates the global village; we are, literally, in touch. But the 
technology itself is also part of the taken-for-granted world; at the 
touch of a switch and in ways mysterious and hence both distanced from 
our everyday experience but yet part of it, we can turn on to that other 
world which is at the same time our own. These two worlds juxtapose 
at the screen, both a domestic nodal point and a frame for the display 
of the limited, vicarious and often crucial experiences that television 
makes constantly available. The frame is significant; it both focuses 
on and defines a different reality; it is the locus of a continually 47 
practiced ritual. Mary Douglas writes: 
"... ritual focuses attention by framing; it enlivens the 
memory and links the present with the relevant past. 
In all this it aids perception. Or rather, it changes 
perception because it changes the selective principles. 
So it is not enough to say that ritual helps us to 
experience more vividly what we would have experienced 
anyway. It is not merely like the visual aid which 
illustrates the verbal instructions for opening cans 
and cases.... It can come first in formulating 
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experience. It can permit knowledge of what would 
otherwise not be known at all. It does not merely 
externalise experience, bringing it out into the 
light of day, but it modifies experience in so 
expressing it."48 
i 
In a different but parallel context Siegfried Kracauer illustrates how 
in the framing of the original script of The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari by 
setting it within a narrative told by a madman, the original revolutionary 
intentions of the authors were entirely transformed. The frame, then, 
has physical, social, political and aesthetic dimensions and to be involved 
with experiences that are framed, above all visually, is to be involved 
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in both the limited and the transcendent. 
This framing is of course doubly confounded; narration acts also as a 
frame and as such translates the world that is lived via its contingent 
rules of transformation into a world that is told. And it is in the 
telling, even in the essential anonymity of the telling, disguised by 
those who speak it, that television and myth are close. The stories 
in television are told, as from a distance, and that distance which may 
be historical, geographical, social or cosmic, or all four, generates 
the magic and the mystery which in primitive societies are associated 
with myth. 
Above all what myth does is to obliterate, only to redefine the conventional 
notions of time and space; in defining its own reality the linearity of 
time and the contiguity of space which are, at least in our own culture 
and linguistic tradition,taken for granted, are replaced by a time that 
is both reversible and ever present and a spatial ordering which has been 
called elsewhere, in the context of film, surrogate. Compare for 
example a discussion of film (in this case the arguments are equally 
applicable to television) and Mircea Eliade on myth: 
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"Far from being 'realistic' film suppresses ordinary 
reality as much as possible and replaces it with an 
artifact of space and time. The space and time of 
the viewer is all but erased and replaced by the film... 
But while one Is viewing the film all places and moments 
are present when they are shown. Film has no past 
tense, no was.'®® 
"... by'living'the myths one emerges from profane 
chronological time and enters a time that is of a 
different quality, a'sacred'Time at once primordial 
and infinitely recoverable."-'' 
This juxtaposition is meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive; 
indeed there are as many disputes about the nature of film and television 
as there are about myth, but the comparison is an important one neverthe-
less, and I shall return to it. 
However one or two problems have appeared. The first concerns the 
apparent contradiction between an analysis which stresses on the one 
hand the significance of the narrative, which is supremely a linear 
chronological form and on the other the destruction of that chronology 
in televisual and filmic texts. But this is more apparent than real. 
The televisual text consists both in immediacy on the one hand and in 
recollection and anticipation on the other; the immediacy is preemin-
ently visual, the diachrony of recollection and anticipation is 
preeminently verbal. In addition any one narrated text loses its 
specificity as a narrative when it is placed alongside others. Once 
this is done the linear narrative chronologies with beginnings, middles 
and ends, which define the integrity of a particular story, become 
serialised; the ends herald a new beginning and ends and beginnings 
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as such lose some of their significance. Indeed as both Mircea Eliade 
and Claude Levi-Strauss
5 3
 in their different ways recognise, mythic 
narratives are carriers of basically other more symbolic messages, 
which for Eliade relate specifically to the transcendence of time and 
the identification of origins, and for Levi-Strauss centre on the 
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solutions which a particular culture offers to the universal dilemmas 
of human existence. There are, of course, elements of both in 
television. 
The second problem follows from this but is less easily faced. It 
revolves around the question of what we are to make of a series of texts 
whose main effect, if not purpose, seemfi to be the obliteration of 
history; and correlatively, of what we are to make of texts which have 
as part of their functioning an ability to incorporate, bricoleur fashion, 
any and every item which may be of interest: "Myth", Ernst Cassirer 
writes, "seems to roll up everything it touches into unity without 
distinction....Things which come into contact with one another in a 
mythical sense - whether this contact is taken as a spatial or temporal 
contiguity or as a similarity, however remote, or as membership in the 
same class or species - have fundamentally ceased to be a multiplicity: 
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they have acquired a substantial unity." 
Cassirer Is dismayed by the intrusion of such forms into historical and 
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therefore rational societies. Roland Barthes, from a different 
perspective, is equally dismayed. It is the naturalisation in myth, 
the mystification that such lnsensitivity to history generates which is 
at the centre of the polemics against the mythic in contemporary culture. 
For him also myth is a way of speaking, but it is parasitic, parasitic on 56 
and destructive of,the possibility of speaking the truth. The openness 
of myth is a false openness and we are blind to its ideological activity. 
His analysis is dependent on a theory which guides him to the specificity 
of capitalist-bourgeois society and therefore of its culture. It is 
much quoted: 
"Reluctance to display Its codes is a mark of bourgeois 
' " and the mass culture which has developed from 
-25-
ICs relevance and usefulness depends on whether the theory of culture, 
predominantly reflective, which it embodies is an adequate one and 
equally on whether, in culture, there is something as unique and 
\ 
specific as its bourgeois form. It also depends on whether we like 
that culture or not. 
Much of the argument must centre on an ability to demonstrate theor-
etically and empirically that the narrative structures which we have 
been discussing, the chronologic and the logic of culturd. communication, 
are universal in the sense that they persist across cultures and through 
time, and also on the ability to demonstrate in what ways these structures 
Integrate with the content of the specific cultures in which they are 
made manifest. The task is an enormous one and easily outruns the 
entirely modest attempt in this thesis. Indeed even the distinction 
between structure and content is an artificial one, though it does hel£ 
to distinguish the permanent from the impermanent, the fixed from the 
ephemeral in culture, and at the very least it should allow us to decide 
whether these distinctions are in any way meaningful. 
A recent study of advertising makes a similar point. Varda Langholr 
Leymore suggests that the structure of advertisements is similar to 
that of the myths studied by Claude Levi-Strauss, albeit for her in a 
degenerate way. Both myth and advertising she argues "strive to provide 
answers to the eternal polarities of the human condition. While the 
dichotomies, or the dilemmas, are universal, the specific answers are not.... 
The classlficatory activity of the mind alone is both predetermined 
and universal. But the specific configurations of relationships between 
variables are culturally bound. The essential point is that the human 
mind is sensitive to certain problems which emanate from the human 
condition and are specific to the human species. These problems are 
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universally apprehended and as such constitute universal themes. 
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The specific solutions offered to them are, nevertheless, varied." 
We can take the reference to the human mind in whatever way we t 
choose; the recognition that different cultures, 
or aspects of them, are organised according to the same rules is not by 
itself an invitation to search for and speculate about their origin, 
but an invitation merely to return to the cultural texts for further 
analysis. These texts are as real and as concrete as anything that 
human beings have created through their action, and should be investigated 
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systematically, accordingly. 
The universality of culture lies in its logic and in the demands for the 
generation and exchange of meanings without which we are not human. To 
talk of system, structure, logic, order, patterns, is not however to impose 
a static view or to reify what is forever changing, but it is to recognise 
that there is, simply, a consistency in the activity of man and that that 
consistency manifests itself in social and cultural relations. In this 
sense the cultural texts which are analysed, from myth to television, 
are of their very essence conservative; they speak coherence and generate 
security - and as Marshal Sahlins argues: "... the isomorphism between 
diverse codes - social, geographical, mythical, and economic - is neither 







 discussion, which involves an overturning of the classical 
Marxian argument of the dependence of culture oh material and practical 
interest, is Itself of particular interest for in many ways it runs 
parallel to much that has been said here. Sahlins is concerned to 
develop a theory and a methodology adequate to identify both similarity 
and difference in culture and to argue that culture, the generation of 
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meanings, treated as a coherent and self-sufficient set of complex 
Interrelationships, must precede the organisation of work and its 
attendant social relations. Culture cannot simply be derived from 
• 
material relations, and cultural logic is not simply a practical 
utilitarian logic transformed into ideas. On the contrary, the very 
possibility of material existence is grounded in the coherence of the 
system of culture.
6 1 
There are two aspects to his argument. Firstly that culture, both that 
of the primitive and of the m o d e m , is concrete, the result of the 
confrontation in the symbolic of mind and matter. 
"It is not merely species which are 'good to think?. 
Levi-Strauss's famous dictum is applicable to all 
kinds of naturally occurring things and relations. 
The whole of nature is the potential object of the 
symbolic praxis, whose cunning, rather like Hegel's 
Reason, consists in this: that it puts to the 
service of its own intentions those relations among 
things existing by their own properties. 
We would expect to find, and we do, contemporary culture generating forever 
new sets of relations with what is to hand, but generating them according 
to a logic which transcends their particular ephemerality. 
The second aspect of his argument is that these relations are lived; 
they comprise the warp and the weft of social activity; that whereas 
the primitive lived his life according to the categories defined by 
the totemic structure of his culture, we, perhaps more dominated by 
appearance, live our life according to the logics of fashion in clothing, 
6 3 
food and other consumables - a language preeminently of consumption. 
The fact that these relations are lived guarantees, for Sahlins, their 
materiality; the fact that our daily, social, productive lives are 
organised according to the structures and codes of culture transports 
these structures from a world of subjective perceptions, in a way perhaps 
more Durkheimian than Marxian, to objective facticlty. 
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The analysis of television programmes follows' from arguments like 
these and from those advanced elsewhere in this introductory chapter. 
With the tools provided by and developed from Vladimir Propp, Claude 
Levi-Strauss, A.J. Greimas, Christian M e t z ^ and others, all of whom 
have been concerned with the intrinsic analysis of culture, and its 
codes, the social and cultural object, television, can be approached 
and its significance more firmly understood. A full consideration of 
their work in theory and in practice takes up the major part of this 
thesis. But to do it in this manner, in other words working from the 
text outwards, inevitably creates its own problems, and if pursued 
fully, as is my intention, has a number of far reaching implications. 
Central amongst these are the way in which we need to understand ideology 
in contemporary culture and the contribution to it which television makes. 
Central too, is the way in which television's culture (such a phrase 
itself is entirely question begging) is articulated into the everyday 
world and to the continuity and changes within our everyday experience. 
I will return to these considerations again, but most substantially in 
the final chapter. 
Suffice it to say now that I see television as being part ideology, part 
culture; both inside history and outside it, manifestly open to and 
contributing to change, latently preserving forms of experience that 
are resistant to change. The analysis of the structure of the message 
immediately identifies a set of coherences beneath and within the 
manifestly diverse; the relation of these coherences to others in 
similar forms of communication within the same culture and within other 
cultures opens the way to the identification of what might be called a 
cultural rather than an ideological ground-base, upon which historical 
manifestations of culture are constructed, and whose operation makes 
these manifestations acceptable. The new and the unfamiliar are made 
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old and familiar while still maintaining their novelty, by their 
incorporation into pre-existing patterns of experience; the trans-
formation is cultural, the motor is structural, and at the level of 
the everyday where these processes are most visible and most significant, 
change is, at root, very slow indeed. 
The hypothesis with which I begin is therefore this: that our involvement 
with television, an involvement which affects almost every member of our 
society from infancy onwards, is an involvement with a type of commun-
ication which in its compression and redefinition of historical, 
geographic^, social and cosmic experience identifies a coherence, a 
continuity and a commonness in culture, but to which, blinded by the 
glare of manifest historical and other changes, of conflict and of 
difference, we are unaware. Television, like myth is both structuring 
and structured; the former referring to its process the latter to Its 
effect. When we watch television we are watching a series of messages 
that both order our experience and define its categories, but which do 
so in ways that transcend the historical conditions of that experience. 
We need to understand through the analysis of the texts themselves how 
this is achieved, but that, as they say, is another story. 
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Television and Language 
i 
If television conmunicates, it does so both through language and as a 
language itself. The distinction is an important one. Most obviously 
much of what is heard and seen on television is in language. The news 
is read; documentary films have commentaries; the characters in a 
drama speak. The language that they use, except perhaps in circum-
stances where a particular effect is desired, is that of a form of 
standard English which, rightly or wrongly, is assumed to be widely 
understood. The problems raised by its analysis are the problems at 
the heart of linguistics, the study of natural language. 
But television, quite obviously, is more than just words. It contains 
images, music and natural sound, and for the purposes of this thesis, 
most importantly stories. As a form of communication it is both 
complex and direct. Its complexity lies in the density of its communi-
cation and its directness in the channelling of that density in patterns 
which are both expected and remarkably simple. 
In the totality of its communication we can certainly ask whether tele-
vision is like language and we can use - with care - the models and 
theories developed for the study of natural language to illuminate that 
totality. Such models and theories may only take us a short way, for 
as Edward Sapir remarks, "all grammars leak"' and indeed when the 
"grammar" is no longer that of a natural language but that of an 
assumed semiotic system, then there may be more holes than wholes. 
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The movement £rom the study of language to the study of something that 
might be (or should be) like language is a movement speculated on by 
2 
Ferdinand de Saussure and indeed by Emile Durkheim. It brings with 
it a concern with the full range of human communication and with that ' 
3 
concern an assumption of its systematic nature. Within the system 
everything signifies and that signification consists in the play of 
difference. The sign gains its uniqueness and its value in its contrast 
with all other signs. Within this premise and within the premise also 
4 
of the essential arbitrariness at the heart of signification the basic 
thrust of semiotics and structuralism gains its momentum. If culture 
is like language then it is so in its structuring. It is in the patterning 
of its constraints that the connection will be found. Hence the search 
is for a grammar, for the identification of codes, for the determination 
of levels within the act and the system of communication which contains 
the act. The question here is net so much how communication actually is 
effected, a question that would demand consideration of language in use, 
but a question of how it is possibly and as such it is a question which 
leads to a search for an answer beneath the manifestations of speech and 
to an abstraction away from the speech act itself. The distinction 
between langue and parole in Saussurian terminology is a basic one 
therefore, however inadequate or incomplete its formulation, for within 
it we can begin to understand both the constraint and freedom of 
language. 
Similarly for television; an understanding of its communication also 
demands a consideration of what it is that constrains it, and correlatively 
on what the creative freedom and ability to generate endlessly unique 
texts rests. One of these constraints, perhaps the most obvious, perhaps 
only the most accessible to analysis, is that of narrative, by which is 
meant the set of rules necessary and sufficient to the definition and the 
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telling of a story. Other constraints, for example, which have their 
source in the image or in music are also of great importance, though they 
will be very little considered here,"* 
In this chapter I shall consider the relevance of the linguistic » 
6 
metaphor for the study of television and I shall do so in four 
different but, I hope, compatible ways; firstly by a brief consideration 
of the contrasting assumptions underlying any study of language; 
secondly by considering the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and 
its influence; thirdly by a more detailed analysis of the semiotic 
work of Christian Metz; and finally by a consideration of the 
relationship between language and aspects of culture. 
II 
"For man was not created twice, once without language and once with 
language. The emergence of Homo in the animal series may have been 
helped by his bodily structure or his nervous organisation, but it is 
due above all to his faculty of symbolic representation, the common 




8 uniqueness in the world is the consequence of his capacity to 
produce symbols, and language, the preeminent symbolic form, is the 
symbol of that capacity. This much said and not seriously disputable, 
it is nevertheless the case that the study of language is by no means 
unproblematic. 
We can accept, for example, language's universality without necessarily 
8 
accepting any value in the search for linguistic universals. We can 
accept that language depends on a community of speakers and also sustains 
that community without necessarily accepting the validity of that community 9 
in any given situation. And we can accept that language constructs and 
creates the world for man without necessarily accepting that in so doing 
its capacity to do so is not otherwise determined by more "material" 
factors and circumstances.^ These are abiding problems in the study of 
language and they spill over as we shall see into the study of language 
systems,'^ semiotics and narrative. 
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And indeed there are further distinctions to be made. Much of 
contemporary linguistics is synchronic; It consists in the study 
of language's systemic nature, in its characteristics at any one time. 
12 i 
But it was not always so. Changes in language are, seemingly, no 
longer of great concern. More vital, perhaps, is the dispute between 
thoae who see language in terms of a relationship between langue and 
parole,In terms of a set of permanently relevant codes and rules 
appropriate to the various levels of linguistic experience, phonetics, 
! 3 
semantics, syntactics, and to the transformations between them; 
and those who see language as speech, indexical, personal, above all 
active..' On the one hand the study of language lays claims to 
objectivity and to science, on the other to subjectivity and to philosophy. 
The source of this schism, of course, lies deep in the disciplines that 
study man. 
And finally there is in the study of language the distinction to be made 
between its different modes, both in terns of the medium of its expression, 
whether written or oral and also in terms of the different forma within 
which a different language might appear. 
These distinctions which otherwise bear so centrally on any consideration 
of natural language must also be relevant to any discussion of other forms 
of communication supposedly like language. Of course, not only is the 
language of television one of eight and sound, but it is also, and as a 
consequence, one which is hardly amenable to the sort of reduction to the 
minimal units that, for example, in phonetics, grounds the study of natural 
language. 
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Nor is it possible, nor reasonable, to consider televisual language as a 
context independent communication. If one is to look for rules within 
it then these rules, however abstractly represented, need much that is ' 
beyond them and beyond the specific communication to be fully comprehended. 
Many would say the same, of course, of the study of natural language and 
in particular of the attempt to reduce semantics to a play of abstract 
logic.
1 5 
If one is to argue therefore that television is like language, and if such 
an argument is to allow one to approach more closely to what television is, 
then these questions are central. 
But if television's communication can, reasonably, be considered like a 
natural language it is both more and less than such a language. It is 
less because we cannot identify two distinct levels 
of articulation,'^ nor can we unambiguously define the minimal unit of 
its communication (what is the equivalent to the word or lexeme in a 
television programme?). But it is more, not only because of its visual 
component but because by virtue of this inability to identify such units, 
we are forced to consider television as a discourse; the analysis of 
television and film in terms of language involves a profound change of 
scale. The study of natural language, with one or two rare and hesitant 
exceptions, stops with the sentence.'^ Problems of syntax, semantics 
and phonology never outreach this basic unit of expression; they never 
need to. So questions of language beyond the sentence involve a trans-
formation in the nature of these questions. As Emile Benveniste points 
out: "The sentence, an undefined creation of limitless variety, is the 
very life of human speech in action. We conclude from this that with the 
sentence we leave the domain of language as a system of signs and enter 
into another universe, that of language as an instrument of communication, 
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18 
whose expression is discourse." 
An examination of what, if Benveniste is to be followed, must now be 
television's communication rather than its language involves, ipso facto 
a concern with constraints operative beyond the sentence. Such a 
movement into the study of narrative undertaken in this thesis is justified 
simply by such considerations. It is supported,though not unproblematically, 
by those who have made in poetics and in the study of folklore a similar 
19 
movement. The model of the sentence, and in particular its simple 
structure of subject, verb, predicate becomes a model of action which 
finds its representation in narration: the hero, his action, the object 20 
of his action. Beyond the sentence, narrative exists as an essential 
constraint . And indeed language, story and as Ernst Cassirer suggests, 
play,are essentially interrelated: 
"L'activite verbale n'est pas seulement une circonstance 
concomitante de toute activite de jeu: elle en est le 
stimulant contlnuel. Le gout du jeu est lie dans une 
large mesure un gout de la fabulation et ne peut en $tre 
separe." 21, 
Narration, the act of constructing or speaking a narrative, is part of 
the communication process grounded in language. Narrative both depends 
on andextends language. Its forms, albeit of their very nature less 
tangible, seem to work in the same way as the forms of natural language 
and the distinction between langue and parole can and is made by those 
22 
who study narrative and poetics. 
Narrative constrains. To recognise this is to recognise a further dimension 
of the way in which language both limits what can be said and also through 
those limits both constructs and destroys the world; 
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"Un eternale anathema semble jete sur le langage; tout 
ce qu'll nous montre: 11 nous le cache aussl, et fatalement; 
dans son effort pas rendre consclente et manifesto la nature 
des choses, pour la saisir dans sot} essence, 11 la defoxme 
et la defigure necessairement," 23 
i 
\ 
It Is in the nature of language to misrepresent, although to suggest 
that this misrepresentation is revocable is of course, by definition, 
absurd. What falsehood we may detect in the language of others is 
only detected through the falsehood of our own language. The creation 
of the world in language is a creation of the world which is both 
independent because in language we create it and dependent because the 
world precedes that act of creation. The disentangling of this lies 
at the heart of any consideration of language's truthfulness and by 
extension,to its contribution to ideological manifestations. 
However these issues are resolved two things are clear; one is that 
language is not neutral in its reflection of a given reality and 
secondly that that lack of neutrality is the product of an activity 
in which, through language, and only through it, we come to know and to 
control the world. I will of course return to these considerations 
in the final section of this chapter. 
Ill 
To begin at the beginning - or at least with Ferdinand de Saussure. 
His Course in Qeneral Lingulstics has been recently much discussed 
and much studied. His arguments are, therefore, well known. They 
take as their point of departure the attempt to establish the science 
24 
of linguistics sui generis, and to do so therefore in a way which 
makes language autonomous and irreducible. Language is neither mind 
25 
nor society, though it is of course both psychological and social. 
In practice, and guided by this recognition, the study of language becomes 
26 
the study of a system and of that system's structure. Language is seen 
in terms of an interrelation of diverse units through whose articulation 
27 
in word and sentence, meaning is created. In order to make this approach 
viable three things are minimally required and much of Saussure's central 
effort is directed towards establishing them. The first is the nature 
of the system, the second is its basic unit, and the third is the inter-
relationship of these basic units. 
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 both essential and social, they create in 
language the possibility of what is in speech both accidental and individual. 
It is language (langue) which is the object of study and language is for 29 
Saussure, "a well defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts"; 
it is something that can be studied independently of its manifestation in 
speech; it is homogeneous in that it consists only in the union of meaning 
and sound images*, and finally it is concrete; "linguistic signs, though 
basically psychological, are not abstractions; associations which bear the 
stamp of collective approval - and which added together constitute language -
30 . 
are realities that have their seat in the brain". 
Speech on the other hand, the specific complexity of the actual act of 
31 
communication, becomes peripheral. Saussure is not concerned with the 
construction of meaning in a sentence or of the grammar of a sentence, but 
with the potential of meaning prior to the sentence, and to a grammar 
reduced to basic essentials prior to the specific grammar of the spoken 
or the written sentence. Thus he defines a different object for 
32 
linguistics than that subsequently defined for it by Noam Chomsky. 
The system Is langue, therefore, end Its basic units are signs. 
"The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept 
33 
And a sound image.
1
' Sounds relate to, but are independent of, 
the world of material objects, a point made more clear by Louis Hjelmslev * 
to 
who sees beyond the sign an undifferentiated purport or matter/which the 
*X I 
sign in its totality gives expression. The sign is constituted therefore 
from within, and that doubly so. On the one hand what is important is 
its intrinsic structure, the concept end the sound image, the signified 
and the signifier respectively, and on the other its inter-relationship 






In the sign, the unity of signifier and signified, sound image and 
35 
concept, is arbitrary. Nothing naturally or necessarily connects the 
sound cat with the concept of cat; it is only hy convention, a convention 
which differs from one language to another, that the two are, albeit 
rigidly,linked together. Arbitrariness is not synonymous therefore with 
a fluid randomness but on the contrary with a socially defined and accepted 36 
immutability. The relationship of signifier and signified in this 
sign Is not natural, in the sense that it is given in the nature of things, 
but it is historical (in the Marxian sense) in that it is a social production. 37 It is nevertheless fixed. 
A second dimension of the sign, stressed but not given as much consideration 
as the first by Saussure, is its linearity. Signs unfold in time and while 
this may be obvious it is however also ambiguous, for as we shall see what 
constitutes the system of signs in langue is, for Saussure, both time and 
space (syntagmatic and associational), and it is therefore only In speech 
that the exclusive linearity of the sign relation is made manifest. 
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If the essential bond within the sign is not fixed naturally its 
permanence can only be guaranteed in its relationship with the other 
signs of the system - by its difference. Its value consists in its 
unique place in a system of other unique signs. Such a value is * 
functional; it is constituted in the play of the interdependence of 
39 
distinct units. "In language there are only differences"; • consequently 
the analysis of language is principally the constituting system of these 
differences, it is principally synchronic. "In language, as in any 
semlological system, whatever distinguishes one sign from the others 40 
constitutes it." 
In general, therefore, within the system of langue signs are to be 
distinguished from each other in two ways. Of these two ways the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic (associational) identify that system as dia-
critical; each sign is defined by a grid, one dimension of which, the 
syntagmatic, relates to the place of a sign in a consecutive series. 
Its value is the product of its opposition to all the signs that precede 
or follow It, a temporal relation based on the linear nature of language. 
In a discourse words are, in Saussure's metaphor, "chained" together. 
Outside discourse, and in a sense preceding it, signs are related in their 
difference in another way. In this, the paradigmatic (associational)^ 
signs are both linked together and distinguished from each other simply 
in the recognition that they are mutually replaceable. To replace something 
by another that works equally well but differently implies the mutual 
identity of the terms,btit this identity is formal. The paradigmatic dimension of 
langue defines the potentially infinite range of alternative terms. The 
selection of one is by definition significant. "We see that the coordinations 
formed outside discourse differ strikingly from those formed inside discourse. 
Those formed outside discourse are not supported by linearity. Their seat 
is in the brain; they are a part of the inner storehouse that makes up the 
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language of each speaker. They are associative relations. 
The syntagmatic relation is in paesentia. It is based on two or more 
terms that occur in an effective series. Against this, the associative 
41 ' 
relation unites terms in absentia in a potentialmnemonic series." ' 
Saussufe's contribution to the study of language and,as he anticipated, 
to the study of signs in whatever form, for semiotics, is of course seminal. 
But like so many seminal statements it is incomplete. It is by virtue of 
his work that European structural linguistics, via Prague and in Paris and 
42 
Denmark is as it is, particularly in the study of phonology. But it 
would not be too far fetched to suggest that it is by virtue of his work 
that the linguistics of Noam Chomsky is as it is - radically different in 4: 
all but the distinction between competence and performance (langue and parole). 
Chomsky seeks in opposition to Saussure to produce a grammar of language, 
centrally concerned with syntax which, as it were, provides the operational 
bridge between an abstract capacity for language and its implementation in 
practice. The rules are grammatical, if one excuses the tautology, because 
they relate to the underlying complexity of speech. And the rules are 
syntactic because they are presumed to be independent of meaning though 
this independence is not a real one. Chomsky's rules are entirely 
dependent on his judgement about the tfteaning of the terms and their 
grammaticality. Similarly the attempts to generate the intrinsic semantics 
within the Chomskian mould fail precisely because knowledge of the meaning 
of the terms and often arbitrary decisions about those meanings are a necessary 
point of departure.^ 
Saussure however is centrally concerned with meaning though he never quite 
says so. The value of a sign is its meaning. But there is more to 
meaning than system specific value, and the meanings which language creates 
quickly outrun that language. The problem has generated in general two 
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responses, the first principally offered by Louis Hjelmslev has involved 
digging deeper into the core of language and into the structure of the sign 
and in its constraining system. The object of Hjelmslev's linguistics 
is pure abstraction, neither semantics nor even phonetics "but an algebra * 
of language, operating with unnamed entities, i.e. arbitrarily named 





designation only on being confronted with the substance." 
At the same time, however, Hjelmslev makes an important distinction, that 
between denotation and connotation, which actually opens out the study of 
meaning in a way that seems inclined to leave the study of languages 
46 
intrinsic form far behind. Denotation is that aspect of meaning in 
which the relationship between signifier and signified is both direct and 
closed. I utter the word 'fiat' and it is to gat that I refer. However 
the reference to cat may in turn suggest all manner of other references 
depending on the way that I say it, the context of the utterance, the values 
of the encompassing culture. Connotation takes meaning beyond one system 
and into another. Its study both defines the central task of semiotics 
and also defines that task's impossibility. 
Formally connotation or connotative semiotics refers to "a semiotics 
.47 
whose expression plane is another semiotics",' or "a system whose 
48 
plane of expression is itself constituted by a signifying system". 
Whether connotation is just another and subsidiary coding as it is for 
49. Umberto Eco , or whether it opens up "the general, the global and the 
50 
diffuse" , it is this, its extensiveness, which is the point at issue. 
The identification of such a dimension of meaning demands a consideration 
of language's full range of references; both of its context and of its 51 . 
use. For Roland Barthes , it leads to the constitution of ideology 
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and .metalanguage and for Louis Hjelmslev also, despite his intention 
to found an algebraic linguistics, the study of language persistently 
and essentially outruns itself: "Linguistic theory is lead by an inner 
necessity to recognise not merely the linguistic system, in its scheme 
and its usage, in its totality and its individuality, but also man and 
human society behind language, and all man's sphere of knowledge through 
language." 
Connotation therefore provides a link between language and other semiotlc 
or signifying systems and of course also a link between signifying systems 
seemingly far removed from language, but it also specifies in its very 
existence the reason why the pursuit of meaning must be endless. 
This perception of the connotatlve dimension of language exceeds what 
Saussure has given us, but at the same time provides the basic means 
whereby semiotics, as a discipline can be undertaken. It provides ,as it 
were,the bridge from the specificity of natural language on the one hand, 
the system par excellence, to the further specificities of other forms of 
language and other ways of communication. Some of these depend on 
natural language, others do 
not, but all of them it is presumed,can be 
understood in their capacity to generate meaning through the principles of 
analysis generated from the study of natural language and undertaken 
initially by Saussure. 
IV 
Television is one such signifying system and as such it is both complex 
53 
and so far little studied. Its complexity lies both in its specific 
nature, that it is a unique medium, but also in its use of other signifying 
systems, say for example narrative, which are themselves complex. In this 
it is like cinema, and of course the comparison goes a long way. Both 
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media are similarly constituted in their use of image, sound, dialogue, 
music, noise and titles. So close indeed are they that one student of 
the cinema and film, Christian Metz, finds it hard to make a clear cut 
distinction at the level of signification between them.
5
^ 
It is therefore worth turning to the work of Christian Metz and this for 
a number of reasons. Firstly he does in the full range of his work 
provide a very precise methodological account of how a film can be 
understood semlotlcally. This involves most centrally consideration of 
the cinema as a language or more precisely as a language system.
5 5 
He illustrates, in this, the nature of the move from the study of natural 
language to that of other forms of communication. Secondly his attempt 
is oriented towards establishing the specific nature of the cinema and 
the cinematic, and here the concern is to establish what it is that marks 
the uniqueness of the cinema, and what correlatively the cinema actually 
uses which might be considered as more general. Thirdly, and paradoxically, 
such a search raises questions as to the non-specificity of cinema, in 
other words questions about what it has in common with other forms of 
communication. And this leads me,at least,to a consideration of narrative 
as such. 
As a preface let me refer in a little more detail to Christian Metz's 
comments on the relationship between cinema and television without which 
any argument purporting to be about television but cast exclusively in 
terms of cinema might seem like a sleight of hand. 
In his discussion in Cinema and language, Metz acknowledges the technological, 
the socio-political and the socio-psychological and effective differences 
between the two media. The first are obvious , the second involve the 
different relationship with the state and the different processes of 
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decision making involved in administration and production, and the third 
pre-eminently involve differences in the conditions of reception. However, 
intrinsically U n e m a and television are nothing more than two neighbouring 
language systems, but ones which push this relationship much further than 
57 
is ordinarily done". Cinema and television are two technologically 
and socially distinct versions of a single language sytem. This is 
defined in terms of its five dimensions, the auditory of which appear in 
their full phenomenal and perceptual richness, and the visual (iconic) 
manifesting "a partial and incomplete perceptual analogy in relation to 58 
the reproduced object." 
What distinguishes television and cinema, for Metz, paradoxically from 
the point of view of this analysis, is their use of narrative - narrative 
being considered more important to the cinema than to television.^ 
This may well be true, though it depends on assumptions about the nature 
of narrative which may not be correct, and in particular on the assumption 
that narrative forms are only manifest in the dramatic, as opposed to the 
documentary. This remains to be established. 
Christian Metz however does recognize what it is importarit for my argument 
(inter *Ue) to establish and that is that the proper codes of narration 
(and the very fact of narrativity) are neither cinematic nor televisual 
but much more broadly anthropological and cultural. * 
His work grows out of a tradition which begins with the work of Sergei 
Eisensteln, whose attempts in theory and in practice to generate a 
proletarian art of the cinema lead him to examine the visual structure 
of the film. Eisenstein was concerned with its particular nature, and 
with the means whereby, in the juxtaposition of image, meaning would be 
61 
created in it. Metz is similarly concerned. Both he and Eisenstein 
seek the language of cinema. 
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Following Metz, then, In an analysis of this relationship, we can begin 
by making a series of distinctions whose origin is in the work of Louis 
62 
Hjelmslev's cBssection of the nature of the sign.- Saussure's primary 
distinction within the unit of signification, the sign, was between, as 
we have seen, the signifier (signifiant) and the signified (signifie), the 
latter referring to the conceptual image, the former to its material-63 
isation in word or morpheme. Hjelmslev argued that in fact each of 
the two dimensions of the sign, he called them expression and content 
respectively, can be further analyzed. To do this involves making a 
threefold distinction applied identically to each of the terms. Both 
expression and content consist in a relation of form, substance and 
purport (or matter). The substance is what results from the imposition 
of form, the product of a particular language, on purport, the unformed 
material outside language. Purport in a sense both precedes language 64 
but at the same time has no existence outside language. A particular 
language, with its particular construction generates substance, which 
can be conceived of as purport formalized. As Hjelmslev writes: 
"Just as the same sound can be put into different moulds, and the same 
cloud takes on every new shapes, so also the same purport is formed or 
structured differently in different languages. What determines its 
form is solely the functions of the language, the sign function and the 
functions deducible therefrom. Purport remains, each time substance 
for a new form, and has no possible existence except through being 65 
substance for one form or another." 
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bstance of the content ~V 
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In Metz's analysis of the cinematic this classification reappears, 
though not unproblematically. Purport seems to refer to the pre-
semiotic, to matter. We might wish to ask, for example, whether recorded 
music, recorded noise or recorded phonetic sound are the same when they 
appear on a film as opposed to on a record. The notion of purport 
allows us to formulate the existence of that which is common to, but 
perhaps differently given substance by, these two media of expression. 
This is a refinement which finds little place in Metz's own considerations, 
for his principal concern is with the relationship between expression 
and content, and it is to this that I will now turn. 
With regard to the content the substance refers to the data or information 
66 
derived from the world at large, and the form to its moulding.' For 
example, I might tell a story (form) about Red Riding Hood (substance) 
and my telling will draw on all manner of information from the world at 
large (purport). This will be incorporated into the tale and thereby 
given substance. The story in its content is complete. 
The same stories (contents) however can be presented in different media; 
they can be told in different modes of expression. At this level of 
expression the distinction between form and substance holds. In the 
cinema the substance refers to the five dimensions which together give 
it its specificity; as I have already mentioned, they are moving 
photographic images, recorded noise, phonetic sound, recorded musical 
sound, and written titles. The form of the expression then refers to 






sub8tances; for example the regular recurrence of a syntagmatlc 
association between a particular phase of dialogue and some visual 
motif etc".*'
7
 Montage, in Eisenstein's theory, exists at this level -
that of the form of the expression or signifier. 
Metz, principally concerned with the specificity of cinema, is in turn 
almost entirely involved with the analysis of its expression and with 
its form. He is concerned to identify what constitutes the cinema as 
such, with questions of how it is constructed and above all-with its 
capacity to generate meaning. His analysis of narrative, of the 
syntagmatics of cinematic language, is thus an analysis in terms of its 
technical specificity. Narrative for Metz is the narrative of expression 
and its significance lies in the particular way cinema in its films 
constructs its texts. But, as I have already remarked, narrative exists 
also at the level of content, and here the problems transcend the partic-
ularity of the cinema, and are located in the realm of narrative as such. 
s 6 
Metz acknowledges the difference of course.° "The narrated event, which 
is a significate in the semiotics of narrative vehicles (and notably of 
the cinema), becomes a signifier in the semiotics of narrativity." 
Metz is concerned principally, then, with the form of the expression, 
with that part of the filmic experience which is particular to that medium, 
and with the possible exception of television, to no other. He is 
concerned, therefore, with the definition of the cinematic, with an 
understanding of the cinema. The distinction, that between film and 
cinema, occupies a great part of his terminological and methodological 
treatise, Cinema and Language, and it represents the key to Metz's own 
exploration of the nature of the language of the medium. 
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I shall In this discussion attempt to be brief. The basic distinction 
is that between cinema and film. The film is what we see and hear. It 
has a materiality. It has a beginning and an end. It is produced. 
It conveys meaning and we can analyse it. We can consider it as a text, • 
self-contained, coherent, articulate, multi-faceted and multi-levelled. 
When we watch a film we receive messages or even a dominant message. 
We identify themes. We follow a plot. We are moved or informed, or 
both; our experience is aesthetic and cognitive. But our understanding 
of a film is not based just on what we see and hear, but also on what we 
bring to it from our non-filmic cultural experience, an experience which 
the film itself embodies and perhaps transforms.
6 9 
The content of the film is therefore not exclusively the property of film. 
It is however presented systematically and if we are to understand it, or 
theorize about it, we have to deconstruct what is given - the text of the 
film in all its many dimensions. That deconstruction involves a 
reconstruction too, and it involves simultaneously the distinction between 
film and cinema,
7 0
 Hetz writes: 
"The goal toward which all descriptive work strives is not the 
film as a real discourse.... for the latter is already an 
achieved object before the analysis even begins. What a 
description hopes to establish is, rather, the system which 
organizes this realization; the structure of this text, and not 
the text itself. The system is no where clearly visible 
in the actual unwinding of the film: a system, as such, 
is never directly attested."
 71
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Cinema, in Metz's terminology, is both what is specific to film and to 
filmic discourse and Is, at the same time, a construction of analysis. 
The cinema is defined by what is present in films. "The sum of traits 
which in the films themselves are taken to be chaacteristic of what is 
72 
sensed to be a certain 'language system'." The analogy of the 
difference between film and cinema is to be found in the difference between 
a book and literature. 
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The phrase 'language system' is an important one, and it marks a point 
at which the model of natural language reaches its limits when faced with 
a signifying system of another order. Metz is increasingly concerned 
to define the linguistic nature of the cinema not in terms of the tight 
i 
coherence of the langue-parole model of natural language, but in terms of 
a relationship of parole, the speech/texts of film, and a language 
system. The difference is clear. The notion of langue suggests a 
singularity of structure, of one code, from which the events of speech 
are constructed. Cinema, unlike natural language, has not one code, 
but many, and a film, unlike an act of natural speech is constructed 
according to many codes, some of which are exclusively cinematic, others 
of which are not and will appear, like narrative, in other media of 
communication. "Thus just as a single code may be manifested in several 
language systems, a single language system may manifest several codes, 
73 
some of which may not be specific to it." 
Codes, then, are specific levels of structuring; we can identify camera 
movements, juxtapositions of image and sound, size and scale of shot as 
specifically cinematic codes; narrative, music, images offashion in 
clothes or other consumables as filmic but not exclusively cinematic 
codes. The language system of cinema then comprises all the codes 
which can be theoretically and practically interwoven in the construction 
of a particular filmic or televisual text. Metz again; "... to speak 
of language systems as specific combinations of codes is to say that each 
language system is the site of a work of structuration, of a specific 
dynamic which ends up by conferring on the diverse 'regrouped' codes 
positions which they did not have anywhere except in this system, which 
74 
thus characterizes the language system and not its codes." 
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Metz is then able to make distinctions as between general and particular 
codes, between the cteaatfc and the non-dnanatic, between code and sub-code, 
between codes of expression and codes of substance.^ The multiplicity 
t 
of codes present in the cinema destroys the coherence and homogeneity 
of langue. The cinema is multiform, and as a result there are no easily 
identified or dominant basic units; one can break up the text in many 
ways according to the different levels of structuring which can be 
identified as at work within it. The notion of the cinematic sign is 
76 
therefore of little worth; 
The formulation of the language of cinema as a language system is a 
product of Hetz's more mature thinking. In his earlier work, and in 
particular in his Essais77 the existence of a system as such is not clearly 
articulated. 
Nevertheless that early work is worthy of consideration, not only because 
in it he attempts to make a number of clear distinctions between cinema 
and natural language, but also and as a result of these attempts, he 
undertakes an explanation of what he calls "la grande syntagmatique", 
the formalization of the basic chronological (syntagmatic) structuring 
of the cinema. Such a formulation, which essentially consists in an 
attempt to establish the basic units of filmic expression, grows out 
of his exploration of the difference between natural language and 
cinematic communication. I have already mentioned some of them. 
The cinema has no langue. It is also, for Metz, a one way communication. 
The image (le plan filmique) does not manifest much that makes it 
equivalent to the sign in natural language. In Metz's mercurial style 
"Le signification cinematographique est toujours motive*^ jamais 
78 
arbitraire." The key to the relationship of signifier and signified 
in cinema is not arbitrariness but motivation, and that motivation is 




Questionshowever remain. There are considerable problems,for example, in defin-
ing the basic unit of the cinema. Is it comparable to the word of 
natural language, or to the sentence? Can the basic unit be broken down 
» 
like the word into its own constituent units; does it in other words 
as I have already remarked, 
manifest two levels of articulation? Mets's conclusion' is that the 
cinema' does not manifest a first level of- articulation parallel to the 
phonemic in natural language, and that the basic units must indeed be 
80 
considered more like sentences than words. But even here there is 
a qualification. "Since the shot . is not made of words, it can 
"correspond" only externally to the sentence, i.e. in relation to discourse. 
As long as one seeks internal equivalence, one will be lead into an 
81 
impasse." 
This limited equivalence is justified in his jpaper Denotation dans le film 
82 
de fiction by five considerations. Firstly there are an infinite 
number of images, while the number of words in a natural language is 
limited. Secondly these images are the creation of the film maker , 
again as such more like sentences than words. Thirdly the information 
they provide the viewer of the film is indefinite. No amount of verbal 
description could exhaust what an image contains. Fourthly the image 
is an assertion. It speaks about something. "L'image d'une maison ne 
signifie pas 'maison',mais V o i d une maison', l'image intfegre en elle-
a 83 
meme ses embrayeurs verbaux, de seul fait qu'elle figure dans un film". 
And finally, and perhaps most importantly, signification in the cinema 
depends very little on paradigmatic opposition or comparison. Because 
each image is virtually unique, its meaning is not derived from its 
juxtaposition with other potential images, whose number is infinite, 
but with its juxtaposition with other Images previously or about to be 
present in the film. "Le grand phenomene Unguistique de 1'Sclairement 
des unites presentes par lesunites absented ne joue pas au cinema. 
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The cinema is an art of presence. "Everything is present in film; 
hence the obviousness of film, and hence also its opacity. The 
clarification of present by absent units occurs much less than in verbal 
language. The relationships in praesentla are so rich that they render 
the strict organisation of in absentia relationships superfluous and
 1 
difficult. A film is difficult to explain because it is easy to understand. 
O r 
The image impresses itself on us, blocking everything that is not itself." 
The significance of this paradigmatic poverty is clear. It leads Metz 
at once to a recognition of the syntagmatic as the heart of cinematic 
signification, and to narrative as its manifestation; "... it was precisely 
to the extent that the cinema confronted the problem of narration that, 
in the course of successive gropings, it came to produce a body of 
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specific signifying procedures." It is the ways in which cinema 
constructs Itself in the film, and to the questions of "successivity, 
procession, temporal breaks, causality, adversative relationships, 
consequence, spatial proximity, and distance," which define what is 
essential... "Cinematographic language" is first of all the literalness 87 
of a plot".* 
Before considering in more detail Metz's analysis of cinematic narrativity, 
a summary of what has been said so far is in order. The starting point 
is the distinction between film and cinema, between the text and its codes 
and between the activity of communication and the analytically determined 
conditions for the possibility of that communication. The language of 
cinema is not governed by a unitary langue, but by a language system, 
multiply coded, and these codes are of two kinds; those that are 
restricted to the cinema, and those that are not. Each will be 
presented in any given film, and because each film is a unique text, 
the films themselves are included among the codes of the language 
system as a whole. Furthermore each film is an act of creation, 
not just using or being constrained by, the various codes available, 
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but actually extending and modifying them. The relationship, then, 
between the parole and the langue of the cinema is more open and more 
fluid than that In natural language. 
Significance in the cinema is predominantly dependent on units, difficult * 
to define or to isolate, which are both larger than the equivalent 
basic-units of natural language (words, morphemes,phonemes), less 
precise and are motivated. Both in terms of denotation, the specific 
anologlcal reference of image to object,and connotation, the essentially 
symbolic reference of image and its range of potential meanings, the 
relations of signifier and signified are not arbitrary. In addition 
these two dimensions of signification relate to the two contexts in which 
meaning is generated In a film: within it, denotative, and beyond it, 
connotative. The former is essentially the domain of the cinematic, the 
latter that of the culture as a whole. A film obviously is involved 
with both. However Metz is principally concerned with what is specif-
ically cinematic and this concern leads, precisely because it recognizes 
the poverty of the paradigmatic dimension in film language, to a discussion 
of narrative. 
Narrative, for Metz, is the pivotal structure in the generation of 
cinematic signification - in syntagmatics, in presence and in the 
juxtaposition of the images throughout the length of the film. It is 
to the study of narrative that Metz, initially, at least, brings his 
attention. He recognizes that while the images of cinema differ from 
each other enormously, the structures of films resemble each other quite 
closely. "While no image ever entirely resembles enother image, the 
great majority of narrative films resemble each other in their principal 
8yntagmatic figures. Filmic narratlvlty by becoming stable through 
convention and repetition over innumerable films, has gradually shaped 
88 
itself into forms that are more or less fixed, but certainly not immutable." 
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The 'grande syntagmatlque', Metz's formalisation of the basic modes 
of cinematic denotation, is essentially a schema for the analysis of 
narrative. In this analysis Metz is concerned to isolate the units 
through which the stories, themes and actions in films can be and are 
89 
told. He is concerned, for example, with the way that juxtaposition 
of images chronologically can in a certain formation generate the image 
of simultaneity. He is concerned, then, with the specific way in whlfch '90 
the cinema constructs its tales. 
The emphasis is on construction. It is in narration as opposed to 
91 
description that the discourse of film is generated. Every narrative 
is a closed sequence, a temporal sequence in which the time of the telling 
is different from the time of what is told (diegesis). In Film Language 
Metz defines narrative as "A closed sequence that proceeds by unrealizlng 92 
a temporal sequence of events", and as one of the great anthropological 
forms of perception. The analysis of narrative in specifically cinematic 
terms is at once the analysis of the primary processes and units of 93 
denotation available to the film-maker and to the film audience. 
It is, always, an analysis of the form of the expression, of the way in 
which cinema tells its tales, and not the form of the content, of the 
way in which tales are told in any, or perhaps every medium. 
The final, though still provisional, formulation of the 'la grande 
94 
syntagmatique' has eight basic categories. It is a classification 
which has occasioned much comment, not least by Metz himself. Both 
the clarity and the relevance of the analysis remains open to question. 
The categories seem more applicable to film of 'classic' narrative 
structure, for example the films of Holywood or Ealing, than to those 
like Tout va Bien, which have sought to revolutionize traditional forms 95 
of film making. They are also not always easy to apply, even to 
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those filmic or televisual texts which fit the classic model. Metz's 
analysis of Adieu Phllipine suggests that much interpretive work is 
96 
necessary before attaching the correct label to the sequence. 
i 
Nevertheless as I have found in my own analysis of the television play, 
the categories and the form of the analysis offered by Metz both fit 
well and allow me,as7preliminary to the work I subsequently undertake, 
to break up the continuity of the text into manageable, classifiable 
97" 
units of expression. 
The eight units of Metz's 'grande syntagmatique
1
 in increasing order of 
temporal and spatial complexity are as follows: 
The simplest unit is that of the shot. It is an autonomous segment 
defined by a unity of space, of an image unbroken by a cut in the film 
or in video, by a change of camera. One can distinguish the shot-sequence 
in which within this basic unity a continuing or developing descriptive 
or narrative action can be seen, and the Insert, of various forms, which 
act as visual interjections in a sequence of greater complexity. 
Beyond the simplicity of the shot we are faced with a distinction between 
those syntagmatic units which have a temporal function, and those which 
do not, between the chronological and the a-chronological. There are 
two kinds of a-chronological syntagma; the parallel or alternating 
syntagm in which alternate images are presented which indicate without 
reference to time or to action, a symbolic coherence. The other, the 
bracketing or embracing syntagm, brings together a succession of images, 
again without any temporal reference, and again the purpose is to indicate 
a symbolic coherence. 
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In practice this version/a-chronological syntagm is often difficult to 
distinguish from the most primitive of the chronological syntagms, 
Metz calls it descriptive, which while manifesting a temporal dimension, 
refers to simultaneity rather than to sequentially. Successive images are 
linked together spatially but at the same time there is a suggestion of a tempoi 
connection between them, for example in a description of the countryside 
one might see first a tree, then a branch of a tree, then perhaps a 
8tream, and then a hillside. 
Narrative syntagms proper, those presenting sequential time, can also have 
two forms: those that refer to more than one piece of time, as it were, 
within the unit as a whole and those that refer to a single linear time. 
The former is the alternating syntagm, for example in a chase, where two 
separate events, separate in space, time and action, are juxtaposed in an 
alternation which signifies simultaneity. They are happening at the same 
time. 
The simplest of the linear syntagms, and one much used in the television plays 
98 
used to illustrate the arguments of this thesis, is the scene. The 
scene manifests a temporal and spatial unity and also a unit of action. 
The image and the diegesis are one. The scene, like the scene in the 
theatre, is played in real time; the action is limited to one piece of 
continuous space. 
Contrasting with this simple unity of space and time, Metz places two 
types of sequence, strictly speaking. The first, the ordinary sequence, 
presents an image of continuous space and action but one in which temporal 
continuity is broken. A scene is broken, reduced or pointed by the 
elimination of items which are of no interest. The second, the episodic 
sequence, brings together interdependent acts different in time and 
place, whose juxtaposition generates a symbolic message. The breaks in 
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tlme are often of importance and signify, in their absence, development. 
A number of brief comments are in order at this stage. Mets is aware, 
as we have seen, of the limitations of this formulation. Re points 
out the range of:its application, to its deductive status and to the 
possibility and the necessity of refining it inductively. He also 
draws attention to its mutability, the result of the continuous activity 
of film constantly affecting the code, constantly creating new nodes of 
Above all in his comments on the nature of the Grandesyntagmatique Mett 
raises the question of the nature of the narrative, and in doing so 
bring! !ace to face its two dimensions. On the one hand, we have seen, 
there Is the narrativity of cinema, on the other narratlvlty as such, 
the generalised, perhaps universal capacity to tell stories', the 
cultural rather than the cinematic fact of narration. Within this 
juxtaposition lies a recognition of the dependence of film on its host 
culture and a recognition too that within these relatively large minimal 
units there can be Identified countless smaller entities whose source and 
justification lie beyond the film, beyond the cinematic. Mets writes: 
"Thus when it reaches the level of the Ismail' elements, the 
semiotics of the cinema encounters its limits, and its 
competence is no longer certain. Whether one has desired 
it or not, one suddenly finds oneself refexred to the myriad 
winds of culture, the confused murmurings of a thousand other 
utterances: the symbolism of the human body, the language of 
objects, the system of colours In each of these cases 
the study (lndispensible by the way) of the properly filmic 
creations of the appropriate significations will provide us 
with no essential paradigmt for those great creative 
tropes of meaning and of humanity will remain embedded in 
culture where only a very general semantics can illuminate 
them - even if their deep scattered appearance in films 




Paramount among theae diverse semiotics is the code of narration, le 
reclt, and my task is the disentangling of it from that which is 
specifically cinematic or specifically televisual. Their inter-
dependence is clear, but so is their independence. Mats in recognising 
the distinction takes one path, that towards the cinema, and he makes the 
point In this way; "II exists done deux enterprises distinctes et 
qui ne sauraient se remplacer l'une 1'autre: d'une part la simlologle 
du film narratif (comma celle que nous teutons); d'autre part l'analyse 
structural* de la narrativit^' elle-tneme (Vladimir Propp, Claude Breaond 
etc.), c'eat-V-dire du r^cit consider*" independaamett dasyehlcules 
informatifs qui le prennent en charge (film, livre etc.). 
L'^vennement narre, qui est un signifie' par la semiologie des vehicwlea, 
devient un signifiant pour la slmlologle de la narrativitf.
M 1 0 1 
V 
I,in this thesis, will now take the other path; In other words.towards the 
discussion of narrative in Its non-specificity, Its cultural generality. 
However, discussion of his work has been well worthwhile. Firstly because 
In It the relation between language and another semiotic system is made 
clear. Cinema is both more and less than natural language; in its 
multiplicity, Its motivation, in the pre-eminance of the syntagmatic. 
Secondly the analysis of the way in which film, as a medium, structures 
its expression, and particularly Its syntagmatic forms of expression, 
establishes the context for a similar analysis of television. Television 
as a medium may therefore also be more or less than cinema in this 
respect; though in what precise ways remains to be established. 
Finally Met* defines the centrallty of narrative for an analysis of 
cinema and also by implication, of television. 
Jf 
From the point of view of its expression, television is like film; as 
the film or video unwinds we art presented tilth a succession of sounds 
and Images, a succession governed by rules we know and which make the 
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text readable. But clearly television is not expression alone. 
I would like in this final section to turn to its content, though still 
in terms of its form in order both to draw out some of the wider 
Implications of the discussion so far and to act as a prolegomenon 
to the considerations of myth and narrative which follow.
 ( 
Substantively what will be asserted is this: that television is a public 
form of communication whose language is restricted in the sense of the term 
used by Basil Bernstein
10
^, it is moreover by virtue of its form - in 
expression the result of its particular technology, in content the result 
of its narrative structures - an oral rather than a literate medium. 
And it is by virtue of both, the restriction of its language and its 
orality, generative of a folk culture, ritually preserved and to a degree 
ritually controlled. Inevitably the issues raised will outrun what it 
possible to discuss here, but I will return to them in subsequent 
chapters. Equally the essentially central role of narrative to the 
language of television's content will be presumed. The demonstration of 
that centrality will be the substance of Chapters 5 and 6, though even 
then much further work will need to be done. 
The work of Basil Bernstein on the nature of language and in particular 
on its distinctive manifestations providesan excellent starting point. 
It is however important to realise that this work itself has its heritage 
in previous study of language although it differs from it in significant 
degrees. In particular,from the point of view of the arguments here, it 
differs from the theories of language suggested by Benjamin Lee Whorf 
What unites both Whorf and Bernstein is a recognition of language's 
central importance in defining perceptual limits and thereby creating dis-
tinct thought worlds particular to each language community. What dis-
tinguishes them, of course, is the part ascribed in this linguistic 
103 




both between language and thought on the one hand,and language 
and society on the other,, is a fundamentally unsolved problem for sociology. 
For Benjamin Whcfrf language Is a law unto ltselft its rules covert and 
overt, define both what it is possible to say and what it is possible 
to perceive. At the heart of a distinct culture, lies a distinct language 
and each language and each culture is unable to express, to understand or 
to know what may be perfectly accessible to its neighbour. For Basil 
the 
Bexatein on the other hand language is crucially related to/social 
structure and in particular, though to a degree contentlousljt to class 
J Q4 
relations. Language for Bernstein, is more of a mediator than a 
creator, though a particular social group speaks distinctly and that 
distinction of speech limits as for Wharf what can be said and under-
stood within it. 
The arguments for and against both the linguistic relativity thesis, as 
Whorf's case is labelled and Bernstein's correlation of class code and 
educability are well-known and they need not be of central concern now'°^. 
Suffice it to say that there is no need to insist on the impossibility of 
mutual translation for some important aspects of either thesis to be 
maintained. While it may be empirically impossible to demonstrate in what 
precise way language limits and controls cognition it is perfectly demon-
strable that different cultures express themselves differently and that in 
so doing many other significant differences including their particular 
view of the world will be affected. Individuals or groups may become bi-
lingual or be able, at the drop of an experimental hat, to discard that 
with which they are most familiar and most comfortable. It is however just 
this effortless familiarity with one's own natural language which is the 
/ 
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source of the plausibility of the relativity thesis. It is indeed 
precisely as to the weight given to the language as an autonomously 
determinant facet of human experience or alternatively to its dependence 
on other determinants, to the structured interests expressed in social t 
relations, that the arguments continue'^*. 
We can therefore and following Wharf and Bernstein enquire into the 
nature of television's language and do so now in terms of its content rather 
than its expression. The concern is still with its form however; to what 
is common and underlays the many diverse ways of .presenting material in 
this particular medium. 
Television's communication is both indiscriminate and precise. It is in-
discriminate because there is no choice, no control over who is to receive 
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it, no direct communication between speaker and listener. It is continuous 
and total: it can be turned on or off at will. It can be watched or 
listened to (or both) by those who agree or disagree or may not even 
understand with what it is they are faced. But it is precise, in the sense 
that it is a singular communication, inflexible to the normal demands of 
social interaction and oriented therefore to a unitary receiver; the 108 
audience, who have perhaps nothing more in common than their television set. 
Whatever the interpretation offered as to the social, economic or political 
structure where this is the case, the presumed unity of the television 
audience is a central phenomenon and must be the starting point for any 
analysis of the nature of television's communication. The massness of 
television has been the subject of much discussion and the concept of mass It is 
society much decried, /however in the sense just Implied an inevitable 




Much then is assumed in the communication, and for this reason if for 
no other it is p u b l i c '
1 0
i n the sense of the term suggested by Basil 
Bernstein. It is public.in the enforced denial of individuality and 
the correlative assertion of the generality of the context in which the 
communication is undertaken. The communication is public therefore 
of 
in terms of what is assumed and what the effects/that assumption.have 
on its form. Public language in . the context of mother-child interaction, 
for example, has for Bernstein the following characteristics. It "contains 
few personal qualifications, for it is essentially a language where the 
stress is on emotive terms employing concrete, descriptive, tangible and 
visual symbolism. The nature of the language tends to limit the verbal 
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expression of feeling. The stress is on expressive symbolism and on 
the present. No elaborate logic or ability to qualify allows for the 
deferral of gratification or indeed for much more than a simple description 
of a sequence of events. The world of public language is a world of the 
here and now. 
From the point of view of television's language and its public character 
it is important to stress the significance of the non-verbal; for what 
might be in face-to-face interaction the glance, the movement of the hand, 
becomes in television the whole central panoply of the image. Important 
too is the stress on the immediate, and many writers have noted the demand 
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in television and filmic communication of the here and of the present. 
There is no past in television/neither that of the societynor of the 
Individual. The image like the glance exists only once. R.P.Kolker and 
J. Douglas Ousley write of film in this way: "Far from being 'realistic* 
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film suppresses ordinary reality as much as possible and replaces it with 
an artefact of space and time. The space and time of the viewer is all 
but erased and replacedby the film... But while one is viewing the film all 
places and movements are present when they are shown. Film has no past i 
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tense, no was." This JLs how it was; this is how it will be. Television 
In this regard is identical to film. 
The immediate, the visual, the expressive symbolism - ail lead 
to a view of public language as essentially social: dependent on and 
defining a common set of experiences which make communication relatively 
simple and uncluttered. It is, as Bernstein suggests, a language of implicit 
meaning. 
Once Bernstein's analysis Is pushed further, it is the restricted nature of 
public language on which he settles; the restricted and elaborated code 
is the very familiar dichotomy which results. The distinction rests at the 
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level of lexicon and syntax on difference of predictability and choice. 
What changes in any move from the restricted to the elaborated code is the 
amount that is taken for granted in and around a particular act of 
communication; a language of restricted code will be deeply embedded in 
the common familiarity of context shared by the interlocuters; that of the 
elaborated code will be relatively free of this indexicality, little can be 
assumed and much needs to be spelled out precisely and made verbal. Much of 
the language on television is of this latter type; much of it is personal, 
individual and able to express subtle differences. However it is the 
argument now that the language of television and in particular the language 
expressed in narrative and of narrative, is predominantly restricted. 
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Bernstein writes of the relationship between the restricted code and the 
social circumstances that both _ produce it and are created by it in the 
following way.• It is a rich passage and it deserves to be quoted in full; 
"A restricted code will arise where the form of the social relation 
is based upon closely shared identifications, upon an extensive range 
of shared expectations, upon a range of common assumptions. Thus a 
restricted code-emerges where the culture or sub-culture raises the 
"we" above "I". Such codes will emerge as both controls «nd trans-
mitters of the culture in such diverse groups as prisons, the age group 
of adolescents, army, friends of long standing, between husband and 
wife. The use of a restricted code creates social solidarity at the 
cost of the verbal elaboration of individual experience. The type of 
social solidarity realised through a restricted code points towards 
mechanical solidarity, whereas the type of solidarity realised through 
elaborated codes points towards organic solidarity. The form of 
communication reinforces the form of the social relation rather than 
creating a need to create speech which uniquely fits the intentions 
of the speakers".
1 1 5 
What then is the social basis for the restriction of television's language? 
In natural language, Bernstein argues,this is fundamentally parochial. The 
paradigm is the primary group: the interaction crucially face-to-face. 
Yet the social context of television as I have already suggested is potentially 
at least^the complete society. If this is so then it may be possible to 
suggest that the restriction of television's code could be based on and at 
the same time generate what we could call national parochial!ty - or 
indeed in many ways an international parochiality. The notion of the 
global village generated by the electronic media of communication as 
postulated by Marshall McLuhan is a similar one, though whereas he stresses 
the totally synaesthetic experience generated by television and its instantan-
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aeity , I am suggesting that it is on the nature of the language that the 
argument can be based. Bernstein too, though in a different context, 
speculates on the presence of *•• common culture shared by all members of 
a society and determined by the specific nature of the general codes or 
language at its syntactic or morphological levels. 
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Let me summarize. For Basil Bernstein the restricted code is generated 
in social circumstances in which interaction is dependent on familiarity 
and within which a great deal is shared. His example is the long-married 
husband and wife, where the intensity of communication is dependent as much 
upon gesture, facial expression, the unsaid,as upon the specifically verbal. 
The notion of the restricted code therefore Implies not just restriction 
at this level of syntax and lexical choice, but also in the nature of society, 
and to the fact that the society is restricted in its extent. It is the 
latter, in a consideration of television which needs qualification. For it 
is precisely in the generality of restriction that television operates. 
Its codes, restricted when compared with other forms of communication, 
assume and are assumed by members of the society who do in fact participate 
in a culture a significant part of which, if only by virtue of television,, 
is indeed common. 
Television cannot appeal to difference and to social and cultural 
specificity because it has no or very little control over who will be party 
to its communication. It must therefore appeal, in both senses, to what is 
shared albeit minimally by the widest possible group in society - in other 
words by and to everyone. 
What then is restricted about television's language? It is necessary to 
say first of all that it is the discourse of television that is the object 
of consideration. Television,as I have said
t
plays host to all manner of 
speech both restricted and elaborated in Bernstein's sense. To talk now 
of television^language - more precisely of its communication - is not to talk 
of the words and sentences that one hears but of the units of discourse, pre-
eminently of a narrative order, which are much larger than the sentence and 
more full in the sense of comprising and being dependent on the image as well 
as the spoken word. It is in the arrangement, the predictability of these 
discursive units, that the restricted nature of television is grounded. 
The purpose of subsequent chapters is to illustrate in what way this is so. 
It will be enough to say now that it is on what has been called the 
narrative structure of television and by that I mean not just the 
chronological but also the logical or non-linear structures of the texts, 
not 
that the argument rests. Television's programmes are predictable/in terms 
of the words or the events, details of content, but in the ways of their 
display or ordering. They share this of course with other forms of 
contemporary communication: some but not all films, comic-strips, popular 
iip; 
novels , novelettes, and so on . What makes television so particular 
in this regard is the intensity and consistency of this structuring, an 
intensity dependent on the presence of the image and a consistency dependent 
on the totality of its communication. Story telling is an archetypal form 
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of restricted communication and television/very little more than a 
medium for the telling of stories. Indeed it tells its stories in ways 
that are not new. The communication generated through the medium of 
television is fundamentally an oral one. Although borrowing from and to 
a degree still depending upon the tradition of literate conmunication,it 
nevertheless opposes them. In'television the individuality of the written 
word is transcended by the communality of the visual and/or oral image. 
This thesis is not a new one but it has I believe been insufficiently under-
stood and explored. M a r s h a l l McLuhan in the brilliant h u e of his writing 
makes the point often and forcefully. His work is studded with references 
to and significantly depeinds upon this transformation which is theproduct 
of the electronic as opposed to the mechanical. For example, in Under-
standing Media he writes this: 
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"Our old Industrialised areas, having eroded their oral 
traditions automatically are in a position of having to
 1 2
i 
rediscover them, in order to cope with the electronic age." 
Television is central to this process: 
"Television completes the cycle of the human sensorium. With 
the omni-pre8ent ear and the moving eye, we have abolished writing, 
the specialised acoustic and visual metaphor that established the 
dynamics of Western civilisation"
 I 2 2
, 
a quotation continued in Counterblast in the following grandiloquent way: 
"We begin again to structure the primordial feelings and emotions 
from which 3,000 years of literacy divorced us. We begin again 
to live a myth":
2 3 
McLuhan's thesis, derived from the works of Harold Innes, and developed 
variously in words and pictures, is that of a technological determinism in 
which the nature of communication changes fundamentally with changes in the 
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technology of the transmission; the message is dependent on the medium. 
Accordingly such fundamental aspects of our perception, our notions of time 
and space pre-eminently, are vulnerable to these changes. The languages ttu 
each medium constructs for itself creates, in its idiosyncrasy,a particular 
world. The written and then the printed word mark the first transformation, 
from an oral, communal, familiar and formulaic world into a literate, 
individual, particular and linear one. The electronic media, by virtue of 
their juxtaposition of sound and image, the speed and directness of their 
communication, and the range of their reference have recreated the oral 
world on a grand scale. We are in the midst, McLuhan would have us 
believe, of a new perceptual revolution. 
The argument distorted by fashion and blurred by excess is nevertheless 
a cogent one. It has its echoes in recent work and in particular in that 
of Jack Goody who refuses reasonably enough the monocausality of McLuhan's 
efforts, indeed stressing literacy rather than printing as the primum mobile. 
But nevertheless Goody remains quite firmly attached to the technological 
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and the technical. 
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The distinction between the oral and the written is therefore an important 
one and the role of different media in creating and sustaining one or the 
other of these dominant forms of communication is central. 
» 
Two preliminary points ought to be made. Firstly it is by no means the case 
that there is unanimity amongst students of language that there is any 
l Jf% 
difference between written and spoken language. Ferdinand de Saussure 
and Edward Sapir^^ for example both deny any significance to such differences; 
writing to them is no more than an extension of speech and does not alter it 
in any major way. Secondly there is no homology between the restricted and 
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the oral, as Bernstein in a footnote acknowledges . Yet clearly as will 
be seen, the characteristics which identify the distinctiveness of restricted 
communication are broadly those belonging to oral communication; it is 
unrecorded speech which depends most on context, the gesture and the glance. 
Television is not written. The script of a play, a documentary or a news-
en 
cast may be, but the performances is/audio-visual experience which is immediate, 
ephemeral and in a certain sense direct. Until very recently television was un-
recordable; it is still and will always be,impossible to fully transcribe. 
as 
What then are the formal characteristics which identify it/a predominantly 
oral medium and what are the implications of such identification? 
L. S. Vygotsky, in considering the development of language skills as 
children grow up,makes the following basic distinction; 
"Written speech is a separate linguistic function, differing from oral 
speech in both structure and mode of functioning. Even its minimal 
development requires a high level abstraction. It is speech in thought 
and image only, lacking the musical, expressive, intonational qualities 
of oral speech. In learning to write, the child must disengage himself 
from the sensory aspect of speech and replace words by images of words." 
He goes on to stress that written speech requires deliberate analytical action 
on the part of the child, that it is speech without an interlocutor addressed 
to an absent or imaginary person, and that it represents therefore the mono-
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logue;"oral speech, in most cases(represents), the dialogue." » 
Following Vygotsky we might wish to suggest that television in terms of the 
situation in which the communication is undertaken, is something of a hybrid. 
It consists in a dialogue with an absent friend; on the one hand oral and on the 
other written. Indeed there is no sense in which we need to insist on the 
exclusively oral nature of television, for it is quite clear that any text 
that television generates will borrow, at least for the time being)'from 
written texts and written culture. On the other hand even in terms of the 
relative absence of the addressee the point has already been made that though 
imaginary or unthinkable in his individuality the audience of television is 
very real collectively. Television even here is more oral than literate and 
significantly so. 
Perhaps more central to the argument is the acknowledged capacity of written 
speech and thought guided by writing to indulge in abstraction. Jack Goody, 
1 j 
both in his early paper with Ian Watt and later makes much of this distinction'. 
"The specific proposition is that writing, and more especially alphabetic 
literacy, made it possible to scrutinise discourse in a different kind of 
way by giving oral communication a semi-permanent form; this scrutiny 
favoured the increase in scope of critical activity,and hence rationality, 
scepticism and logic to resurrect memories of those questionable 
dichotomies".
1 3 2 
Writing is open to inspection, it can be analysed word for word, it can be 
reviewed, re-read, skipped, examined out of context or in it. 
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"Speech Is no longer tied to an 'occasion'; it becomestim&ess. Nor is 
is attached to a person; on paper it becomes more abstract, more de-
personalised. 
Writing makes speech 'objective' by turning it into an object of visual 
as wellvas oral inspection; it is the shift of the receptor from ear to 
eye, of the producer from voice to hand." ' » 
Writing brings with it, correctively with its encouragement to abstract and to 
analyse, a reduction of any dependence on memory. The permanent replaces 
the impermanent, the list replaces the formula and history and geography 
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become possible. The ability to write is an ability to place once and 
for all events in their time and place and to establish chronology and 
geography. Writing generates its own time, non-reversible and linear, both 
in the form of its text and in the expression of its message. In oral 
culture history is replaced by myth and linear temporality by mythic harmony. 
Context is everything, memory fundamental and time might becomes as Edmund 
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Leach suggests for the Greeks, more of a pendulum than either a line or a 
circle. Jack Goody and Ian Watt make the point, and it is echoed, though 
transposed to a more relevant dimension for television by Marshall McLuhan. 
They write this: 
"A8 long as the legendary and doctrinal aspects of the cultural tradition 
are mediated orally, they are kept in relative harmony with each other 
and with the present needs of society in two ways; through the un-
conscious operations of memory and through the adjustments of the j^g 
reciter's terms and attitudes to those in the audience before him". 
Marshall McLuhan on the other hand, or perhaps on the same hand, writes this: 
"Just as history begins with writing so it ends with TV. Just as there 
was no living history when there was no linear time sense, so there is 
post history now when everything that ever was in the world becomes 
simultaneously present in our consciousness."'
3 7 
What television denies therefore, ipso facto, is writing. If we are to accept 
something of these arguments, then we can also accept that television represents
; 
in that denial, the unselfconsclous orality of a preliterate age. It does so 
not of.course,in its content; the content is contemporaneous and is 
different from that of the primitive and the preliterate as chalk from cheese, 
but in its form; and here the key notion is the formula. 
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The notion of the formula both literally and metaphorically implies a number 
of things. It is, first of all, to be opposed to the list as a way of 
recording, classifyirfgand memorising. The transition from oral to written 
culture ii marked by the construction of lilts and tables; objects are 
recognised, recorded and arranged - hierarchy,difference, identitybecome > 
principles of classification. Writing brings with It In Michel Foucault's 
138 ' 
words a ""universal mathesis", though for Foucault the former's relation-
ship to*the latter goes unrecorded. But if the list brings with it 
abstraction and analysis then the formula brings with it immersion and 
synthesis. Above all the formula, in the context of the song, "a group 
of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to 139 
express a given essential idea", allows the prellterate to communicate 
extendedly, poetically, dramatically, without help or hindrance of a written 
text. The performer, be he the teacher or the rhetorician, cannot learn 
by rote all that he has to communicate, nor does he by virtue of the demands 140 
of the performance accept or need the constraint of the static and fixed. 
Its creativity and the novelty that emanates from that creativity is the 
product of his working through and with established units, metrical or 
narratively functional, which he can arrange or rearrange, to embroider or 
leave naked according to rules or even at will. The oral text is therefore 
fluid: it consists both of the familiar and the new: the familiar will in 
turn consist of motifs, formulae, accepted conventions, the new will be in 14 the occasional but legitimate twist of plot or metre and also in the content.
In order for an oral text to work it must do so within the constraints of 
memory and of concentration both of singer or' performer and his audience. 
Performances for all their immediacy depend on a priori acceptance by all 
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concerned of the rules of construction and context. These rules in the 
broadest sense are the rules of narrative, and of demonstration. As A.B.Lord 
points out for the Macedonian singer of tales: "Formulas and groups of 
formulas both large and small serve only one purpose. They provide a means 
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for telling a story in song and verse. The tale's the thing". > 
A. B. Lord'8 central concern is the demonstration of the role of the formulaic 
in the enormously extended songs of the folk tradition in Macedonia. The 
singers learn not whole songs, for some of them can be sung for an entire day 
or even longer, but units and rules for their construction. Singers, therefore, 
have the freedom to construct each time they are called upon to sing a new 
tale, but yet . that tale is sufficiently familiar for them to be able to V 
construct it satisfactorily and for the audience to follow it. "The (singer) 
builds his performance or song in our sense, on the stable skeleton/narrative, 
which is the song in his sense We must distinguish, then, two concepts 
of song in oral poetry. One is the general idea of the story, which we use 
when we speak in large terms, for example of the song of the wedding of the 
/ 
Smailagic Meho, which actually includes all singings of it . The other 
concept of song is that of a particular performance or text... " 
Narrative, therefore, the rules for the construction of tales, is central 
to the consideration of the oral tradition, and what it is for a text to be 
A8 
considered/an oral one. This is not to say that written texts are not 
rule governed. But the strength of the rules governing a literary text are 
those principally of natural grammar ,and in a different way,of genre 
and style. It is perfectly possible, and of course often the case, that a 
written text creates its own rules. But however "traditional", a written text 
is not dominated by the formula to the same degree or in the same way as 
an oral one. Those texts that do, a serial romance for example, preserve the 
oral forms albeit in a weakened way rather than articulating those peculiar to 
a written tradition. 
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There are now two points to be made. The first one is that much of our 
contemporary culture is oral. Much if not most of our communication is 
face-to-face. As jack Goody and Ian Watt point out "For even within a 
literate culture, the oral tradition - the transmission of values and » 
attitudes in face-to-face contact - nevertheless remains the primary mode 
of cultural orientation, and, to varying degrees, it is out of step with 
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the various literate traditions.
ir
 Proverbs, catch phrases, ritual 
greetings and gestures, jokes, stories, slang are all part of our everyday 
conversation. They depend for their effectiveness on the acceptance of a on 
tradition and/ appropriate context, albeit improverished when compared to 
the supposed richness of pre-literate culture,by all those involved; and they 
depend also on the full range of communication - visual, oral, even that of 
touch and smell. Television is no more than a magnification and a revital-
ization of this, the everyday culture of oral communication. It is so 
primarily because it is no longer written, and it does not communicate 
fixed and infinitely recoverable texts. Its communication, potentially 
endless, like the songs of the Macedonians, consists in the eternal play 
of the formula. In drama, news and documentary success consists in the 
grafting of the novel onto the familiar, and it is through the familiar 
- the formula - that the experience of television is grounded in the 
experience of the everyday. 
The second point is the centrallty of narrative in all of this. The telling 
of stories seems to be as centrally human as the speaking of language. It 
is not confined to an elite group of literati. It is further and more funda-
mentally an oral expertise. As Lord writes of the sung folktales of his 
study: "The art of narrative song was perfected, and I use the word 
advisedly, long before the advent of writing. It had no need of stylus 
146 
or brush to become a complete artistic and literary medium." From the 
simplicity of the "and then" copula which links in the telling two events 
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chronologically, to the elaborate forms of folktale and myth, tales are 
told according to conventions and rules. Like the rules of language 
these rules seem to differ less than one might expect. Roman Jakobson 
makes the point well: "According to the experience of modern linguistics, * 
language patterns exhibit a consistent regularity. The languages of the 
whole world manifest a paucity and relative simplicity of structural type, 
and at the base of all these types lie universal laws. This schematic 
and recurrent character of linguistic patterns finds its explanation first 
of all in the fact that language is a typical collective property. Similar 
phenomena of schematism and recurrence in the structure of folktale through-
147 
out the world have long astonished and challenged investigators." 
Television is supremely a story-telling medium; the structures that 
generate its texts,as I hope to illustrate in the following chapters, are 
significantly those of narrative. These narrative patterns are not the 
product of print technology, but pre-date it, and television in reaffirming 
them re-establishes the centrality of oral culture in our experience. 
Through the form of its communication it challenges and subverts the 
literacy of the last five hundred years. 
There are two further aspects to this argument that I want, briefly, to 
consider now. The first is the collective nature of the oral tradition, 
l 
and the second is its ccnstraining nature. 
The weakening of the oral tradition in the face of literacy and of printing 
involved a weakening of communality and of sub-culture. The coming of 
literacy brought with it,paradoxically,both specialism and the breakdown 
of inter-cultural boundaries. It also, it has been suggested, brought 
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with it nationalism. The folk traditions expressed in symbolic or 
material culture were either incorporated and transformed or destroyed. 
What vitality they had, dependent as it was on the intensity of face to face 
Interaction and immediate communication was increasingly denied by the 
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dletance and delay of the written text. 
By virtue of the form and the extent of television's communication these 
traditions are being reasserted. Television's restricted codes, grounded 
» 
in narrativity, and in the juxtaposition of sight and sound, as Bernstein 
argues for natural language raises the 'we above the I
1
. The paradox, 
as many commentators on the mass media have noted, is that the communality 
is generated at two removes: not only is the line of communication 
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attenuated - Donald Horton and Richard Wohl called it para-social - but 
the'community is symbolically rather than physically expressed - it is the 
community of the independent and often otherwise socially isolated household. 
It is however nonetheless real for that. 
This community is a folk community, a gemeinschaft, and it is both product 
and precondition of the restricted nature of televisual communication. 
This 1b, I admit, a fairly hazardous assertion, especially in view of much 
if not most of the thought on the nature of contemporary society which seeks 
to establish on the one hand its anonymity and its alienation or on the other 
the essentially ideological nature of just such pretentions to community. 
These claims, it is suggested, mask the true reality of conflict, contradiction 
and structural imbalance in capitalist s o c i e t y .
]
H o w e v e r , social and 
cultural experience is not monolithic and measures of culture's falsehood 
are risky to say the least. Arguments for cultunl coherence are therefore 
not by definition spurious, though they must be carefully advanced. The 
precise nature of the community which television both proposes and supposes 
in its communication is still open to question, of course, but it is a 
question worthy of exploration and not to be dismissed out of hand. 
There is one final dimension of this discussion of television as language 
to be considered. And that is its significance for constraint or control. 
Maurice Bloch In his consideration of ritual language and song asks the 
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question: "How is it that formalization can become a form of power or 
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coercion?" . In essence this is the question asked now, though any 
more complete answer, depending as it does on consideration of the 
relation between language and social structure, must await the final
 t 
chapter. A number of considerations are therefore of relevance. Firstly 
we can acknowledge that language is itself powerful, in the sense underlying, 
for example, J.L. Austin's notion of its ittOcutlonary force. Austin 
distinguishes between locution, illocution and perlocution as dimensions 
of communication through speech,both oral and written. Locution refers 
to what is aaid, illocution to what is done, and perlocution to what is 154 
achieved. As Austin himself notes, the distinction between illocution 
and perlocu.tion. is likely to become troublesome. The distinction rests 
on their relative conventionality. Illocutionary acts are conventional 
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acts; perlocutionary acts are not conventional. However, it is 
important to establish that language, acts of language use, do things 
as well as say things. In speaking we condemn, condone, inform, amuse 
and so on. Perhaps this is obvious. It is however, in the context of 
\ 
this argument, important. Communication is, among other things, a bid for 
control, and indeed some sociologists have taken this so much to heart that 
it has become the central issue of their w o r k . ^ ^ 
But if language is, potentially at least, powerful, then it is also the case 
that some types of language are likely to be more powerful than others. It 
is here that questions of the form of language are of relevance, and it is 
here that the distinction between restricted and elaborated codes as 
formulated by Basil Bernstein is also relevant. Restricted forms of language, 
and by now we can include, I hope, among thes^television
1
8 communication, 
constrain by virtue of their formalization what can be crudely called 
the right of reply. This needs to be made more precise. Formal 
-84-
language significantly restricts what can be said; communication through 
formal language in its predictability,disqualifies the freedom that 
individuals have in language to create and to communicate idiosyncratically, 
158 
originally or even, in a certain sense, genuinely. As Maurice Bloch > 
notes: "The formalization of speech therefore drastically restricts 
what can be said and the speech acts are neither all alike or all of a 
kind and thus if this mode of communication is adopted there is hardly 
any choice of what can be said.... (Formalization) leads to a specially stylized 
form of communication: polite, respectful, holy, but from the point of view 
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of the creativity potential of language, impoverished." Through 
formalization the response of a colloquent can be restricted or coerced. 
For Bloch the song is the extreme case of formalization and correspondingly 
of restriction. In the performance of a song, even the participants 
become an audience. They accept a pregiven form of communication, or 
perhaps non-communication, where significance is not in its detail or 
honesty but in its generality. Ritual communication, in its detachment 
from the specificity of vital interaction - both from intention or motives 
of the individual speakers (it is the role that speaks) and from its 
concrete location in a unique time and space - suffers from increasing 
ambiguity. This ambiguity is the ambiguity of the impossibility of logical 
response, rather than the result of deliberate incorporation of tropes to 
convey the complexity of implicit m e a n i n g . A s Bloch argues, "You 
cannot argue with a song". 
You can no more argue with a play or any closed narrative structure. 
Any demonstration therefore of this structure in television, myth or 
folktale involves as a necessary corollary the demonstration of the way 
in which that communication functions as a constraining force within the 
act of communication and the culture in general, and that this constraint 
is the product of the formal characteristics of language used or more 
broadly of the communication as a whole. 
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But we need to be careful. Formal language might well be considered, 
as I have suggested, as a variety of restricted code. But it is, as it 
were, a limited variety, for in many essentials its social significance 
appears to be very different and is indeed contrary to what Bernstein * 
argues is central to the language of restriction. 
Formal language is the product and guarantee of social hierarchy; it 
constrains, certainly, but that constraint is positive for the communicator, 
negative for his audience. It creates distance and perhaps masks that 
distance by the play of the familiar in form, tone and content. Restricted 
codes, on the other hand, are the producer and guarantee of social familiarity 
- not the audience ,but the family, not the ritualised, but the everyday^seem 
to be its context. What constraint there 1% is equally enforced on both 
interlocutors and is equally enabling from the point of view of their 
capacity to communicate with each other. In conflating both formal and 
restricted as I have done in my description of the language of television, 
I have run the risk of bringing together two apparent opposites in the guise 
of identity. There is, however, method in the madness. It would appear 
that something is left out of each of the accounts; for Bloch ignores or 
chooses to underrate the community which even formal communication needs 
in order to be effective and which it actually sustains - perhaps despite 
Itself - in its communication,and Bernstein, equally, ignores or chooses 
to underrate, while stressing the community, the fact that restricted codes 
would tend to reify the inevitable hierarchy within social relationships, 
however close. Bernstein and Bloch have chosen each to identifyor .stress 
one necessary corollary of limited modes of expression - the former comauntty, 
the latter control. What I would want to suggest is that television'gr language 
in its restriction generates both. Its formulae and in particular its 
narrative structures generate both distance and familiarity; the society 
that sustains its communication is similarly both out of reach and close 
at hand; unequal structurally but more equal culturally. Television 
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in its language, articulates this tension and preserves it; the tension 
however is real, the product of the reality of both community and control. 
In sum what I hope to have achieved in this chapter, both in theoretical 
discussion and demonstration, is that television's communication can be 
profitably considered from the point of view of language; and that the full 
range of questions asked about that language are relevant to television. I 
am not suggesting that television is a language, nor that narrative is its 
only dimension. Nor indeed am I suggesting that it is language's structure 
which should be the exclusive concern of any analysis of television. I am, 
however, suggesting that a consideration 6f the structure of the television 
message, as undertaken in chapters 5 and 6, will prove profitable, above 
all in pointing a way towards a more mature understanding of the role 
television plays in our contemporary culture. 
-87-
Chapter 2. Footnotes and References 
1. Edward Sapir, Language. New York. 1921. (London. 1949). p. 35. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Mythic and Television 
There is very little that is novel in the suggestion that television and 
other aspects of contemporary culture are like myths.^ Most often the 
argument that they are is a functional one; myths and television fulfil 
the same purpose or satisfy the same needs, be they individual or social. 
Often too it is argued that myths and the products of contemporary culture 
are similar in their form and their content; they convey similar messages 
in similar ways. 
What most of these considerations obscure is the very real difficulty in 
identifying what myths are. The supposed comparison of like with like 
ignores the fact that it is not just, for example,television, which is 
partially understood, but that the supposed key to the puzzle is itself 
amorphous. Myth, ritual, magic, folktales, indeed the whole panoply of 
a supposedly different and distinct way of thinking, acting and communicating 
- the assumed preserve of'primitive'pre-literate societies and cultures -
2 
have so far denied us their essence. This denial is the product both of 
the manifestly enormous range of words and acts that we might wish to 
include under a common rubric, but it is also the product of the problems 
associated with any cross-cultural comparison, particularly those concerned 
with the transferability of our own categories of thought beyond their 
normal range of relevance. 
I would like in this chapter to attempt a draft of the equation of television 
and the mythic, and to do so in a way which would avoid, hopefully, the 
worst excesses of either claims for a general theory or of a refusal to be clear 
about the nature of the terms of the comparison. Such a comparison, I would 
suggest, is a fruitful one. Indeed more than that, I would maintain that 
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unless the mythical dimension of contemporary culture is recognized and 
understood then perceptions of that culture will remain - if such a thing 
is possible - both equivocal and banal. 
This chapter, therefore, will consist of three parts: firstly and 
inevitably a consideration of some of the most influential theories of 
myth and ritual - a consideration which, for reasons of space and competence 
- will be relatively synoptic; secondly an identification of in what, 
minimally a definition of the mythic should consist; and thirdly a 
consideration of the role mythic thought might have in contemporary culture. 
But first, and as in the preceding chapter, a simple but important 
distinction needs to be made. Television, as indeed all other forms of 
mass communication, uses specific items of folklore, myth and represent-
ations of ritual within its discourse. This has been noted and it is 
noteworthy. Advertisements, questions in quiz shows, the retelling of 
the familiar tales and the broadcasting of a state opening of parliament 
or a coronation, all illustrate the various ways in which aspects of 
traditional culture are preserved in our own. However, just as we can 
consider television as a language or language system in the acknowledgement 
of the obvious point that a significant part of its communication is in 
spoken language, so too can we at least suggest that the television message 
as a whole can be considered as mythic, irrespective of any specific item 
of content. 
_ri 
Theories of myth are amenable to no simple classification. Indeed as for 
example G.S. Kirk points out respect for the great differences between 
cultures in the form, content and context of mythical communication demands 
that no one theory will be adequate, though each may have something of value 
5 
to say. Percy Cohen, equally, eschews synthesis, though he does produce 
6 
a definition, and ends by listing seven types of theory. Nevertheless 
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despite this situation, which is after all an endemic one in the human 
and social sciences, the attempt must be made^if only as a means of 
presenting a great deal of conflicting and contradictory theory in a short 
space. 
We can therefore begin by making an initial distinction between those 
theories which seek to establish a distinct form of thought whose central 
and seminal expression is in myth, and those theories which wish to relate 
the particular activity of the narration of myth to other aspects of 
individual or social existence, for example, magic or ritual.
7
 Among 
the former we can make a further distinction, between those who see myth as 
an expression of feeling and those who see it as an expresion of thought. 
For the first, above all for Ernst Cassirer, Lucien Levy-Bruhl and 
g 
Mircea Eliade, myth is unashamedly primitive, and its primitiveness is 
grounded in the proximity of man to nature and to the supernatural, and 
in the recognition of, and response to, the power of this otherwise unmediated 
reality. Myths are essentially sacred. They are believed and they 
accurately reflect the ways in which the primitive perceives his world. 
Opposing this view with a theory that stresses the intellectual coherence 
• 9 
within myth is, of course, Claude Levi-Strauss. For him myth has 
nothing to do with emotions, and its relationship to the sacred is 
incidental. Concerned to establish a mode of thought through the analysis 
of myth, that mode of thought gains its coherence not in the uniqueness of 
primitive experience, but in the capacity of all men to think equally well; 
in other words ultimately in the structure of the human mind. Myth for 
10 
Levi-Strauss is As close as one can get to pure thought , and though 
the argument is not without its difficulties, the difference between the 
primitive and his myth and ourselves without it is more a matter of content 
1 1 
and of history than anything as fundamental as the denial of emotion. 
-101-
For Cassirer, Levy-Bruhl and Eliade, though again not without qualification 
as I shall argue, it is man at a particular stage of his evolutionary 
development which is the centre of concern; for Levi-Strauss it is man 
tout court. 
Let me briefly consider each of these theories in turn. 
Ernst Cassirer sees myth as the expression of the life-force of the human 
spirit at a particular stage of its development; it is its power, its 
urgency and its emotional charge which give it is distinctiveness. 
Mythical thought is not logical; the connections it makes between things, 
indeed its very categories, reflect and perpetuate the coherence of a 
felt unity in ,and of,the world. As Suzanne Langer succinctly puts it; 
"All mythic constructions are symbols of value - of life 
and power, or of violence, evil and death. They are charged 
with feeling, and have a way of absorbing into themselves 
more and more intense meanings, sometimes even logically 
conflicting imports. Therefore mythic symbols do not give 
rise to discursive understanding; they do beget a kind of 
understanding, but not by sorting out concepts and relating 
them in a distinct pattern; they tend, on the contrary, 
merely to bring together great complexes of cognate ideas, ]2 
in which all distinctive features are merged and swallowed." 
Myth rolls up everything it touches, "Things which come into contact 
with one another in a mythical sense - whether this contact is taken as a 
spatial or temporal contiguity or as a similarity, however remote, or a 
membership in the same class or species - have fundamentally ceased to be 
13 
a multiplicity; they have acquired a substantial unity." This vision 
of the childhood of man is incidentally give some empirical support by 
Peter Worsley when he, following L.S. Vygotsky's work on the childhood of 
men, opposes Levi-Straussian structuralism with evidence of alternative 14 
forms of classification in the totemism of the Groote Eylandters. 
- 1 0 2 -
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Cassirer's vision, for as G.S. Kirk points out Cassirer knew no more 
than anyone else about how myths actually are or were created, stems from 
a philosophical position, derived from Emanuel Kant which seeks to 
establish the construction of symbols as the central activity of man. 
The symbolic world, of which myth together with language, is both a part 
but also the source, mediates between object and mind. Myths grow out 
of man's experience of the world, and that experience is both concrete 
and undifferentiated, above all because both object and its signification 
are bonded together. There is no difference between the thing and its 
image. There is no consciousness in mythical thought of thought as such, 
no abstraction nor conceptual manipulation. In a curious way myth is 
pre-symbolic, The world is believed in and it gains its sacredness in 
that belief and in the recognition of its power. 
The categories through which the mythic world is ordered grow out of this 
1 7 
emotional bonding with the world. Space and time, number and 
causality are grounded in the profound separation of the sacred and 
18 
the profane and in the emotional response to that separation. Indeed 
spatial differentiation is basic to mythical thought; "The barriers which 
man sets himself in his basic feeling of the sacred are the starting point 
from which begins his setting of boundaries of space and from which hy
 a 
progressive process of organization and articulation, the process spreads 
of the
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over the w h o W physical cosmos." Absolute and unchanging mythic time, 
and magical and powerful number derive from the same essential dichotomy. 
In a sense Cassirer wants, despite this stress on the spirit, on emotion 
and on the sacred, to have it both ways, for he is insisting at the same 
time on an underlying structural form which gives unity to what otherwise might be 
thought as potentially entirely arbitrary emotional responses and fantasies. 
"The mythical fantasy drives towards animation, towards 
a complete spiritualization of the cosmos, but the mythical form of thought 
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which attaches all qualities and activities, all states and relations to a 
solid foundation, leads to the opposite extreme, a kind of materialization 
20 
of spiritual contents'.' 
And this contradiction is re-emphasised when he faces Levy-Bruhl's theory 
of the prelogical, and towards what Cassirer wrongly assumes to be the 
21 
former's absolute dichotomy of primitive and modern. For here Cassirer 
is arguing for a continuity in some, the profane, aspects of human existence, 
a continuity which in fact is nowhere provided for in his theory. 
It is tempting to deny Cassirer's mythical speculations in their entirety, 
either on empirical grounds: not all myths seem to depend on emotion for 
their creation and maintenance; or on logical and philosophical grounds: 
that he is both contradictory and as M.F. Ashley-Montague points out that 
he never faces his true object: "he is not interested in mythology as such but 
22 
in the processes of consciousness which lead to the creation of myth." 
It is tempting too, to reject his crude evolutionism wherein myth is 
always negatively valued when faced with its developments, religion and 
science. 
Three things can be plausibly extracted however. The first is the 
recognition of the emotional content of myth. This need not be interpreted 
as simply an irrational response, but can be understood as Suzanne Langer persuas-
23 
ively argues, in terms of aesthetic experience and presentational symbolism. 
Secondly the mere fact of myth as a symbolic structure to be interpreted and 
24 
understood in another than a literal way seems also to be important. 
Thirdly, and by extension, the unity of mythical thought which Cassirer 
postulates but never really explores is also significant. The structure 
which he finds in myth is the structure of feeling; its disentanglement 
is by definition impossible, but despite that we can recognize, at least, 
the problems of understanding such complex phenomena. 
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Ernst Cassirer is therefore offering a theory of myth which demands, 
despite itself, a clear dichotomy between ancient and modern, between 
one world view, the mythical, and another, the m o d e m , religious or 
scientific. It is self-consciousness, consciousness of the sign, 
freedom from the concrete ties of emotion
(
which marks the boundary. 
And this freedom brings with it the freedom of the individual, the rejection 
25 
of the bonds of taboo and mythical thought. 
David Bidney is correct therefore, to draw a parallel between Cassirer's 
s Oft 
work on myth and that of Lucien Levy-Bruhl. For the latter too, at 
least until his very last and fragmentary work, also insisted on a clear 
separation, a non-comparability between the primitive - he called it 
27 pre-logical - and modern thought. 
Much influenced by Emile Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl offers a perspective of 
primitive mentality which demands the primacy of the social. At the 
root of all thought are the collective representations, themselves the 
28 ^ 
product and mirror of a social structure , which Emile Durkheim insists 
29 
on calling elementary. Here the lack of social differentiation generates 
in the collective mind the impression of solidarity and above all of 
participation; an impression which is centrally mystical. In such a 
world dreams become real, objects and images become fused. 
"I should be inclined to say that in the collective 
representation of primitive mentality, objects, beings, 
phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to 
us, both themselves and something other than themselves. 
In a fashion which is no less incomprehensible, they give 
forth and they receive mystic powers, virtues, qualities, 
influences, which make themselves felt outside, without 
ceasing to remain where they are. 
In other words the opposition between the one and the 
many, the same and another, and so forth, does not impose 
upon this mentality the necessity of affirming one of the 
terms, if the other be denied, or vice versa."30 
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Primitive mentality therefore has two facets. It is both mystic and 
31 
prelogical. Its prelogicality consists in its non-recognition of 
the law of contradiction; things can be what they are and other than 
32 
what they are simultaneously. Its mystic qualities reside in the 
33 
non-recognition of secondary causes; the unusual, which the primitive 
like ourselves wishes to explain, is explained non-empirically, or as 
Levy-Bruhl suggests non-objectively. While being technologically perfectly 
efficient, explanations of what is perceived are offered in terms of 
what is felt or believed. "The actual world and the world beyond are 34 „ 
blended". And as Levy-Bruhl notes, "their world is more complex than 
35 
our universe, but on the other hand it is complete, and It is closed," 
At one important level, the level which Cassirer for example does not see 
beyond, Levy-Bruhl is postulating a clearly defined, and different form 
of thought for the primitive in his collective existence. It is the 
description of a belief system which does not preclude the individual from 
being empirically sensible but which demands that explanation be other 
than, in our terms, logical. But at the same time this unilateral 
vision of man's mental history is more complex and more uncertain. 
First of all there is the question of myth itself. So far, and for good 
reason, there has been no mention of it. The reason is that the primitive 
in his full participation with nature and with other men needs no mediation, 
no rationalisation, which myth would offer: 
"Where the participation of the individual in the social 
group is still directly felt, where the participation of 
the group with the surrounding groups is actually lived 
- that is, as long as the period of mystic symbiosis lasts -
myths are meagre in number and of poor quality.". 
Myths then are the product of a first stage of development, beyond the 
pure solidarity of social existence. They take the place of feeling, 
and of direct communion. As Levy-Bruhl puts it, "participation tends 
38 
to become ideological." Communion is no longer lived, it is to be 
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spoken, to be explained. But the myths are still tied to the mystery and 
the emotion of the primitive's perception of things. Indeed it is the 
39 
mystic element which gives myth its force and social importance. Myths, 
for L^vy-Bruhl, and as we shall see also for Mircea Eliade are sacred : 
histories, and as such they function to express and to maintain the 
40 
solidarity of the social group. But once again, and in a way similar 
to that of Cassirer, Levy-Bruhl believes that to understand myths one needs 
41 
first to understand the mentality which has produced them. 
The second of the complicating factors lies in Levy-Bruhls's recognition 
of, and increasing insistence on, not the difference between primitive and 
modern but on their similarity. This first of all manifests itself in 
the suggestion that the native is empirically competent, then in the suggestion 
that mythical, participatory forms of thought persevere, and indeed they are 
to be valued; 
"II n'est pas probable que jamais il disparaisse, ou s'affaiblesse 
au-dela d'un certain point, et sans doute n'est ce pas non plus 
souhaitable. Car avec lui dispara^tndert peut-etre la poesie, 
l'art la metaphysique, 1'invention dans les sciences - bref 
presque tout ce qui dont la beaute et la grandeur de la vie 
h u m a i n e . " ^ 
and finally in the disquiet about the notion of prelogicality, which in 
43 ' 
the Carnets is abandoned. It is abandoned not because Levy-Bruhl 
relinquishes his argument about the difference between two forms of thought 
but because that difference no longer appears supportable by such a 
category. The problem is falsely posed, and Levy-Bruhl, while insisting 
still on the significance of participation, and on a mystical jmentality, 
nevertheless refuses to equate such a way of thought exclusively with the 
primitive. What this amounts to is a denial of the diachronic dichotomy, 
of the evolution of one form to another, and its replacement by a synchronic 
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one. It is in the nature of man that both forms, emotion and rationality, 
44 
myth and science will co-exist. These relative proportions will vary 
and are not contradictory, but only different. Indeed Levy-Bruhl 
acknowledges that the capacity of modern science to make the world 
intelligible is itself, as Albert Einstein notes, unintelligible and he 
asks "Might there not be here simply a difference of degree? A trans-
ference of the unint eLligibility of the detail to the world given in 
45 its totality?" 
It is this final equivocation, an equivocation which was perhaps always 
present, which makes Levy-Bruhl's work so interesting. Once again we 
need not, as he finally does not, accept an evolutionary model which 
demands a clear distinction and a clear measure of inferiority. Nor 
need we accept that the primitive was a permanent prisoner of his emotions 
or that myths are exclusively the product of emotion. But we can 
acknowledge, with him, that a significant part of man's inheritance involves 
the mysterious and that myth in expressing that,effects a transformation 
from the profane to the sacred, a transformation of history into mythical 
time and space. 
The explanation of in what mythical time and space consists, is the 
peculiar preserve of the endlessly recursive theorizing of Mircea Eliade. 
Eliade, unlike Cassirer and Levy-Bruhl, is concerned exclusively with 
myths - and myths are sacred histories. As he, synoptically, puts it; 
"Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that 
took place in primordial time, the fabled time of the 
"beginnings". In other words, myth tells how, through the 
deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, 
be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment 
of reality - an island, a species of plant, a particular 
kind of human behaviour, an institution. Myth then, 
is always an account of a "creation"; it relates how 
something was produced, how it began to t>e. Myth tells 
only of that which really happened....myths describe the 
various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the 
sacred (or the 'supernatural') into the world. It is this 
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sudden breakthrough of the sacred that really establishes 
the World and makes it what it is today. Furthermore, it 
is a result of the intervention of Supernatural Beings that 
man himself is what he is today, a mental, sexed and 
cultural being."
 4 6 
This generalization is palpably absurd. Clearly Countless myths have 
nothing whatever to do with origins and even many that do, seem to be 
adding only an aetiological footnote to an otherwise entirely differently 
47 
oriented tale. Indeed the unequivocal equation of myth with the sacred 
is also open to dispute, for many tales which we would expect to call 
myths have nothing or very little of the sacred about them, either in 48 
their content or the context of their telling. Nevertheless if we 
water down the argument, and reduce its content of yeast, a number of 
important perceptions remain. 
Mircea Eliade is concerned to identify both a number of themes within , 
and a number of functions served by, myth. Myth, as for Cassirer and 
Levy-Bruhl, is participatory; it is prompted by and part of a deep 
spiritualization of the environment, natural, and human. The world 
that myth presents is supremely sacred and as such it is real, more 
real in a certain sense than empirical reality. To enter the mythic 
world involves a transformation, both in space and time. In space one 
moves from the periphery to the centre, the hub, and that movement is 
49 
simultaneously one from the illusory to the real, the profane to the 
50 
sacred. Ritual action creates that space. This ritually defined and 
sacred space, in its centrality redefines profane geography. If all 
roads lead to the centre, as they do in Eliade's view of archaic and 
mythic thought, then social and empirical distance is abolished. 
In a similar way empirical, historical time is abolished by its trans-
formation into the sacred world of myth. Now the concern is with 
origins, with illo tempore, and all ritual action, and mythical thought, 
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seeks to recreate and return to that time when both things began and 
when they were perfect.^' Historical, real time, is abolished either 
52 
in rites of regeneration or eschatological visions. The linearity 
of profane time gives way to the endlessly circular and the repetitive.
 : 
And in this denial of progress or of movement of any sort, and in the 
creation of cosmogony which this involves, myth provides an exemplary 
model for all human action. 
One might think that this mode of expression is oppressive, but Gliade argues 
53 
the reverse. Archaic man is freed the weight bf dead Time' , of history. 
He can abolish his past, begin his life anew, re-create his World. "Myth 
assures man that what he is about to do has already been done; in other 
words it helps him to overcome doubts as to the result of his undertaking.., 
There is no reason to fear settling in an unknown, wild territory, 
because one knows what one has to do. One has merely to repeat the 
cosmogonic ritual, whereupon the unknown territory (« Chaos) is transformed 
into "Cosmos", becomes an imago mundi and hence a ritually legitimized 
"habitation".... The World is no longer an opaque mass of objects arbitrarily 
thrown together, it is a living Cosmos, articulated and meaningful. In the 
last analysis, the World reveals itself as language. It speaks to man 
through its own mode of being, through its structure and its rhythms." 
And we might add too that, as Eliade conceives of it, in myth nothing 
remains unexplained. Suffering was bearable in Its explanation - we 
might say in its being explained away. It was never absurd. "Suffering 
is regarded as the consequence of a deviation in respect of the norm" and 
its critical moment" lies in its appearance; suffering is perturbing only 
insofar as its cause remains undiscovered. 
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Mircea Eliade's theories, it would appear, explain too much. In the face 
of much empirical evidence his generalizations are unwarranted, as indeed 
is the extension of his analysis from the content of myth to belief and 
action. Nevertheless there are a number of important insights in what : 
he has to say, not least because he refuses to limit the mythical imagination 
and the mythical world to archaic man. He insists many times that both in 
the content (for example, Superman), in the form (in narrative transformation) 
and in belief (the suspension of disbelief and the escape from real time in 
the act of reading a novel) that we in the twentieth century are as 
56 
involved in and as enamoured of myth as any of our ancestors. And indeed 
this denial of historical, linear time which is so central to his view of 
myth reappears, only to be condemned, in Marx's and Engels' analysis of 
bourgeois ideology;^ a theme which is revived in the mythology of Roland 58 
Barthes. 
He has also identified certain preoccupations within human culture, not 
perhaps universal or persistent, but general and resistant to change, and he 
has shown in what ways these preoccupations are incorporated into and spoken 
by myth. Furthermore his view of myth has one other attraction, though it 
Is not one on which he dwells or develops; it finds its justification both in tl 
individual and the social. The former is relieved of his fear of chaos and 
the latter, society, whose institutions might be conceived of as serving a 
similar purpose, are supported and buttressed by it. 
What unitesthe first three theories of myth whkh have been considered, 
apart from their inadequacy when treated on their own terms, is their stress 
on the world view that myth generates and in which it participates. Whatever 
else they might be, myths and the thought which they are supposed to express, 
are different from the world of science, and from the world of commonsense -
the sacred as opposed to the profane. However that difference, particularly 
with regard to the profane world of commonsense, is not a difference of 
distance but an intimate one. Each world stresses the same emotions and 
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the mythic intrudes into all m a n n e r of everyday acta and thoughts^ But at 
the same time this world of mystery and imagination, of feeling, participation 
and transformation is involved in the creation of order and of a secure 
reality out of the darkness of the unknown. This order is not a logical 
one, nor is it essentially cognitive. To understand myth in this sense 
and to explore in what ways that order is created and maintained coldly 
and unemotionally, one needs to turn to the theories of myth of Claude 
Levi-Strauss. 
"Myths and rites are far from being, as has often been held, 
the product of men's 'myth-making faculty', turning its 
back on reality. Their principal value is indeed to 
preserve until the present time the remains of methods of 
observation and reflection which were (and no doubt still are) 
precisely adapted to discoveries of a certain type: those 
which nature authorised from the starting point of a 
speculative organization and exploitation of the sensible 
world in sensible terms." 
In this quotation Claude Levi-Strauss is clearly opposing the kind of 
mythopoeic view which underlies the arguments I have just been discussing, 
but as I have suggested elsewhere, especially with regard to Cassirer, 
»» 
Levi-Strauss's own work is not as far removed from the neo-K£ntianism of 
60. 
those he opposes as he is inclined to think. Be that as it may, however, 
what clearly distinguishes them is the different and central stress that 
is laid upon the role of reason and emotion. While Levi-Strauss recognizes 
that myth and magic have affectivity as their source, he insists that myth 
61 
is essentially intellectual. Impulses and emotions are never causes, but 
only results. Causes "can be sought only in the organism, which is the 
exclusive concern of biology, or in the intellectual which is the sole way .. 62. 
offered to psychology, and to anthropology as well . The demands of 
what he takes to be his object, the need, as he sees it, for a material 
grounding for anthropology, and the failure of Emile Durkheim and Marcel 63 
Mauss in Primitive Classification to transcend the implications of 
their own theory, all conspire to produce the following axiom: 
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"As affectivity is the most obscure side of man, there has been the 
constant temptation to resort to it, forgetting that what is refractory 
to explanation is ipso facto unsuitable for use in explanation. A 
64 
datum is not primary because it is incomprehensible," » 
s 
I will reserve a detailed discussion of the method of Levi-Strauss's 
analysis until the next chapter and will do nothing more now than 
outline the major elements in his view of myth.^ 
Myth is a language, which in its own particular order both reflects 
the ordered activity of man's mind and derives or attempts to resolve 
the natural disorder of precultural experience. Myth is functionless, 
or at least it serves no practical function.^ its purpose, rather, 
is to present to the minds of the men who create it and who hear it 
evidence of their own mastery of the world, a mastery which is both 
intellectual and cognitive. Myths are anonymous, "from the moment 
they are seen as myths, and whatever their real origins, they exist 
only as elements embodied in a tradition. When the myth is repeated, 
the individual listeners are receiving a message that, properly speaking, 
is coming from nowhere; this is why it is credited with a supernatural 
origin."^ The truth of myth is therefore in its structure, not in 
its manifestation; the truth is not available directly to the native 
68 
who hears it. Partly that truth is emotional, visceral, partly 
that truth is diffused through the system of myth, so that each single 
text reveals a portion of it only. It is in the redundance of the 
system as a whole that the message gains its coherence. And it is 
only the mythologist, privileged by distance, theory and method, who 
69 
can define in what the truth of myth consists. 
— II 3— 
This privilege has not gone unchallenged, of course. The accounts 
that Levi-Strauss produces are neither simply verifiable nor falsi-
fiable in their own terms - they are both complex and selective of 
empirical support - nor are they entirely supportive of the structure,
 { 
the theory of mind and culture, which he erects above them.^ But 
in this failing, as we have seen, he is not alone. The failure can 
be acknowledged, condoned even, but nevertheless recognized as being 
productive. In what way? 
Firstly, myth is seen as a language. The meanings that it generates, 
combining and dependent on both langue (the structured rules, defining 
the possibility of language) and parole (the product of that possibility, 
the infinity of speech), are at the same time beyond language. "Myth 
is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds 
practically, taking off from the linguistic ground on which it keeps 
71 
rolling." The units of the mythical text are superior to the units 
of natural language but gain their significance by their place in a 
synchronic and diachronic system in precisely the same way as, according 
to Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, the units of natural 
language do. Not words, but bundles of words are the primary units -
the mythemes - of the mythical system. And it is within the mytheme 
that the coincidence of langue and parole and also of reversible and 
non-reversible time takes place; "myth uses a third referent 
which combines the properties of the first two. On the one hand a 
myth always refers to events alleged to have taken place long ago. 
But what gives the myth an operational value is that the specific pattern 





Myth, and it is always the mythic system, not the individual myth, 
presents essentially a synchronic, a static structure of meaning. 
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While a single myth develops chronologically and deals with 
historical events, the system as a whole imposes a logic of its 
own which simultaneously denies that history and transforms it. 
Whtf then we are left with, as a result of this operation, is a » 
coherent account presented in terms of the concrete categories 
of empirical experience, of the primitive - essentially preliterate -
culture. The myths are basically answers to questions, and the 
questions and to a degree the answers also, are the universal ones 
of human existence. Centred on and around the dichotomy of nature 
and culture, and of the problems associated both with understanding 
and defending that boundary, the myths deal with problems of cooking, 
of table manners, of sexual relationships, of economic survival and 
so on. 
There is inevitably some ambiguity here, for much of this apparent 
meaningfulness in the myths is available in their content, and not 
in their structure. It is clear, for example, that Asdiwal's marriages, 
on the one hand, and the dribbling frog on the other, have quite manifestly 
to do with what Levi-Strauss only reaches structurally, problems of 
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kinship relations and problems of table manners respectively. Such 
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an observation as this, which Is also made by G.S. Kirk, would suggest 
that contrary to what Levi-Strauss insists, not all details of the myth 
are equally important or indeed structured,
7
^ and much of the myth's 
meaning is available without the detailed analysis of which he is so 
fond. Nevertheless what he insists on being able to show, and this 
only through the myth's structure, are the various levels at which 
mythic communication takes place. 
"So complicated a journey through the mythic field, 
along roads which sometimes proceed in the same direction, 
but follow courses which are far apart while remaining 
parallel, or intersect or even turn back upon themselves, 
would be incomprehensible if we did not realize that it 
has allowed us to carry out several tasks simultaneously. 
This vciuBB presents the development of an argument in 
three dimensions - ethnographical, logical and semantic; 
and, if it has any claim to originality, this will be 
because, at every stage, it has shown how each dimension 
remains inseparable from the others." 
This is important, for Levi-Strauss
1
s question of myth is not so 
much the what of it, but the how of it. And it is for this reason 
that his definition of myth is an operational one, not linked to 
content or particular texts, but to a way of communication, peculia^ 
as he would argue,to preliterature cultures and to societies, he calls 
them cold, without history. Once again we meet the dichotomy and 
once again we can, in part, ignore it. For, indeed Levi-Strauss 
does also. On the one hand he stresses the boundary between societies 
with and without history, cultures with and without writing, and 
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those who have science and philosophy rather than myth. But then, 
as he continually insists, the intellectual capacity of the mind of 
man is unchanging: "The difference lies not in the quality of the 
intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is 
78 
applied; man has always been thinking equally well." 
Ill 
I have presented, albeit briefly, an account of what for want of 
a better phrase, we might call the visionary theories of myth. 
Each of them is in its own way suggestive; each of them, or so it 
seems to me, is saying something important about the mythical 
imagination and the functional significance of that particular form 
of communication. We can accept that myth, precisely in its 
combination of emotion and reason articulates a particular view of 
the world which is distant from,though not opposed to, the profane 
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world of everyday experience. That the relationship between the 
two is complex and often blurred goes without saying, as equally 
complex and blurred is the boundary between myth and science. 
Nevertheless the distinction holds, as it must; for without it a 
most significant tension in human existence would go unrecorded. 
But if the concern is to identify a specific form of communication, 
then clearly that communication is not exclusively a verbal one, 
nor is it without its effects, social or individual. We might 
then enquire, as has been done consistently in the study of myth, 
into its connection with magic and ritual. Such enquiry will 
inevitably be a limited one here. There is as much dispute as to 
the nature of ritual and magic as there is of myth. Indeed the 
literature and the controversy which it articulates is extensive. 
As Edmund Leach notes at the end of his Encyclopedia article: 
"...it has been stressed that even among those who have specialised 
in the field, there is the widest possible disagreement as to how the 
word ritual should be used and how the performance of ritual should 
79. 
be understood." The differences between such an expression of 
what might pass for either honesty or insecurity and the confidence 
of Ruth Benedict's equivalent attempt at definition some thirty years 
earlier is both marked and symptomatic of much that has happened within QQ 
the social sciences. 
However central to any consideration of this sacred triad is the work 
of Bronislaw Malinowski and in particular his collection of essays 
81 
Magic, Science and Religion. Malinowski is much influenced by 
Sir James Frazer who saw an intimate connection between myth and 
ritual and between magic and religion. Ritual precedes myth and 82 
magic religion. Magic itself, in a view of it which in turn 
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depends on that of Sir Edward Tyler is pseudo-science. For 
Tyler myth and magic depends on the twin pillars of animism, 
"the doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings in general", and 
analogy in which objects are thought to feel and act in ways 
83 
analogous to human feelings and actions.'
r
 Sir James Frazer's 
consideration of magic and ritual is as firmly grounded in the 
security of Victorian England, in which the primitive magician, 
is seen as acting 
scientist manque^ through the childhood of man's intellectual 
development. But that mistake itself rests on a correct perception 
of the two forms of analogy, metaphor and metonymy, which become in 
the practice of the magician, homeopathic and contagious magic. 
Magic, based on these principles, correctly denies the intervention 
of a spiritual being between intention and effect, but incorrectly 
understands that connection in its misunderstanding of the laws of 
84 
nature. 
Malinowski's Trobrianders inhabit the same world of practical responses 
to basic needs. Magic fills the gap between the demand and the 
ability to effectively control nature. It is akin to science, but 
it is pseudo-science. "It always has a definite aim intimately 
associated with human instinct, needs and pursuits. The magic art is 
directed towards the attainment of practical ends; like any other art or 
craft it is also governed by theory and by a system of principles which 
dictate the manner in which the act has to be performed in order to be 
85 
effective." It consists in formula, rite and reasonably enough, the 
presence of a magician. Magic, the rite and the spells in which it consists, 
are traditional activities, indeed they need to be in order to be 
effective; which is as much to say in order for them to be believed in. 
And it is in the justification, guarantee and indeed legitimation of 
86 
magic which it is myth's function to fulfil. 
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"It can be said without exaggeration that the most typical, 
most highly developed mythology in primitive societies is 
that of magic, and the function of myth is not to explain 
but to vouch for, not to satisfy curiosity but to give 
confidence in power, not to spin out yarns, but to establish 
the flowing freely from present-day occurrences, frequently 
similar validity of belief."
8 7
 , 
I will reserve comment as to the usefulness of such an observation 
for the moment and remark only, but significantly , that for 
Malinowski myth is preeminently to be understood sociologically, and 
functionally. Myths, and not just those intimately connected with 
magic exist for the telling of origins, for the maintenance of the 
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traditions and in order to provide a charter for present action. 
Myth is not idle speculation, nor a symbolic communication; it neither 
explains nor illustrates. It is firmly grounded in the practical 
demands of everyday life, and in particular in a life in which rational 
and empirical control is sorely limited. It "fulfils in primith/e 
culture an indispensible function; it expresses, enhances and 
codifies beliefs; it safeguards and enforces morality, it vouches for 
the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance 89 
of men". Myths themselves are in no need of explanation; their 
meaning is clear enough and their function is just as clear. In 
Malinowski's ringing prose; "Myth is a constant by-product of living 
faith, which is in need of miracles; of sociological status, which demands 
90 
precedent; of moral rule, which requires satisfaction." 
Clearly Malinowski overstates his case. Myths may very well serve to 
legitimise action, ritual, magical or otherwise and justify the institutions 
of a society but they need not do so exclusively nor indeed directly. 
Myths can offer explanation as well as justification and the way they do 
either can be the subject of an interpretation which accepts their 
symbolic nature rather than their manifest and directly observable content. 
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Furthermore as G. S , Kirk points out myths and ritual are not necessarily 
co-^existent nor is myth by virtue of that supposed co-existence necessarily 
sacred ^ . 
However, there a number of threads to be extracted from such a position.
 : 
Assuming, for the time being, that we have some understanding of what myth 
consists in, either despite or because of Malinowski, we need to enquire 
both into the nature of ritual and into the connection between ritual and 
myth. Ritual, for Ruth Benedict, is a form "of prescribed and elaborated 
behaviour"; it is both individual, in the neurotic,and cultural. Ritual 
is "extra necessitous for the technological point of view" and it is a 
"prescribed form of behaviour for the occasions not given over to 
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technological routine" . While this definition suggests one of the 
dichotomies apparently so essential in the definition of ritual, that of 
the rational and the irrational and in that it follows Malinowski, it 
avoids or assumes the second, that between the sacred and the profane. 
Emile Durkheim
1
s argument for the division of the world made by religious 
thought is a familiar and highly influential one: "all known religious 
beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: 
they presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of which 
men think, into two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by two 
distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and 
sacred. This division of the world into two domains, the one containing 
all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait 
93 
of religious thought" 
This dichotomy, like the one between rational and irrational, is much 
insisted upon, but in a way similar to the first it is charged with being 
ethnocentric and likely to be inadequate as a viable classification of the 
native's own thought - as much is shown by E.E. Evans-Pritchard in his study 
94 of the Azande . Arguing as such and at the same time denying its universal 
on 
applicability, Jack Goody nevertheless insists/the observer's right to 
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observe and therefore on the analytical serviceability of such a dichotomy 
and similarly Edmund Leach prefers to argue in an early work that such a 
dichotomy expresses a continuum rather than an absolute."From this point of 
of action 
view technique and ritual, profane and sacred, do not denote types/ but . 
96 
aspects of almost any kind of action." 
But to blur this category while at the same time observing it extends the 
range of actions that might be included within ritual. On the one hand it 
is a form of consecrated behaviour, but on the other hand we can and do 
extend the notion of ritual to include non-religious ceremonials and even 
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non-public ceremonials, the rituals of family and inter-personal relations 
The classification of different forms and functions of ritual can then be 
endless. 
What can be disentangled from all this? We can insist on the preservation 
of the distinction between the sacred and the profane worlds even in the 
acknowledgement that in certain cultures and society that distinction may 
be relatively meaningless. For us it signifies the ability to accord 
special significance to a certain set pf actions and to a certain set of 
beliefs. To employ a linguistic analogy the sacred is an equivalent of the 
98 
marked term and minimally this itself suggests distinction and difference 
Secondly we can make a distinction between the function and the form of 
ritual action and acknowledge that it is predominantly with regard to the form 
its function, that controversy centres. A ritual is social. While it need 
not as Jack Goody argues, depend on the physical presence of a community, it 
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becomes meaningful only through its collective acknowledgement . And 
ritual in the peculiar clarity and consistency of its forms is clearly both 
opposed and responsive to the ambiguity endemic in social life. Max Gluckman 
for example sees ritual as the particular product of tribal societies, he 
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calls them "multiplex" in which social role and status is diffuse . 
Ritual is essentially to do with the disentangling of status and role 
101 
and in the establishment of authority within the social structure 
He suggests therefore two interdependent hypotheses; the first proposes 
that the greater the secular differentiation of role the less ritual there 
will be and the less mystery in the ceremonial of etiquette; the second 
proposes that the greater the multiplicity of undifferentiated and over-
lapping roles, the more ritual there is to separate them. The presence or 
absence of ritual therefore grows out of the social structure; an argument 
which leads him to suggest that the reason for relative absence of ritual 
in our own society is due both to the segregation of roles and to the 
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segregation of conflict between roles. This is, I think once again, 
too narrow a view. Clearly there is more to status than role differentiation; 
and contemporary preoccupations with status, both individual and collective 
grow out of a society whose ambiguity consists not so much on fusion of role 
but on the contrary, on its elaboration. 
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The relation nevertheless between ritual and status is a central one, 
though it can be extended beyond the strict sense of social status. 
Ritual expresses and attempts to resolve not just the uncertainties of 
social status but the uncertainties attached to the status of any and perhaps 
every aspect of culture. Myth also, as I have argued, seems to function 
in this way. And it is probably this equivalence of response to, as it were, 
structural demands of society, that underlies all attempts to make myths 
and ritual mutually supportive. 
For Clyde Kluckhohn in the context of his attempt at a general theory of 
myth, this is expressed not in terms of society but in terms of the individual: 
"...the only uriformity which can be positive is that there is a strong 
tendency for some sort of interrelationship between myth and ceremony and 
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that this relationship is dependent upon what appears, so far as present 
information goes, to be an invariant function of both myth and ritual; 
the gratification(most often in the negative form of anxiety reduction) 
104 
of a large proportion of the individual in a society". This 
formulation involves the introduction of insights derived from psychoanalysis, 
specifically Anna Freud's characterisation of the ego's defence mechanisms 
and Malinowski's theory of myth as a charter. But as I have already pointed 
out, myths occur without rituals and vice versa^and myths have characteristics 
rituals have not, "their fantasy, their freedom to develop and their complex 
„ 105 
structure." 
There is, therefore, no clear agreement on what might pass as the function 
either of ritual or myth. Like so many arguments of a similar cast, the 
problem is the non-falsifiability of the theory even were it to be coherent. 
The presentation of "myths" which were clearly non-functional or at least 
not functioning in the prescribed way could easily be, by definition, 
an 
excluded from the theory. So in the absence of/alternative definition 
of myth, one which G. S. Kirk, for example, refuses to provide, his so-
called aberrant myths are not myths at all. In any case the perception 
of myth as preeminently a response to,and an attempted resolution of stress 




s Oedipus myth is a powerful advocate of such a 
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perspective , and even Clifford Geertz's comments on it, telling though 
107 
they may be, still leave the functionist beast alive. 
We can avoid, in part, the functionlisttautology on the one hand, and 
G. S. Kirk's, albeit highly intelligent and persuasive eclecticism on the 
other, if we follow another route; the route prescribed by considering 
both myth and ritual as languages - indeed as a language. As Marcel Mauss 
108 
writes: "all ritual is a kind of language, it therefore translates ideas." 
-123-
And Edmund Leach following Claude Levi-Strauss, and taking also 
a cue from J.L, Austin argues similarly: "We engage in rituals 
109 
in order to transmit collective messages to ourselves." 
Ritual becomes a form of expressive communication involving no clear 
distinction between audience and performers. The source or origin 
of the ritual is neither clear nor important, and what is of 
immediate and consummate interest is the patterning of acts, words, 
images and music which make up a collectively legitimised, though 
still individually perceived,message. 
Myth is also language, and the relation between it and ritual no 
longer becomes necessarily dependent on reference to the society 
in which they are found or which produces them. Nor is there any 
reason to suggest that the response will be homologous. Indeed 
Claude Levi-Strauss has made just this point in considering the 
similar ritual but different myth of the Mandan and Hidatsa Indians.**^ 
What now becomes the issue is the form, or structure, that myths and 
rituals present and which guarantees their communication. As I 
have already noted myths and rituals will vary enormously in their 
complexity; and we can expect mythic language to be more developed 
and more subtle. But we can also expect that the basic logical 
principles will be similar; they will consist in the transformation 
of sign and symbol, metonymy and metaphor, and in such a way that the 
basic categories of spatial, temporal and causal differentiation are 
given concrete expression.***" Together and separately, myth and 
ritual comprise a system and it is only within this system that any 
one item gains its meaning. The interpretation of myth and ritual, 
therefore, while not undertaken independently of any consideration 
of its social and cultural context, is nevertheless not determined 
by it. 
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Arnold Van Gennep, while not offering a linguistic theory of ritual 
in any precise sense, nevertheless sees ritual In systematic terms, 
identifying the basic elements of ritual, whose significance is 
gained in the relationship to each other. He sees ritual, not in '• 
terms of "the particular rites' but in the essential significance 
and their relative positions within ceremonial wholes, that is, their 
order.... the underlying arrangements is always the same. Beneath 
a multiplicity of forms, either consciously expressed or merely 
implied, a typical pattern always recurrs; the pattern of the rites 
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of passage." Like so many seminal ideas this one is remarkably 
simple. It consists firstly in the Durkh6indaa, hypostatisation 
of the sacred and the profane which, in Van Gennep's view is given above 
in ritual 
all/, spatial and territorial expression, but which is also manifested 
in time, in the seasonal and life-cycle patterns of human existence. 
The movement from profane to sacred and back again is a movement 
fraught with social implications, and in order to effect such a movement 
a transitional stage is necessary. The movement, in any case, is 
marked by ritual whose dynamics consist in three phases; those of 
113 
separation, transition and incorporation. A man, on coming of age, 
will be taken away from his family and friends, a separation involving 
ceremony, and placed beyond that circle, physically and socially, 
before being allowed to return. His return, however, equally marked 
by ceremonial, will see him with a new status: sacred from the 
perspective of his previous state, but now profane by virtue of his 
involvement in it.^"^ 
This pattern is the basic one which Van Gennep asserts underlies all 
ritual, those of life cycle, birth and death, marriage and initiation, 
and those of any ceremony which involves an even temporary acknowledgement 
of the sacred. Indeed any such movement, even for example meeting and 
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leave taking is marked by a transitional period, albeit brief, which 
in his views serves to "make the break gradual rather than abrupt."**'"' 
All boundaries which are given ritual expression, which are ritually 
marked, are marked in such a way as to make movement through them > 
both visible, that is they are given symbolic expression, and relatively 
painless. Some societies are clearly more conscious of these 
thresholds than others, and different societies will give different 
aspects of their culture ritual expression. With a metaphor that 
we shall have cause to remember Van Gennep makes this point quite 
clearly: "A society is similar to a house divided into rooms and 
corridors. The more the society resembles ours in its form of 
civilization, the thinner are its internal partitions and the wider 
and more open are its doors of communication. In a semi-civilized 
society, on the other hand, sections are carefully isolated, and 
passage from one to another must be made through formalities and 
ceremonies which show extensive parallels to the rites of territorial 
..116 
passage..,." 
It is clear that in our own society the scale of ritual in interpersonal 
relations and at points of transition in our life cycle is not great, as 
Van Gennep notes, though those passages in and out of the sacred which 
are marked, are done so in ways perfectly in tune with Van Gennep's 
characterizations of them. Edmund Leach, for example, draws attention 
to the role of formality, masquerade, and role reversal as marking in 
all forms of society, including our own, the aspects of separation, 
incorporation (interchangeably) and transition r e s p e c t i v e l y , A n d 
he, like Van Gennep, wishes to establish the coincidence and validity 
of the logic across and between cultures, irrespective of, though not 
irrelevant to, the particular beliefs and practices which are associated 
with it. 
-1 26-
I hope to argue, that in our society and culture this ritualisation 
is given expression not so much in the details of social relations 
but in the forms of its culture, that it is not so much in terms of 
the 'lived' relations of social status, but in the 'thought' relation t 
of the status of knowledge and ideas. It is in this sense that such 
a transition marking and ameliorating Institution as television gains 
its significance. The source of our social and cultural anxiety has 
been, to a degree, displaced. We are much less concerned by the facts 
of birth, marriage or death, for example, in contemporary culture, because 
it might appear, we have forms of knowledge which have allowed us to 
deny or minimize the dangers associated with them. We are, however, 
much more concerned with that knowledge itself, and with the dangers 
that it poses to our security. Culture is itself, in its cognitive 
or aesthetic aspects, in need of mediation, and television, in both 
its content and its form, is a central instrument of that mediation. 
It marks the site of the most important rite de passage in our 
contemporary society. 
I shall return to these issues shortly and to an attempt to characterize 
the way in which television can be understood mythically and ritually, 
but before I do there is one further dimension of the problem to be 
considered. This too, like the equation of myth and ritual, has a 
semantic quality about it, but equally it has operational significance. 
It is the question of the difference between myth and folktale. 
IV 
The dispute is endless. Its resolution is not helped by the failure, 
as we have seen, to agree on what myth is. On the one hand there 
are those who argue that the material of myth and folktale is inter-
118 
changeable, and that it is only the sacred quality of the former 
which mark8 it as distinct,; and there are those who suggest that 
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myth is the general category of which folktales are a species 
or even that folktales are, in a number of significant ways, a 
120 
degeneration of myth. Let me explore some of these aspects 
in a little more detail. 
Stith Thompson, the folklorist, identifies the coincidence of plot 
structure underlying the different forms of tale: "Fairytales 
become myths, or animal tales, or local legends. As stories transcend 
differences of age or of place and move from the ancient world to 
ours, or from ours to a primitive society, they often undergo protean 
transformations in style and narrative purpose. For the plot structure 
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of the tale is much more stable and persistent than its form." 
It is the mutual convertability of myth to folktale and vice versa, 
which he, and Franz Boas, equally stress. Each, for Boas is the 
product "of the play of imagination with the events of human life; 
an imagination and a play which is rather limited. People much 
rather operate with the old stock of imaginative happenings than 
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invent new ones." Ruth Benedict also finds little with which to 
distinguish folktale and myth; "Myths like folk tales are primarily 
novelistic tales, the two are to be distinguished only by the fact 
that myths are tales of the supernatural world and share also 123 therefore the characteristics of the religious complex." 
But this diffuseness is not general, and those who are cognisant of 
the narrative structure and its variation seem prepared to hazard 
more than this - though inevitably not without some backsliding. 
For example, Thompson quotes A. Olrik on the definition of the 
folktale, only to suggest that it Is, rather, the difference between 
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oral and literary narrative that is being distinguished. G.S. Kirk 
also offers a definition of a folktale; "traditional tales, of no 
firmly established form, in which supernatural elements are subsidiary; 
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they are not primarily concerned with serious subjects or the 
reflexion of deep problems and preoccupations; and their first 
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appeal lies in their narrative interest."; which stresses little 
that is unequivocal even including the seriousness of the content . 
of myth, a seriousness which suggests a difference in the intensity 
with which they are believed. For Kirk the folktale is a derivative, 
logical if not chronological, from the unbounded category of myth; 
and what links them is the presence of folktale motifs or narrative 126 
devices often visible in an elaborated myth. It might even be 
that the folktale is a discovery of the early nineteenth century, 
a figment of the imagination of those who discovered peasant culture 127 
in all its illiterate glory. 
Nevertheless it does seem reasonable to suggest that folktales 
involve the weakening and the transformation of myth. That much 
at least is agreed by Vladimir Propp and Claude Levi-Strauss, and 
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by someone who might be called their mediator, Eleazor Meletinsky. 
I will reserve a discussion of the methodological dispute until the 
next chapter and concentrate, albeit briefly, on the substantial 
arguments. 
Vladimir Propp has little to say beyond recognizing .that "the fairytale 
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in its morphological basis represents a myth," but he is taken 
well to task for failing to incorporate that insight into his analyses 
of the narrative of the folktale by Claude Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss, 
in offering his own version of the relationship, begins by making 
a queationnable assumption - that "almost all societies perceive the 130
 b u t 
two genera as distinct" -/then makes two more substantive suggestions: 
"In the first instance, the tales are constructed on weaker oppositions 
than those found in myths. The latter are not cosmological, metaphysical, 
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or natural, but, more frequently, local, social and moral. In the 
second place - and precisely because the tale is a weakened trans-
position of the myth - the former is less strictly subjected than 
the latter to the triple considerations of logical coherence, • 
religious orthodoxy, and collective pressure. The tale offers more 
possibilities of play, its permutations are comparatively freer, and 
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they progressively acquire a certain arbitrary character." 
For L^vi-Strauss, as I hope to argue in the next chapter, Proppian 
in it 
analysis is basically misconceived because/he attaches himself to 
the derivative and incomplete text of the folktale, but clearly 
this is simply a case of one man's meat. The issue, methodologically, 
has to do with the relative stress one places on the chronology of the 
story as compared with the structural logic of a mythic system. The 
choice itself is in part determined, and this would be the point, by 
the relative strength of one form of ordering over the other in a 
mythical or non-mythical text. The shift, in a sense, involves a shift 
from, in myth, a deep structure of logical categories given concrete 
expression synchronicslly, to in a folktale, a less deep ( though still 
not manifest) structure of chronologic and function. In an extreme 
way, the meaning of a myth lies in the mythic system, while that of 
a folktale can be divined from the single text, at least in conjunction 
with ethnographic and sociological evidence. 
Despite having defended Propp against Levi-Strauss, Eleazor Meletinsky's 
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recent return, in English, to the subject of myth and folktale, 
involves an acceptance of the primacy of myth, and the argument that 
the transformation from myth to folktale involves a movement away from 
the cosmic to the social and the individual. But this is a transformation 
and not a denial of the basically mythic structures of categorial opposition 
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and presumably does not involve any change in the myth's basic 
function which is to explain "the existing social and cosmic order 




We need no longer accept such an inclusive and totalitarian 
formulation entirely, but it has some, inevitable foundation. So too 
does Meletinsky's characterisation of the elements of the transition 
from myth to folktale. I can briefly list them without detailed 
comment; the elimination of ritual and sacred elements, the weakening 
of strict belief in the truth of the mythological happenings, the 
development of conscious invention, the loss of ethnographic concreteness, 
the substitution of ordinary people for mythical heroes, of indeterminate 
fairytale time for the age of myth, the weakening or loss of aetiologism, 
the shift of attention from collective destinies to individual ones, 
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and from cosmic destiny to social destiny. What is involved, essentially, 
is a change of scale. 
"In the fairytale, the objects that are acquired and the goods that 
are achieved are not elements of nature and culture, but food, women, 
magical articles etc., which bring about the hero's good fortune; 
instead of a first beginning of things, we find here a redistribution 
of goods which the hero acquires for himself, or for his immediate 
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circle." One might be tempted to characterize this as the 
con8umerization of myth, and indeed this is not as entirely unfanciful 
as it might appear. 
Not only does the folktale therefore offer a weakening of much which 
in myth gives it its power, whether that is interpreted logically or 
aesthetically, but it brings the telling of tales, in a sense, much 
closer to home. The content of the folktale is less transcendent; 
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it is told for enjoyment and as I have noted in the last chapter, 
the teller of folktales and songs is given a certain licence in 
his narration. This might also be true, of course in the telling of 
myth, but insofar as myths are linked to particular rituals and 
actually do recount an origin or explain a practice, then this must 
be less likely and less extreme. 
y r-
Let me now discuss, by way of summary, not myth and folktales or even 
ritual as separate phenomena, but the mythic which contains them all. 
In view of the disputes and differences on matters of substance this 
seems both reasonable and likely to be more profitable. It does not 
involve an argument for mythopoeia, a mythic form of thought, but 
more in the way of Levy-Bruhl, a mythic dimension to thought. Such 
a dimension will gain greater or less expression, depending on the 
culture and on its development; it will be expressed differently and 
through different forms likewise. It is the present argument, of 
course, that our society is no more exempt from this than any other, 
claims for the disenchantment of the world notwithstanding. And it 
it is 
is the present argument that/television, supremely among the mass media, 
which articulates the mythic in contemporary society. 
A definition is in order. The mythic dimension of culture contains 
traditional stories and actions whose source is the persistent need to 
deny chaos and create order. It contributes to the security of 
social and cultural existence. The mythic is a world apart, but it is 
also close at hand. It acts as a bridge between the everyday and the 
transcendent, the known and the unknown, the sacred and the profane. 








I will consider each in turn. 
1. Narration Much of the remainder of this thesis will be concerned 
with narrative and I will postpone its substantive discussion. 
Suffice it to say that the telling, singing or acting of myth and 
folktale, within or apart from ritual, involves the communication of 
an ordered and rule governed text. The rules are both constraining 
and enabling. They guarantee the viability of the performance; they 
generate in the disciplined mixing of the novel and the familiar and 
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of risk and certainty, the pleasure of the tale. Narration 
itself is, in a certain sense, a transcendence. 
Conversation, of course, is rule governed, and includes quite naturally 
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the telling of stories; indeed jokes, fables, proverbs constitute 
a logical residue of the miniminally performed and they mark, along 
with the unselfconscious products of informal narration, the hither 
end of the mythic. 
Similarly for Claude Levi-Strauss the deterioration of myth begins with 
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the folktale and ends with the serial romance. Beyond that it is 
no longer worthy of the name. Clearly not all stories belong to the 
mythic, though perhaps they all have something of the magical about them. 
But clearly too, what makes a story a myth, is the social recognition 
that it is such; and mythic narratives are essentially collective 140 
properties, both anonymous and secure. 
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Television's narratives are mythic in this sense, as I hope 
subsequently to show. They preserve in their structure the 
relatively simple logic of event and meaning, of more obviously 
mythic tales. Everything in television is told, though it remains * 
to be established conclusively, of course, that everything which 
television tells is mythic. 
2
' Tradition "If then myths are traditional tales, then their 
telling is subject to the rules of all traditional tales: they will 
be varied in some degree on virtually every occasion of telling, and 
the variations will be determined by the whim, the ambition or the 
particular thematic repertoire of the individual teller, as well as 
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by the receptivity and special requirements of the particular audience." 
It is the structure of the tale which preserves its authority, as well 
as the structure of the performance within which it is narrated. 
The conservatism of which the mythic is an embodiment and which it expresses 
is dynamic and complex. So to be effective conservative thought needs 
to be able to maintain harmony with the new, and the mythic does this 
by processes of adjustment and cooperation wherein its structures are 
preserved. Innovation in culture is itself constrained by, and 
dependent on, not so much the weight or the content of tradition, but 
on the presence within that tradition of the forms of expression and 
orientation which have developed generally, if not universally, as the 
j / 2 
response of man's fundamental confrontation with his world. 
It seems hard to assert that television is traditional; it is certainly 
compelling in its repetitions, but equally certain and equally obvious in 
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its contempt for anything which is not new and not unique. Even history 
becomes de-reified in the dramatization of the moment. However once 
again, not much beneath the surface, television is traditional; not 
only does it establish its own traditions, in programmes and more 
144 
significantly in the sheer act of watching , but it depends crucially 
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on the restraints of storytelling. At this level we already know -
and I hope to demonstrate - that television is the preserver of 
tradition and that novelty is a thin disguise. 
t 
The culture which sustains and is sustained by it is a folk culture -
the little tradition perhaps, though not exclusively rural nor in 
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any way immune from the influence of the elite. A folk culture is, 
almost by definition, a traditional culture, though once again it needs 
to be stressed that the 'folk' are not those of the backwater, but a 
national folk with whom we all identify, to a greater or lesser degree, 
at some time or another. 
3. Motivation "Man can adapt somehow to anything his imagination can cope 
with, but he cannot deal with chaos... Therefore our most important assets 
are always the symbols of our general orientation in nature, on the earth, 
in society and in whatever we are doing."
1
 The mythic grows out of 
man's fear of chaos. On the one hand it is expressive of the solidarity 
gained in communion, though not as Durkheim would have it, its exclusive 
product. On the other hand it grows out of a desire to make enough sense 
of the world in order to stem the panic engendered by the unknown. "Every 147 
human order", argues Peter Berger, "is a community in the face of death." 
The mythic, in a certain sense, is a literal response to such feelings. It 
may well use, and depend on, as C.G.Jung and Sigmund Freud argue, the 
particular structure and contents of the unconscious. For Jung the purpose 
of rite and dogma was clear; they were dams and walls to keep back the 
dangers of the unconscious.^^ And for Freud the common symbolism of myth 
and dreams was evidence of the workings of this, perhaps even mythic level 
of the psyche. Geza Roheim uses his Freudianism also to see in myth and 
folktale a response to archaic feelings of guilt and anxiety; "In the folkta] 
we relate how we overcome the anxiety connected with the 'bad parents' and 
grew up; in myth we confess that only death can end the tragic ambivalence of 
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human nature. Eros triumphs in the folktale. Thanatos in the 
150 
myth." 
Indeed all those theories of the mythic which have emotion as their 
base perceive it as a response to some dark layer of man's existence, 
be it internalized, in the psyche, or externalized, in the natural 
world. For Mircea Eliade, as we have seen, myth is a response to the 
terror of history and to pain and suffering. Aspects of the world, 
beyond control, are made bearable and hence controllable through accounts 
which can only succeed in their consistency and persistence. The mythic 
is motivated by a desire to reduce the ambiguity and uncertainty of the 
raw world and to replace it in consciousness and in lived relations, by 
a structure of minimum viability which guarantees the integrity and 
reality of human existence. The fact that this was a symbolic structure, 
a mediation, an idealization, did not mean that it was false, as for 
example Jurgen Habermas seems to think. "In primitive stages of 
social development, the problems of survival - and thus man's experiences 
of contingency in dealing with outer nature -were so drastic that they had 
to be counterbalanced by the narrative production of an illusion of order, 
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as can be clearly seen In the content of myth." That illusion is 
such only because these creations cannot eradicate the uncertainty or 
contingency of the world which prompted them; but insofar as they 
generate the conditions for a more or less ordered and secure world 
then they are as close to the real as human beings will ever reach. 
So the perception of the mythic as being logical, in a concrete, 
non-Aristotelian sense, is one which itself is persuasive. Myth is, 
in part, a response to and a necessary resolution of the arbitrary; 
it cannot just produce it. It must combine, therefore, the emotional 
and the rational, and both are needed to explain it, just as both are 
needed to explain man. The logic is concrete, it uses the natural 
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world, because as Levy-Bruhl argues, the mythic imagination is at 
one with the world. Economic and social contiguity with nature 
is both reproduced and supported by narrative contiguity. 
We meet arguments which are ultimately to do with motivation in the 
context of television research, both in the notion of escape and in 
and 
the concept of uses and gratifications; perjorative/anti-perjorative 
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functions respectively. As Elihu Katz and David Foulkes suggest 
this research follows the question "what do people do with the media", 
and the answer is something like this:"....everday roles in modern 
society give rise to tension or drives (stemming from alienation or 
felt deprivation) which lead one to high exposure to mass media with 
its characteristic context.... and its characteristic content (e.g. 
fantasy) from which via psychological processes such as identification 
one can obtain compensatory gratification and, perhaps, an unanticipated 
consequence, "narcotization" of other role obligations." Here media 
of mass communication, though not granted exclusively dysfunctional 
roles, nevertheless are studied in terms of the drives which make 
fantasy both necessary and appropriate.'"^ 
Function "The function of myth, in short, is to stabilize the 
existing regime, to afford infallible precedents for practice and 
procedure, and to place on an unassailable foundation the general rule 
of conduct, traditional institutions and the sentiments controlling social 
behaviour and religious belief... myth is not aetiological but fidejussive. 
Its business is not to satisfy curiosity but to confirm the faith. It 
is here to cater, not for the speculative man with his 'why', but for 
the practical man with his 'how' if not then?"
 1 5 5 
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Arguments about function, which are or should be social, inevitably 
156 
grow out of assumptions about motivation. The mythic therefore 
is seen as a containment of the irrational, a justification of what 
passes for the rational, a protection against the unknown and the 
different. The mythic connection with violence has often been 
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noted. 118 continual restatement of origLn; its denial of 
empirical time and the reinstatement of real time is perceived as an 
aspect of its function as a legitimater of the present social order, 
as well as a guarantee of its future. 
158 159 
The mythic reinforces status. It is a guide to action. It is 
160 
nona of these things. The problem of function centres on the 
tendency for those who consider it, Malinowski perhaps apart, to make 
the mythic coextensive with society, and to assume that the accounts it 
gives of the world are faithful to the work of lived relations and 
directly bear upon them. The great joy of the notion of latent 
function is that even when this homology is not apparent, the argument 
can still stand. 
Equally absurd, of course, is the totalitarion theory of falsehood, 
equally functional, but premised on the assumption that the mythic 
not only holds back the natural threat but also the social threat to the 
existing social structure. In this sense myth is an uncritical response 
to a critical situation; "Myth originates whenever thought and 
imagination are employed uncritically or deliberately used to promote 
social delusion.".'*'
1 
This isi of course, an increasingly common theme, particularly in 
much criticism of contemporary culture. But just as much as myth 
cannot be treated as the be all and end all of social existence, no 
more can it be perceived as a permanent aberration. The Mythic, of 
course, is functional, but not because It is ubiquitous. On the 
-1 38-
other hand, of course, it is often out of accord with the interests 
of sections of society who would have most to gain by the transformation 
of that society and a replacement of one myth by another. 
Indeed mythic forms can be used precisely and paradoxically to aid 
this transformation as James L. Peacock has pointed out in his 
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discussion of the Ludruk, the classic drama of Indonesia. The 
incorporation of new values and content into the old forms serves, 
in this case, a number of purposes: first of all it helps both 
actors and spectators to understand modernization in terms of vivid 
and meaningful symbolic classifications; secondly it seduces the 
participants into empathy with modes of social action involved in the 
modernization process; and finally it involves the participants 
aesthetically, but equally in favour of the changes being undertaken 
in their society. 
Here the mythic is much more than just a 'symbolic statement about the 
social o r d e r ' , b u t involves the more or less selfconscious manip-
ulation of traditional forms to involve those who have accepted those 
forms to accept, in turn, social change. Whether this is functional or 
not will depend on how one values those changes and indeed how one 
measures the success of such cultural events in contributing towards 
them. One cannot, easily or at all, move from descriptions about 
what a myth contains to assumptions about action; nor can we posit 
a one to one correlation between action and communication. Theories 
of reflection, as much as theories of function, mask the very real 
difficulty and complexity of such relations. 
Nevertheless of all aspects of culture, the mythic will be the closest 
to a heartland of belief, thought and action. Prompted, as I have 
argued by a desire for order and control, it attempts, in thought 
-1 39-
and deed, to generate just that. But it may be, and increasingly is, 
only one solution to that need and to the problems associated with it. 
Once again arguments about the function of television parrot those about 
myth; often critical, though not always so, they stress the role television, 
cap in hand, plays to the institutions of the state and of society as a 
165 
whole. This seems at least as fer as a centralised medium of mass commun-
ication is concerned, unremarkable, though we may not like the way of it. 
But it is, I think, in the final analysis, also misconceived. The relation-
ship between television and society, just as the relationship between myth 
and society, is not simply functional, if by that we mean essentially and 
necessarily preservative of existing institutions. Indeed, whatever notion 
of function we use, substantial questions about the nature of television 
remain. This is an issue to which I shall return in the final section of 
the thesis. 
5. Framing The response which the mythic offers to these cultural problems 
is therefore particular. I have already suggested that although myths are 
not necessarily or exclusively sacred tales, they nevertheless constitute 
the marked element in culture. By that I mean that the mythic is a form 
of expression that is both different from and at the same time similar to, 
as well as distant from and close to, the world of every day experience. 
The move from that world to the world of the mythic involves a transformation, 
the crossing of a boundary, the entering of, in Victor Turner's terminology, 
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a liminal dimension. Its sacred nature is not therefore objectively given 
by the presence of gods or the exclusive preoccupation with things cosmic, 
but solely in that movement from one clearly defined domain to another. 
The passage is both illuminating and modifying of normal experience. And this 
is so because in the mythic, both in myth and in ritual, it is the patterning 
of experience that is made manifest; the coherence of experience becomes 
explicit. As I pointed out in the first, introductory, chapter, the mythic 
167 • 
consists in a framed reality. The notion of a frame surrounding the work 
of art and marking it off from an otherwise undifferentiated background, is 
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relatively modern. As Meyer Schapiro writes: "Apparently it was 
late in the second millenium B.C. (if even then) before one thought of a 
continuous isolating frame around an image: a homogenous enclosure like 
a city wall.... The frame belongs to...the space of the observer rather 
than of the illusory, three dimensional world disclosed within and behind. 
It is a finding and focussing device placed between the observer and the 
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image." The frame, in its metaphorical sense - in television of course 
it is both - is just this finding and focussing device, and there are 
at least three dimensions to the frame of the mythic. 
First of all we can identify the social aspect. The frame here is a spatial 
and temporal boundary which separates the mundane from the sacred. Those 
who enter this sacred time and space are entering an emotionally toxic 
world of familiarity and risk, in which they are expected to suspend disbelief 
169 
and accept for the time being a heightened set of categorical imperatives. 
On entering they are faced with a form of communication with displaces their 
own, which denies or alters their normal perceptions of space and time. The 
narrative of a myth or drama contracts or expands temporal sequences at will. 
As Mircea Eliade among others notes, mythic time is forever present. Space 
too is transformed; it is always here. In the metaphor and metonymy of 
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sympathetic magic distances are transcended. In the mythic, cause too is 
transcendent. Motivation, empirical connection - both are relegated to the 
search for perfection and equilibrium of an ordered play. "To be perfect an 
ending must be perfectly prepared for."'''' And 'play
1
, here, is play in both 
its senses, that of drama and that of voluntary, superfluous, enjoyment in 
Jan Huizinga's sense. Play is distinct from ordinary life - and like ritual 
that distinction is marked by time and by place and by a distinct order. 
"Inside the playground an absolute and peculiar order reigns. Here we come 
across another, very positive feature of play: it creates order, is order. 
Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a 
temporary, a limited perfection. Play demands order absolute and 
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supreme." We are to be reminded also that the word stage has a 
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temporal, spatial and active reference. 
The third sense of frame refers to the content of the mythic: 
173 
Suzanne Langer's "strongest light and deepest darkness". 
The content itself is marked off and distinct,though not entirely,for the 
simultaneity of distance and proximity must be maintained and articulated. 
The content is the product on the one hand of a synesthesia: the 
mythic is a communication in which differences of perspective, of 
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emotion, of sensibility are united into a plurivocal text. And 
on the other it speaks of balance between its elements and between 
their referents beyond the myth; in this sense the content of the 
myth speaks of the particular ambition.... "to reach the threshold, 
undoubtedly the most profitable to human societies, of a just 
equilibrium between their unity and their diversity; and to maintain 
an equal balance between communication, favouring reciprocal 
illuminations - and absence of communication, also beneficial - since 175 
the fragile flowers of difference need half-light In order to exist." 
Television is the frame par excellence of our culture; it shares with 
ritual as Mary Douglas points o u t ' t h e capacity to redirect and to 
redraft perception and experience; not for ever certainly, but for 
the duration. Within and through the frame, perhaps, Henri Bergson's 
famous notion of 'growing old together' (La dureelis for the time 
being annulled.'^^ 
6. Mediation I prefer the notion of mediation to that of transformation, 
that 
because while it makes obvious sense to recognize/the mythic is often 
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a world of topsy-turveydom, it need not be, and I want to stress 
now, and in the next section that the mythic is essentially a bridge 
between man in his everyday existence and both the natural and super-
natural world which bounds that existence. "Mythological thought 
operates within the continuity between the human world and the world 
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of the goda. Theological thought serves to mediate between the 
two worlds, precisely because their original continuity now appears 
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broken." Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann echo Levy-Bruhl's 
recognition that myths themselves are secondary, the product of a 
self-consciousness which is absent in mythical thought itself. 
The mythic, of which I have been talking, is much closer to the 
theological of Berger and Luckmann. 
In a defintion of the mythic which looks to Mircea Eliade and to 
Arnold Van Gennep, Victor Turner stresses its mediatory position and 
function. The mythic is the domain of the liminal, which paradoxically 
from our point of view stresses the ambiguous and the fluid, rather 
than their resolution. "The attributes of liminality and of liminal 
personae (threshold people) are necessarily ambiguous, since this 
condition and those persons elude or slip through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural 
space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are 
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arranged by law, custom, 
concentration , and ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and 
indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols 
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in the many societies that ritualize social and cultural transitions." 
Myths are liminal phenomena: "...they are felt to be high or deep 
mysteries which put the initiand temporarily into close rapport with 
the primary or primordial generative powers of the cosmos, threats of 
which transcend rather than transgress the norms of human secular a 
society. In myth is a limitless freedom, and/symbolic freedom of 
action which is denied to the norm bound incumbent of a status in a 
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social structure. Liminality is pure potency," 
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Mediation is the dynamic within the mythic. We need not accept 
entirely Turner's characterisation for it denies, though his work 
often seems to incorporate, the angular logic of an intellectualist 
perception of myth; and this seems necessary both in terms of a 
definition of the myth and also in order for us to understand the 
mythology of others. With the notion of mediation, however, this 
discussion of myth and the mythic comes full circle. Whether 
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conceived in terms of symbolic function or totemic operator, or in 
terms of the liminality of Mircea Eliade and Victor Turner, the 
mythic is the site where chaos and order, past, future and present, 
reason and emotion meet, if only momentarily. It is the nature of 
this meeting, one which unites television with the mythic as I have 
presented it, which I want to consider in the next and final section 
of this chapter. 
VI 
In order to do this effectively I want to return to some considerations 
which I presented in the first chapter, and in particular to the notion 
of commonsense. "Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge I share with 
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others in the normal, self-evident matrices of everyday life." 
And for Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and indeed for Alfred Schutz, 
the commonsense world is the taken for granted, typical world of you 
or I in our daily existence. We are wide awake in it, It is 
ordered and objective. It is the domain of the 'here' of my body 
and the 'now' of my present. "What is 'here and now' presented 184 
to us in everyday life is the realissinum of my consciousness." 
It is intersubjective; I share it with others. It is unproblematic 
until further notice, that is until, quite tautologically, it becomes 
problematic. Commonsense is bounded by finite worlds of meaning. 
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I am excluded from these by my involvement in the everyday world 
and in order to make them accessible to me as a member, I have to 
translate their particularities into my own. Everyday language 
does this for me. "Typically, therefore, I distort the reality 
of the latter as soon as I begin to use the common language in 
interpreting them, that is I 'translate' the non-everyday experience 
185 
back into the paramount reality of everyday life." Commonsense 
is sedimentary; it contains within it the accumulated experiences 
of man faced with similar problems at different times. 
Perhaps, as hard as it is for a member of the everyday world to under-
stand the reality of finite worlds surrounding him the reverse is also 
true. Specialized, and by that I mean in this context at least, 
sociological, conceptions of the commonsense world are both infrequent 
and apparently ill-informed. Berger and Luckmann, for all their 
sensitivity, produce an unevenly eclectic account of an abstract 
186 
social process. Elsewhere considerations of commonsenfte have 
been judgemental. And clearly within any self-conscious Marxism 
the view of the unselfconscious man in the street is likely to be 187 condemnatory. 
Among these ,perhaps the most interesting is the account given of 
188 
commonsense by Antonio Gramsci in The Prison Notebooks. 
Gramsci makes a distinction between commonsense and good sense, the 
former is "not rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming 
itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical 
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opinions which have entered ordinary life." The latter, 'good 
sense', is the particularly philosophical element of commonsense, 
practical, empirical, and which deserves to be 'made more unitary 
. . . • 190 
and coherent'. 
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"Coramonsense is riot a single unique conception, identical 
in time and space. It is the'folklore'of philosophy, 
and, like .folklore, it takes countless different forms. 
Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception 
which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, 
incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the 
social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy 
It is. At those times in history when a homogeneous social 
group is brought into being, there comes into being also, 
in opposition to comnonsense, a homogeneous - in other words 
coherent and systematic - philosophy." 191 
Commonsense, for Gramsci, therefore, has a certain coherence, as 
well as its fragmentary quality; it is material because it is 
grounded in the experience of social existence; it contains within 
it residues of previously held beliefs and opinions, and indeed the 
relationship between religion and commonsense is a close one. 
192 
Philosophy, an intellectual form of thought supercedes both. 
Commonsense and folklore are coexistent; "Commonsense creates 
the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase 193 
of popular knowledge at a given place and time." 
These considerations, despite the different valuation, accord very 
well with the Implicit model of commonsense I outlined in the first 
chapter, in which commonsense was conceived as a form of knowledge 
grounded in the everyday world and bounded by other forms of knowledge 
and non-knowledge with which it has to maintain a relationship. 
Traditionally that relationship has been articulated through the 
mythic; contemporarily it is articulated through the media of 
mass communication, pre-eminently television. A Venn diagram 






FIGURE I: MYTH AND COMMONSENSE 
Commonsense here is core knowledge. Grounded in man's material 
experience of the everyday it defines and is the product of the 
everyday's typicality. With commonsense, we get through or 
get by, admittedly in a parochial way, but with a parochiality which 
is universal, as are the problems with which it has to deal. 
Commonsense is taken for granted, but it need not be unconscious, 
and of course its consciousness may not coincide with that of 
critical reason, but that is another matter. Indeed the judgements 
about it, mirror those judgements against primitive thought of 
which, in its ethnocentrism, the nineteenth century 
194 
was so fond. It is none the less logical and adequate for its 
task. Commonsense is bounded, one might even say surrounded, by 
aspects of human existence which are not intrinsically available to 
it, and with whose juxtaposition life becomes uncertain and ambiguous. 




the natural for the primitive, the unknowable, the unpredictable, 
the uncontrollable. On the other hand there are the various and 
often competing specialist accounts of the world,as often as not 
of that world of the unknowable which itself is unknown, unpredictable 
and uncontrollable from the point of view of commonsense. Where these 
three zones overlap we find the domain of the mythic. The mythic bridges, 
mediates and translates the unknown and the unknowable into terms which 
are accessible and forms which are familiar. For Clifford Geertz this 
boundary is essential to an understanding of the cultural significance of 
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ritual : "A man, even large groups of men, may be aesthetically in-
sensitive, religiously unconcerned and inequipped to pursue full scientific 
analysis, but he cannot be completely lacking in commonsense and survive. 
The dispositions which religious rituals induce, then, have their most im-
portant impact - from a human point of view - outside the boundaries of 
ritual itself as they reflect back to colour the individual's conception 
of the established world of bare fact." The mythic frames the world of 
commonsense and it concentrates the mind wonderfully. 
Although the distinction is a relative rather than an absolute one, it is 
clear that the two dimensions of the mythic, the cognitive and effective , 
each have their place in this model. The mythic boundary between the 
particular forms of knowledge and commonsense is essentially a cognitive one; 
reason is the transformer; the appeal is to the intellect. And equally 
the mythic boundary between non-knowledge (the world of nature) and common-
sense is essentially an affective one; emotion is the transformer and the 
appeal is to feeling. 
Indeed the various forms of television programmes, the news, the documentary, 
the drama and the entertainment show can be placed within this model and 
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distinguished, quite simply, through it. Each form articulates its own 
mix of familiarity and novelty and each mediates in a different mode across 
the divide into the world of commonsente. Most distinct are the documentary 
and the entertainment show, the former predominantly appealing to the 
intellect, the latter to the emotions. Drama and news are more equivocal 
forms and more complex, though I suggest there is more reason than emotion 
in the news, while the reverse is true of drama - there is more emotion 
than reason. 
The drama, with which I shall be concerned in this thesis is to be clearly 
demarcated, at least iri the eyes of the producers, from the documentary; 
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the audience is to know that drama is not real. Freed, therefore, 
from the constraints of direct portrayal, but nevertheless constrained 
by memory and ephemerality, (a drama is not memorable because it is true), a the 
television drama is narrative form par excellence. In serial or soap box 
as well as in the isolated play, but particularly in the former, the novelty 
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of character and style is firmly locked into the familiarity of plot. Here 
the myth is in the logic of expression, the excitement of event and the 
control of expectation. Its content is the content of direct experience, 
though heightened, transformed, given prestige; violence, love and sex, 
the family, work, life and death. Emotion rules reason. As I have 
suggested drama is to be distinguished most clearly from documentary; 
television knows it; "...it is essential that the nature and purpose of 
every programme should be made clear to everybody. Not only must the 
audience know that they are watching a documentary as opposed to a play; 
they must know that it is a documentary which sets out to do this or that, 
and to do it from certain standpoints only... And since the audience must 
-149-
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be in no doubt about such things, this must usually be said more than once'.' 
Documentary is not reality of course; it is a translation of reality and as 
199 often as not the esoteric or presumed esoteric reality of others. . 
But documentary treats of particular knowledge and particular worlds - ; 
the scientific, aesthetic or political - and it does so in an attempt to 
broaden horizons of everyday culture. It is an equivocal task - for the 
boundary remains both despite and because of such attempts; the documentary 
is the site of intellectual liminality, where the categories of, for example, 
science, are blurred and those of the everyday extended, and where the result 
a 
is/prestigious illusion of understanding. This is myth also; because the 
illusion is inevitable and necessary, just as in drama the solutions it 
offers are impossible. Narrative though in different degrees, and probably 
in different ways, underlines both. 
I have less to say about the news and the light entertainment show. The 
news with its formulae and its persistence is much studied though not always 
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in a particularly enlightening way; it consists in fragments of 
narrative and its fragmentary quality masks its forms. Here above all is 
revealed television's engine of transformation as the novelty of origin, 
of distance, of size and of conflict are made amenable and manageable in 
time (News at Ten) and space (Here is the News). News is drama reversed; 
the chronology of narrative is shattered and the categorial logic of the 
mythic system assumes dominance. News is reason over emotion. 
The show is pure emotion, pure entertainment and the constraints of song, 
dance and the joke reach out to the edge of ritual,for our participation 
is necessarily intense but impotent. The mystery, however, is intense, 
and it is perhaps in the show, above all, that television creates its 
201 
own canon of stars and idols. The content of the show is itself 
close and familiar; indeed in light entertainment nothing is new except 
its style. This very familiarity demands therefore its heroes, and its 
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extravagance; what is near is pushed away; in the news what is far away 
is brought home. 
Figure II 
Television and Myth; the forms 
essentially because through it we of the profane world have access 
to something which, in its unmediated state, and by its very 
distance, is sacred. We may not, as individuals, be particularly 
anxious about problems of science or aesthetics on the one hand, or 
of life, death and identity on the other, but our culture, like 
any other, is. Television betrays the other, while at the same 
time preserving it. Its particular intensity is that of a synaesthetic 
experience of sight, sound and touch; it defines the location, where 
in drama or in documentary, our own world is open to the reassuring 
challenge of magic and enchantment. And indeed that experience is 
a communal one; we are participants and not just patients; and this 
is so through our participation in the entirety of television's 
culture, through newspapers, magazines, and in conversation. The 
mythic world of television demands a response which it itself conditions 
and constrains. It does not exist without us. 
— 151 — 
This characterisation is, in a sense, overly poetic. Therefore 
the remainder of the thesis, in exploring the structures of drama, 
seeks to give it some substance. More work is needed before a full 
understanding of the other forms of television will be reached. But 
it is hoped this framework will be useful. Television, I suggest, 
should be given a significance which transcends the immediate and which 
despite its appearance, locks its participants in a communication which 
preserves, integrates, and legitimises, not only our own society, but 
the continuity of human, cultural existence. In thia sense it is 
mythic. 
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around that assortment. Its function, if you want to call it that, 
is interpretive; it is a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, 
a story they tell themselves about themselves." 
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Marshall McLuhan has argued that television must abandon the story line. 
"There simply is no time for the narrative form, borrowed from earlier 
print technology."' McLuhan's understanding of narrative is, however, 
too literal. 
The purpose of this, and the next two chapters, is to illustrate in what 
ways television can and does tell stories, and to discuss some of the im-
plications of that facility. Indeed the process has already been begun in 
my discussion of the work of Christian Metz and in the demonstration of its 
usefulness for an analysis of the form of television's expression. Through 
such an analysis we can begin to understand how it is that television, and 
of course film, structures its texts in its particular way. This dimension 
of narrative is medium specific and of course says nothing about the content 
of the stories, though an understanding of it depends on a measure of that 
content. The problems associated with pushing this work further are legion 
and in particular they involve a minute examination of the image and its 
internal structure. Such work has begun elsewhere, though hesitantly, and it 
still seems unable to transcend problems both of translating image into 
words and of making those words seriously illuminating or the interpretation 
2 
offered through them ultimately compelling. 
For my purpose, such work is in any case preparatory, for my interest now 
and in the rest of the thesis is with the content of the narrative and with 
its form. The problems here are of a different order, though they are still 
3 
enormous. They are not of course solved through the kind of formal and 
structural analysis which I offer here, but if it is recognised that such 
an analysis is itself the beginning, though in my view the correct beginning, 
then it should be clear, at the end of it all, what the problems are and 
perhaps even how they might best be approached. 
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So, if television tells stories, what are the stories that television 
tells? We can begin, as many others have done before, with the classic 
4 
studies of Vladimir Propp. 
Vladimir Propp's study of Rissian folktale took as its point of departure 
the literary theories of Veselovsky"* and his thematics, but it owed 
a much more direct debt to his formalist contemporaries, among whom 
the study of the texts, both poetic and narrative, as autonomous entities 
was the principal concern. Victor Shklovsky^, Boris Eikhenbaum^, and 
g 
Roman Jakobson , among many others, defined for themselves a new 
. 9 
field of poetics and attacked the study of the devices and structures 
within the poetic and novelistic texts with gusto, an enthusiasm fanned 
and encouraged in the few years immediately following the Russian Revolution 
and before the cold hand of Marxist criticism stifled their anti-sociological 
independence' 
Formalism was directed towards making the study of literature and literariness 
scientific''. Boris Eikhenbaum wrote in 1927: "What does characterise us 
is the endeavour to create an autonomous discipline of literary studies 
12 
based on the specific properties of literary material." , a discipline 
which claims autonomy for its object and an object defined not by its content 
but by its form, by its devices: "...the specificity of art is expressed 
not in the elements that go to make up a work but in the special way they are 
13 used". It involved, face-to-face with narrated texts, a distinction between 
14 
plot (sjuzet) and story (fabula) and it was the former which demanded 
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their attention. The contrast with the previously genetically oriented 
literary history was clear enough. 
"The genetic approach can elucidate only origin and 
nothing more, while for poetics the elucidation of 
literary function is vital. Precisely what the 
genetic point of view fails to reckon with is the 
device as a special kind of utilisation of material; 
it fails to reckon with the selection of material 
from communal culture, its transformation, its 
constructional role; it fails finally, to reckon with 
the fact that a detail of communal culture may 
disappear, and yet its literary function remains; 
it remains not as a mere relic but as a literary 
device, retaining its own meaning, even if totally 
unrelated to communal c u l t u r e . 
The claim for the autonomy of the text and for its identification through 
the study of the devices that construct it involved necessarily a denial 
of any type of reduction, to the social or to the psychological.'^ Neither 
the author's personality nor the social circumstances of his time were in 
any sense relevant to a science that claimed not books, but literature, 
not poems, but poetry, not stories, but narrative, as its object of study. 
At once, then, there was an explicit claim to generality. Formal units or 
devices abstracted inductively and justified theoretically had a viability 
beyond the specific texts in which they were originally located. Herein 
lay the claim to science and to an objectivity of analysis; "the main test 
was to establish the unity of any chosen structural device within the 
greatest possible diversity of material"'^. 
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Vladimir Propp's analysis of the folk tales, Victor Erlich calls it 
( 24) 
"one of the most valid formalist contributions to the theory of fiction" 
lies easily in this tradition. And it is in his work that narrative as. 
such, the structures that define how it is that a story can be told,gets 
its earliest systematic formulation, Propp was not, of course, blind to t 
implications of his study: "The scheme is a measuring unit for individual 
tales, Just as cloth can be measured with a yardstick to determine its 
length, tales may be measured by the scheme and thereby defined. The 
application of a given scheme to various tales can also define the relation 
ships of tales among themselves. We already foresee that the problem of 
kinship of tales, the problem of themes and variants, thanks to this, may 
(19) 
receive a new solution". 
The folk tale is, in Propp's view of it, doubly constrained; both by 
cultural reality outside it and by its internal structure. He concentrates 
his attention on the second and the result inductively reached, is a 
morphology: "...a description of the folk tale according to its component 
parts and the relationship of these components to each other and to the 
w h o l e .
2 0
^ The primary units of the tale are its functions; "an act of 
a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the 
( 21) 
course of the action," and they are few in number. The morphology 
is therefore the product of an ex post facto analysis and does not 
reflect or represent the act of creation or of reading with its concomitant 
uncertainty or risk; it is fundamentally a static analysis of an achieved ( 22) and completed structure. 
From an examination of the folk tales which he takes from the Afanasev 
collection he produces a morphology which consists of 31 basic functions 
( 23) and nine preparatory ones. 
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( 24) The preparatory functions are of uncertain status and they are not 
involved in the rigorous chronology of the main functions; they exist 
primarily to set the scene and there are no rules determining their ' 
necessary presence or absence. The 31 main functions, however, give 
the tale its unity, though even here,on the basis of his empirical 
study, there are alternative arrangements which lead Propp to hazard a 
( 25) 
four-fold subclass!fication of the tales before him. The actors, too, 
are subject to a simple classification and one which depends on their 
functional significance.^^ 
The reader is referred to Appendix 2 and of course to the subsequent 
discussion. In brief, an account of Propp's conception of the narrative 
of the folk (or fairy tale) would be the following: 
The scene is set. by the absence or death of significant members 
of a family, by the arrival of a villainous character or by various acts 
of deception, stupidity or disobedience. The story proper begins with 
either a villainy or the experience of a loss (lack) - in other words 
through the assertion of disequilibrium, which it is the purpose of the 
following action to remedy. The hero or searcher would then leave home 
and become involved in a series of adventures which tests him and which 
lead, perhaps with magical help, to a successful resolution; either he h e
 (27) 
finds what he is looking for or/triumphs over the villain . The triumph 
is marked; the hero has some evidence of it and he returns home though 
pursued. His arrival may be something of a shock, for he will not be recog-
nised as the hero and will subsequently have to test his status against the 
claims of a false hero. Once this has been achieved and he has gained his 
full recognition, the hero can be rewarded with marriage or gifts. In any 
re 
event the equilibrium has been /established, the lack redeemed, the villainy 
resolved. 
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This formulation is, even in Propp's view of it, doubly limited. It is 
limited to the genre, the fairy tale which albeit being a misnomer, identifies 
a specific group of tales linked both by content in AfanaSev's classification 
(28) 
and then subsequently by their form when Propp considers them. It is 
equally limited by what Propp acknowledges is the pre-Linnean level of the 
(29)
 L t 1 8 
admittedly crude, analysis which he offers, but/nevertheless necessary 
as a preliminary, above all as a preliminary to true scientific work; 
"it must be said that - decomposition into components is, in general, 
extremely important for any science. We have seen that up to now there 
has been no means of doing this completely objectively for the tale. This ( 30) 
is a first, highly important, conclusion". 
Nevertheless despite this modesty which is both substantive and methodological 
Propp has been criticised in a number of different ways. We need to be aware 
of these criticisms. They are of two kinds; the first centre on claims that 
Propp has misunderstood the nature of the folk tale and its narrative 
structure and the second that he has failed to see the implications or to 
fully develop the potential of his analysis. 
Among the first, the most important, is that articulated perhaps centrally 
( 31) 
by Claude BremOnd that Propp's monochronology betrays the dynamic 
richness of the folk tale and that it denies its complexity. In so doing 
it imposes a premature and illegitimate closure on the tale. The folk tale, 
even at its most basic is not a simple linear structure and any method for 
its analysis should, Bremond believes, be able to recognise that such 
narratives can be complex both chronologically - for example, they can 
present two plots simultaneously - and in terms of character - we should 
be able to recognise both divergent perspectives and different motivations 
(32) 
within a narrative . The folk tale in Propp's hands becomes a static 
entity which overlooks the fact that a story is not predetermined but open 
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to a whole range of variations which are themselves the product of 
the narrator's freedom,however limited. A narrative, for Bremond, 
is a dynamic structure and analysis must preserve that dynamism in the 
identification of its risk, its choice, its uncertainty. What needs to 
be avoided most of all, and Propp fails to avoid it, is the reification 
(33) 
of the text. 
These objections are pertinent; they must be seen as the necessary 
definition of some of the limits of what Propp has attempted, and indeed 
they give substance to Ptopp's self-acknowledged crudity. But they are 
themselves premised on assumptions which themselves are flawed and which 
lead in Bremond's own work.on narrative to an analysis of the logic not 
of narrative as such but of action. What is missed by Bremond in his 
dereification of the text is precisely its coherence. Narrative does 
(3, 
not consist in its potential, but in its completion. A story must end 
and it is not until its end that it becomes a story. The analysis of its 
elements is therefore dependent on a previous recognition of a story's 
integrity and on an understanding of its content, on the decisions that 
have already been taken. To suggest otherwise is a sleight of hand. 
Claude Bremond, while correctly identifying the limits of Propp's work, 
nevertheless errs in denying narrative's own limits. 
Underlying Claude Bremond's criticism, however, is the recognition which 
he shares with most of Propp's critics that formalism inpoverishes its 
object. A whole range of questions - about motivation, about the place 
of the subject, about the different modes of narration and the place of 
with 
the narrator, about the concern ' character and with content - are 
(35) 
avoided or relegated in Propp's analysis of the folk tale 
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Indeed, Roland Barthes, in one of his more recent works, draws 
attention to what he calls the plurality of the text, a plurality that 
ultimately defies formal analysis. Barthes prefers to think ofkthe 
infinity of structure, in a manner, perhaps despite himself, very akin ' 
to Claude Levi-Strauss; "...for the plural text, there cannot be a 
narrative structure, a grammar, or a logic: thus if one or other of 
these are sometimes permitted to come forward; it is in proportion 
(giving the expression its full qualitative value) as we are dealing 
with incompletely plural texts, texts whose plural is more or less 
36 
parsimonious." Even accepting this, it is of course the case that 
implicit in Propp's argument is the assumption that folktales are just such 
"incompletely plural texts" as indeed is my assumption that television 
is also. 
The second set of criticisms develops from this argument about 
impoverishment but centres more on what Propp has not done rather than 
on what he has, but poorly. There are a number of dimensions to this: 
firstly that he excludes any notion of performance, of the dynamic in 
37 
the presentation and reception of a spoken or sung narrative; 
secondly that it fails to integrate the text with its context and in 
particular with the culture that generates it and supports it; and 
thirdly and as a corollary of this latter point, that Propp's formalism 
is both too abstract, and insufficiently aware of the concrete logic 38 
underlying narrative and in particular mythic narratives. These 
are points made substantially by Claude Levi-Strauss, and worked through 
in practice both by him and by A.J. Greimas. The remainder of this 
chapter is involved in a consideration of the substantive work of 
Levi-Strauss and Greimas and therefore I would like at this stage only 





"Unless the content is surreptitiously reintegrated into 
the form, the latter is condemned to remain at such a level 
of abstraction that it neither signifies anything any longer 
nor has any heuristic meaning. Formalism destroys its object. 
With Propp it results in the discovery that there exists in reality 
but one tale." 40 
From form to structure. Claude Levi-Strauss opposes Propp's 
diffidence with a conception of narrative which systematically 
moves beyond questions of morphology to take account of content, 
context and meaning. However the barracking is deceptive; as 
• 4l 42 
Levi-Strauss recognizes and as Propp foresees, the divide between 
them is neither clear nor unambiguous. 
In Levi-Strauss's own characterization of it, Propp's analysis does 
not acknowledge that myth and folktales are metalinguistic entities 
not linguistic ones. In his concentration on the syntax or chronology 
of the tale he refuses to see that the elements from which it is 
constructed themselves signify: "Let us say, to clarify this thesis, 
that in a tale a "king" is not only a king and a "shepherdess" a 
shepherdess, but that these words and what they signify become tangible 
means of constructing an intelligible system formed by the oppositions: 
male/female (with regard to nature) and high/low (with regard to culture) 
ii 43 
as well as all possible permutations among the six terms. Propp 
cannot incorporate the content into his system. It remains outside. 
It will be studied by the historian. 
But £>r Levi-Strauss, as I have suggested, it is precisely this 
incorporation which makes the analysis of narrated texts both possible 
and exciting. The texts themselves, and for Levi-Strauss, these 
and 
texts are typically/ideally mythical, are metalanguages, in which not 
only is the narrative chronology structured, but in which the entire 
44 
content and not just what Propp chooses to call its attributes, 
• is patterned and constrained by its active inclusion in the text 
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and culture alike. Levi-Strauss's view of the mythical texts and 
the way of their analysis is a more inclusive, less humble affair, 
and it is oriented to a desire to understand the texts and to do so by 
relating them to their context, and to treat the content and its system « 
as a fundamental part of its structuring. Whereas Proppian formalism 
remains in his view at the level of the abstract and of the syntactic, 
and hence is ultimately sterile, Levi-Strauss's own structuralism 
demands consideration of the concrete context in which the tales are 
constructed and told, a level of analysis which is essentially semantic 
45 
and which will be able to recreate the richness of the texts. 
"The study of any linguistic system requires the cooperation 
of the grammarian and the philologist. This means that in 
the matter of oral tradition the morphology is sterile unless 
direct or : indirect ethnographic observation comes to render 
it fertile."
4 6 
The analysis of the myth or folktale demands that all of it can be 
structured, that nothing in it can be relegated to the arbitrary. 
To suggest, however, that for Propp, the content is indeed arbitrary 
47 
is misleading. Propp, as Eleazor Meletinsky notes, had a clear 
sense of priorities. Consideration of content, the attributes of 
the tale, must take a logical and chronological second place. His 
consideration of this, at least in publication, gets no further than 
4 8 
a list, but he is quite aware of their significance, and that^ 
potentially at least,the characters'attributes, initially listed under 
three heads (external appearance and nomenclature, particularities of 
introduction into the narrative, and dwelling place) can be analysed 
and be analysed in a way remarkably close to that subsequently under-
taken by Levi-Strauss. 
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Content therefore can be analysed and done so scientifically: 
"To speak of the fact that the villain may be a dragon, a witch, 
an old hag, robbers, merchants, or an evil princess etc., or that 
the donor may be a witch, an old woman, a backyard-grandma, a 
forest-spirit, or a bear etc., is not worthwhile, because this would 
lead to the compiling of a catalogue. Such a catalogue is interesting 
only if it is presented from the standpoint of more general problems. 
These problems have been outlined; they are: the laws of trans-
formations and the abstract concepts which are reflected in the basic 
49 
forms of these attributes". 
If, as I have suggested, the whole discussion of form and structure 
in the analysis of tales is overlain by the distinction between 
then 
language and metalanguage, /underlying it, and in a certain sense 
parallel with it, is the distinction, less easily drawn, between folk-
50 
tale and myth. That there is a distinction to be made is clear, 
not 
and I have discussed it already; that it can/be made unambiguously 
is equally clear. For Levi-Strauss, as we have seen, folktales are 
in every sense weaker than myths, though they are of a similar order; 
tales and myths lie on a continuum, both dealing in similar ways with 
similar material. The myths construct their oppositions through 
cosmology, metaphysics and nature; the folktales are more often local, 
social and moral. The structure itself differs. In the myths the of 
pressures of logical coherence, religious orthodoxy and/the collectivity, 
as it were, guarantees a coherence which the folktale avoids."'' The 
tale is structured in an altogether freer manner. 
If this is the case then why, asks Levi-Strauss, does Propp only concern 
himself, and concern himself rather naively in his view, with folktales 
and not myths? The simple answer, of course, and one that Levi-Strauss 
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obstinately refuses to recognize as legitimate, is that Propp is 
actually more interested in folktales. Instead he berates Propp 
for his ethnological ignorance, his miaconception of the true 
relationship between folktale and myth, the former being a miniatur- ' 
ization of the latter, and his failure to recognize that far from being 
historically prior, myths and folktales actually coexist in many 
societies. 
"The point is not to choose between tale and myth, but to 
understand that they are the two poles of a field that also 
includes all sorts of intermediate forms and that morphological 
analysis must be considered in the same way, if one does not 
want to leave out elements belonging, like the others, to one 
and the same system of transformations."52 
Levi-Strauss is berating Propp for not being Levi-Strauss, and in so 
doing seems to misconceive the distinct method and the distinct 
material to which Propp addresses himself. It seems intuitively 
correct to suggest that whereas the object of Propp's analysis, folktales* 
are chronologically or syntactically strong and possibly logically or 
semantically weak, the object of Levi-Strauss's analysis, myths, are 
chronologically less strong and semantically far from weak. In part 
however this judgement is too intuitive; the method masks the content. 
But the intention is also different. Propp wishes to describe the 
/ 
tale, Levi-Strauss to describe the system of tales. As Eleazor Meletinsky 
y 
notes, Levi-Strauss's analysis "... represents the analysis of the 
53 
structure of mythical thinking, and not of mythical narration," a 
54; 
comment echoed by Alan Dundes. Propp recognized the relation of 
folktales and myth, as Levi-Strauss notes, but regarded the description 
of the tale as necessarily prior; he also recognized what generated 
the coherence of the folktale more than anything else was its narrative 
structure. As Meletinsky justly observes: 
"Levi-Strauss's idea of the possibility of interpreting 
individual functions as the result of a transformation of 
the same material is very interesting and fruitful. However, 
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it is better to make such an examination after the summary 
morphological analysis and not in place of it.' -55 
This seems reasonable. A Proppian formalist analysis need not, 
indeed does not, contradict what a structuralist might offer. < 
The questions it asks, albeit limited, are different. In many cases 
they may be more appropriate. In this case, that of the analysis of 
television programmes, and in particular the analysis of drama programmes, 
these questions do seem to be appropriate. We can by virtue of the 
tools Propp provides, define the framework of the narrative and we can 
define in what the structure of a particular tale might consist. There 
is therefore a level of story-telling about which it is possible to be 
quite precise, and that is its chronology, the syntagmatic arrangement 
of its functional units. Such precision demands, as Propp and' Christian Met 
acknowledge, little concern for the nature or structure of the wider 
culture. Such precision therefore is necessarily exclusive of a 
large part of the narration, its content, its meaning, which is told. 
The listing of functional units in the description of a narrative's 
morphology is necessarily a prolegomena to the work of understanding 
what and how the narrative signifies. 
•II 
Any attempt to face the problems of a text's semanticity involves 
moving away from a close concern with its manifest structure, with 
its visible patterns, and a correlative movement away from a desire 
to preserve the textfe integrity. Questions about a textfe meaning 
necessarily involve leaving the particular, albeit temporarily, 
in order to establish the generality according to which that particular 
becomes possible. Structure replaces classification, logic chronology, 
and by and large, deduction replaces induction. The analysis of a 
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text, which might be a folktale or an individual myth, becomes the 
analysis of meaning, of language or of myth as such. 
At one extreme, Propp's morphology being at the other, of this broad 
advance on narrative lies the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, and it is 
an extremity defined by its attempt to generate for myth, a logic of 
sensible qualities, a logic of the concrete, a logic of culture. 
The mythical texts with which he is concerned, manifest that logic but 
in their entirety not in their individuality. Levi-Strauss is 
concerned with a system and its constitution and he is concerned to 
reveal its basic categories, and their interplay. The chronology of 
the narrative is reduced to an enigmatic formula, but one which has a 
logical coherence of thesis, antithesis, synthesis rather than a 
56 
defined and precise sequence of elements. 
Somewhere between, and the vagueness is deliberate, for the metaphor is 
57 
not precise, lies the structural semantics of A. Julian Greimas, 
which, as this would imply, is concerned not with narratives as such 
and certainly not with folktales, nor indeed with myth or with culture, 
but with a theory of the construction of meaning which in its 
syntagmatics owes something to the morphology of Propp, and in its 
paradigmatic8 to the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss. Its 
model of language owes much to Ferdinand de Saussure and to Louis Hjelmslev. 
For Greimas narrative is where the semantic action is, and the structures 
i 
of narrative lie at the heart of a general theory of meaning. 
It is in the movement through a text that its various elements, their 
interrelationship and above all their transformations become manifest. 
It is in the exploration of the structure of narrative, and in the 
definition of its grammar, that the semantics as well as the syntactics 
of language are explored. His analyses are uneven and often eccentric. 
-1 179-
Indeed Jonathan Culler has argued that his claim for an adequate 
semantic theory, or even for a clearly defined move in that direction, 
59 
is generally open to dispute. I am not here concerned with these 
claims, but to demonstrate in the acknowledgement of their limitation, i 
in what ways Greimas' understanding and analysis of narrative aids 60 
pur understanding of the way in which the television drama is patterned. 
Greimas moves away from the Proppian classificatory schema, but he 
quite 
does not leave the text/in the way that Levi-Strauss might do. 
At the same time his work takes the form of an analytical theory and 
in its advocacy of structures and in its exploration of canonic 
formulae the theory has a similar shape to that of Levi-Strauss and 
in many ways is compatible with it,^' For my purpose then, the work 
of Greimas allows us to deepen an understanding of the nature of 
narrative and at the same time to direct attention to the ways in which 
we might formally approach it. 
Central to Greimas' understanding of narrative is what he terms its 
anthropomorphic nature. By this he means that at a certain level, 
the level of superficial grammar, the narrative presents a logic " 
which translates the abstract categories of contrariety, correlation 
6 2 
contradiction and transformation in terms of subject, object and act. 
The act (faire) is to narrative what the verb is to the grammar 
of natural language, but also what the operation is within a logical 6 3 
system. There is an assumption, made by others also, that the 
construction of the sentence, and the construction of the narrative 
are structurally homologous. The act and the verb and the operation 
all act as pivots in the creation and in the transformation of 64 
meaning. 
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For Greimas indeed, the structures of narrative lie at the heart 
of a general theory of meaning: 
"...on voit que 1'elaboration d'une theorie de la narrativite 
qui justifierait et fonderait en droit d'analyse narrative 
comme un domaine de recherches methodologiquement autosuffisant,
 ; 
ne consiste pas seulement dans le perfectionnement et 
formalisation des modeles narratifs obtenus par des descriptions 
de plus en plus nombreuses et variees, ni dans une typologie 
de ces modeles qui les subsumerait tous, mais aussi, et surtout, 
dans 1'installation des structures narratives, en tant 
qu'instance autonome a l'interieur de l'economie generale, 
de la s£motique, concue comme science de la signification."65 
The path from verb to act is extended in the detailed analysis of 
the structure of narrative to the functional significance of the test 
(l'epreuve). It is here, of course, that the Proppian model intrudes. 
For, like the verb and the generalized act, the test acts in the narrative 
as an agent of change; from the potential to the actual, from hope to 
success or failure, from lack to its remedy.^ 
"Si l'epreuve, comme nous avons essaye^ de la montrer par ailleurs, 
n'est que la manifestation superficielle, situee sur le plan 
anthropormophique, de la transformation de contenues profonds 
du recit, le narrateur, pour conduire les acteurs deja 
institues vers l'epreuve, doit prevoir de quelle maniere 
leur affrontement auia s'effectuer par produire la trans-
formation finale souhaitee."67 
It is here, in the test, that the particular balance of liberty and 
68 
constraint which marks the progress of the narrative is defined, 
and it is here, in the test, that the particular temporality (chronologic) 
of the narrative manifests itself, overlaying and directing the 
categorial logic (which may be abstract or concrete).^ 
In order to understand this more fully we have to recognize that for 
Greimas, the anthropomorphic grammatical structure of the narrative 
expresses and, in a sense, operationalizes a more fundamental grammar 
and is itself manifested in a figurative discourse; it is given a 
content in which the act becomes an action. The reading of a narrative 
then becomes an operation which demands a simultaneous recognition 
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of three levels of ordering; the fundamental, the anthropomorphic 
(superficiel) and the manifest. The first, the fundamental, is an 
abstract logic, content free from the point of view of the text; 
the second, the anthropomorphic in a sense gives this abstract logic , 
life by replacing categories by actors and operations by acts, but 
whose meaning is still logical and categorial as opposed to chronological, 
and it is still abstracted from the text; the third, the manifest, is 
the equivalent to Propp's morphology: a level of meaning which is 
textually specific, though rule governed. The last two, the 
superficial and the manifest are equivalent to the semic and the 
lexemic in Greimas' analysis of the elementary structure of meaning, 
the 
and the first^/fundamental, is, in this sense, pre-semic. I shall 
return to this dimension of the analysis again.^ 
I want now to consider how Greimas understands the nature of narrative 
and to show how this understanding is derived from his analysis of 
the work of Vladimir Propp, and also in a certain sense, overlaps 
with that of Claude Levi-Strauss. 
"Le declenchement de la narration y serait represente 
comme 1'^tablissement d'une relation contractuelle 
conjonctive entre un destinateur et un destinateure-suject, 
suivie d'un disjonction spatial entre les deux actants. 
L'achevement du recit serait marque, au contraire, par un 
conjonction spatiale et un dernier transfert des valeurs, 
instituant un nouveau contract par une nouvelle distribution 
de valeurs, aussi bien objectives que modales."' 
This summary definition illustrates the transformation which Greimas 
works on the Proppian schema, a transformation from an inventory to 
a model. It is an attempt, above all, to define the system underlying 
the presentation of a narrative and in so doing to identify the 
capacity of the narrative to generate meaning. 
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There are a number of dimensions to this transformation. 
Firstly there is the incorporation into the theory of narrative 
of 
per se/a semantic theory which depends both on a simple distinction 
73 
of level, that between the seme and the lexeme, and a distinction : 
within the seme between the nucleus and the classeme. In each 
basic unit of meaning (the seme) Greimas distinguishes a core 
element, the nucleus, and a variable one, the classeme. In with 
narrative this correlates/the distinction between an act and its 
qualification, or contextualization. The nucleii are those functional 
acts, equivalent to those identified by Propp', the confrontation? , 
deceptions, transformations, present in,and necessary to
}
any narrative; 
the classanes ace those elements which place them and make :them relate 
to each other; some will be geographical, some alimentary, some 
physical and so on. 
75 
However, Greimas finds Propp's thirtyone functions unwieldy. 
He suggests that Propp has failed to gather the full harvest 
of his insights and in particular that he has not recognized the 
interdependence and balance between the various functions which he 
identifies. Greimas' reformulation of them involves, it would seem, 
some sleight of hand, but the principle of them is clear enough. 
In the first instance, it involves a pairing of the initial eight 
categories of Propp . This leads to a formulation in which 
essentially interdiction (Y) is paired with violation (6), reconnaissance 
(4C) with information received (C), deceit (H) with submission to 
76 
deceit (6), and villainy (A) with lack (a). More significantly 
each of these pairs identifies a particular dimension of the narrative, 
the threads of which in this situation are broken but which are retied 
as the narrative progresses. So the interdiction and violation announces 
the breaking of a contract; reconnaissance and information received 
-1 83-* 
suggests the denial of information or knowledge (savoir) to the 
hero to the advantage of the villain, and deceit and submission 
to deceit lead to an equivalent denial of power or ability to act 
(pouvoir). Villainy and lack, preserve the active/passive 
so 
dichotomy and dc /in terms of a denial of an object which becomes 
therefore an object of desire, and is situated thus in the realm 
of wishing (vouloir).^ 
Each of these dichotomies, in a redundant fashion, define the 
rupture with which the narrative opens, and underly the further rearrangemet 
of Propp's categories (a rearrangement which Greimas acknowledges to 
78 
be hardly more manageable than the original set) . It is both the 
fact of rupture and the dimensions of rupture that are most crucial. 
Greimas wishes to establish the essential balance in the narrative; 
a balance suggested in the notion of contract - broken, then mended -79 
and in a conception of the narrative as a system of exchange. 
What Greimas aims to show, then, in general terms ,is how the narrative 
proceeds to remedy the various dimensions of rupture which have been 
initially stated. Propp's functions B and C therefore involve the 
hero in accepting the task; a new contract is potentially established. 
Greimas argues that the narrative, usually in the order suggested by 
Propp, an order which in Greimas' hands is essentially logical rather 
than chronological, demands that the hero first of all gains the 
necessary power, and for this he seeks and finds helpers or magical 
agents; he then confronts the villain and gains (or does not gain) 
the object of his desire, and finally that he must prove himself the 
true hero and thereby establish his authenticity. So power, desire 
and knowledge recover their integrity. Finally each narrative restates 
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the new contract and Propp's function W, the wedding, symbolizes 
« 8 0 
that. 
However Greimas' algebraic notation for the structure of the narrative 
> 
exceeds and transcends Propp's model, and an attempt to make his 
81 
categories comparable to those of Propp proves somewhat tortuous. 
In addition it ignores the importance that Propp attaches to the 
alternative models of the narrative structure. It suggests that 
the narrative of the folktale can be structured with certain of these 
crucial elements missing and still remain an 'authentic' tale. In 
Propp's formulation tales can manifest either the combat with the 
villain (HI), or the assignment of a difficult task (MN), but not, 
O O 
normally, both. Incidentally Propp's function L, the claims 
of the false hero finds no place in the Greimas'scheme, though it is 
implicit in the need for the hero to prove himself authentic. 
Underlying these complaints, which are themselves fairly trivial, is 
an anxiety about the exact status of the model Greimas offers. By 
that I mean whether it is to apply to folktales or to narratives as 
a whole, and if to the latter - a more likely proposition - whether 
it is to be a minimal or a maximal definition. If narratives are 
to be defined in terms of their balance and coherence, then what 
would be the effect of the absence of any of the elements apparently 
needed to preserve that balance? Indeed, as some commentators have 
83 
pointed out, there are many narratives, or apparent narratives, 
which do not manifest a structure as either Propp or Greimas suggests. 
Are they to be excluded? The advantage of the Proppian formulation 
in this regard is its inductive generalization: it acts as a summary 
before it becomes a prescription. The disadvantage of Greimas' 
formulation lies precisely in its prescription. The reason for 
introducing these comments now is that they relate substantially to 
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the claims, explicitly and implicitly made by Greimas, and by other 
84. 
students of narrative that what they are studying is universal, 
the 
The key to/universality of narrative lies, for Greimas, in the 
fundamental formula which he suggests underlies it and indeed the * 
entire universe of the symbolic. That this remains to be established 
goes without saying. This discussion of the work of Greimas then 
leaves open the question of the range of its applicability. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that empirical evidence will define precisely 
its limits. 
So far what has been presented is a model of the narrative^ equilibrium 
of contract ruptured and remedied, and of the points along the way 
which define the various aspects of the contract. The narrative 
balances in the communication of information (objet-message), 
85 
strength (objet- vigeur) and goods fcibjet-bien). 
The dynamic in the narrative is provided by the test, Greimas identifies 
three tests within the Proppian classification, and noting where Propp 
has failed to recognize their symmetry and also failed to identify them 
fully, represents them in terms of a qualifying (pouvoir), principal 
86 
(vouloir) and glorifying (savoir) test. In his more detailed analysis 
of the morphology of the test Greimas succeeds in showing that within 
it the first and the second two elements are themselves balanced: the 
hero is challenged, he accepts the challenge and is followed by combat 
and success (or failure). The one unpaired element in the entire 
narrative structure is the result of the test, its consequence, the 
achievement or non-achievement of the object. 
The balance in the narrative is therefore preserved even in the test, 
until the last moment; it is in the achievement or failure, its 
postponement or its neutralisation that the freedom of the narrative 
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consists and it is through this that narrative tips over, as it were, 
a 
and moves on and forward towards/re-establishment of its 
equilibrium. 
« 
Two further dimensions of the structure of the narrative at the 
anthropomorphic level need to be considered; the first concerns 
the basic acting units, the second their movement from place to 
place. The first follows from Propp's alternative and parallel 
definition of the narrative of the folktale in terms of its roles. 
Propp lists seven, each of which dominates a sphere of action. 
They are the villain, the hero, the donor, the helper, the princess, 
87 




 formulation, and in part following Etienne Souriou,
x
 these 
seven become six and are presented in the form of a model; the actorial 
model; 
Dispatcher Object ^-Dispatched Person 
t 
Helper Subject Opposer 
\ / 
"... ce modele semble posseder, en raison de sa simplicite, 
et pour 1'analyse des manifestations mythiques settlement, 
une certaine valeur operationelle." 
This is a reductive formula. Greimas intends that the characters 
in a narrative be understood in terms of a simple and exclusive 
structure. These acting units (actants) are therefore neither 
roles nor characters, but abstractions, logical from the point of 
view of the narrative^ system, but necessary to it. Each actorial 
category can be filled by one character in a tale, or by many (there 
can be many helpers) and, conversely, one character can fulfil more 
than one of these acting units (a character can be both dispatcher 
and opposer). 
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Jonathan Culler has questioned the coherence of this model in terms 
of the different quality of involvement as between the dispatcher 
90 
- dispatched ,and the other four categories. A further comment 
might be added. It is precisely in the variety of the articulations * 
of these units (figures) that a story or a genre will gain some unity 
and identity. The actorial structure is important because in it the 
two dimensions of a narrated text meet; on the one hand its chronology, 
the narrative proper, in Greimas' terms, on the other the discourse, 
the content or thematic structure. The actor in his action both 
advances the narrative, but does so in a particular way and with 
particular significance. 
"La structure actorielle apparait des lors comme une structure 
topologique; tant en relevant a le fbis des structures 
narratives et des structures . discursives, elle n'est que le lieu 
de leur manifestation, n'appartenant en propre ni a l'une ni 
a 1'autre."91 
The final dimension of the narrative conceived in its anthropomorphism 
is provided by the movement of the hero from place to place. Greimas 
discusses this in the context of the chronological development of the 
narrative. Where the action takes place, at home or away, within 
society or beyond it, is important for his interpretation of the 
narrative, and in particular of that of the Russian folktale presented 
that 
by Vladimir Propp. For here Greimas suggests/the tales present a 
conflict between the individual and society, a conflict of freedom and 
constraint. The hero is free to act as long as he remains outside, 
92 
away from society. But it is clear also that the movements of the 
hero (Propp's functions + , G,Pr/Ps, and + ) are of a second order of 
significance within the structure of the narrative. Movement from 
place to place in a narrative is of a different order of significance 
than the contract, the lack and the test. Such movements are much 
more the property of the discourse or logic, than of the chronologic 
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- they are contextual rather than actorial. I will give some 
illustration of this in chapter 6. 
is 
The final level of analysis/offered by Greimas in terms of what he 
calls the constitutional (canonic) model. ' Here is the base 
structure, the semiotic foundation to the narrative, indeed, as 
he believes, the foundation of all meaning. It has much in common 
with Levi-Strauss's concern with the binary. In both cases what 
is presented is a logical structure. Above this primary semiotic 
level which defines "the fundamental mode of existence of an 
individual or a society, and subsequently, the conditions of existence 
^
 fl
s I have already suggested 
of semiotic objects," we find/two further levels, the first an 
anthropomorphic grammar, independent of the text, and the second 
the structures of manifestation embodied in its content and context. 
The constitutional model is constructed on the opposition, at an 
abstract level, of contrariety and contradiction and it is presented, 
diagrammatically, in this way: 
o r
_ 5 i h 
h h 
S^ and Sj are contraries of each other; S^ and S^ and S^ and §2 are 
contradictories. For example, to give S^ the meaning 'life', and 
S^ the meaning 'death', its contrary, S^ and §2 indicate the absence 
94 
of life (non-life) and the absence of death (non-death) respectively. 
95 
It is suggested, though Bremond notes, not without ambiguity, 
that S
1
 and Sj and and S^ are related by implication; for 
example the situation of non-death implies life. It need not, of 
-189 -
of course, and in a footnote to the French original which is not 
reproduced in the translation, Greimas defines this as an unsolved 
96 
problem of orientation. 
i 
The point, however, is the suggestion of the ubiquity and relevance 
of such a model, particularly in terms of its ability to define the 
essence of a text or a discourse. We have seen it underlying the 
relations of contract and test in Greimas' description of the 
superficial level of the narrative (its chronology). Here it is 
articulated in terms of the balancing of offer and acceptance, of 
lack and remedy in which positive and negative valencies are 
97 
continually opposed. It is also present in the opposition of the 
actorial model, above all in terns of subject and object, helper and 
opposer, and indeed in an analysis presented in a later study of 
narrative, location, action and antagonism are intermingled in an 
attempt to show how the narrative moves through this logical structure 98 
of contrariety and contradiction,in its totality. 
Indeed this is the very structure that Levi-Strauss himself identifies 
• 99' 
to be at the heart of mythic narration. Greimas and Francois Rastier 
are not unaware of precisely this. 
"This new presentation allows one to see that what is first 
of all the structure permitting an account of the model of 
existence of the meaning,finds its application, as a 
constitutional model of the Inverted contents, in very 
varied spheres: Indeed, it is the model of myth propounded 
by Levi-Strauss, it is the form of the achronic articulation 
of the folktale, but it is also the model justifying a 
certain number of particular semantic universes (Bemanos, 
Mallartn^, Destutt de Tracy). It is comforting for the 
semiotician to note that a deductive approach encounters 
models constructed empirically to account for the limited 
corpora." 
It may be comforting but it is by no means certain how we are to 
understand the precise significance of such a level of narrative. 
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There is a problem, as for example Claude Bremond notes, of 
reducing the essential chronology of narrative to a static 
abstraction, and this is essentially a problem of seeing the 
narrative in terms of its dependence on, its operationalisation of, ' 
a series of logical categories which are not specific to it. There 
is no certain reason why this should be outlawed, as Bremond would 
but 
wish,/on the other hand, and equally, there is no certainty that 
all narratives are so reducible.However as I have already said 
Bremond's model of the narrative denies in an almost a priori fashion 
the suggestion of a reduction of what is fundamentally a chronological 
structure to the play of semiotic forces. For Bremond movement is 
more important than stasis, time more central than space. 
In opposition to Bremond's insistence on movement and chronology 
with its tendency to deny the integrity of the narrative, Greimas 
102 
offers a more rigid approach to the semiotic and semantic preconditions 
for its reading. He identifies the various levels, of imminence and 
manifestation, of grammar and discourse, and attempts to suggest their 
interrelationship. The model assumes the compatibility of sentence 
and story. In his early work, the chronology of the text is preserved, 
albeit at the price, perhaps, of the lack of generality which these 
analyses have, by virtue of their proximity to the Proppianschema. 
Subsequent developments have created the condition for approaching 
the generality of narrative though still not the universality which 
is claimed, but this seems to be at the expense of the text, of the 
narration itself. More importantly there is a consistent attempt to 
produce an intrinsic semantics, a logic for the generation of meaning, 
and this involves a corresponding reluctance, not to say refusal, to 
consider to what extent the deciphering of a narrated text depends on 
a previous knowledge of other texts and of the culture as a whole. 
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The content of a tale is structured, but that structuring need 
not be the exclusive product of the telling; it may precede it. 
And even though the constitutional model claims adequacy for any 
and every process of signification, it is precisely how and in what * 
ways it becomes incorporated into a text which is interesting and still 
problematical. This is, I assume, an empirical question. To 
answer it one must be aware of the particular nature of the presenting 
and presented culture as a whole. It is the culture which acts, as 
it were, as the filter through which the basic categories of the 
constitutional model gain their content. To understand the resonance 
of a narrated text, then, involves not just a consideration of its 
intrinsic chronology, nor even of the static equilibrium which may 
sustain it, but also a consideration of the redolent categories of 
its historical context. While A.J. Greimas' formulations by no means 
exclude that possibility, indeed in part they depend on it, his primary 
concern with narration leaves open the questions of the integration 
of the narrated text into the wider culture. 
Ill 
It is more towards these questions that the analyses of myth of 
Claude Levi-Strauss are oriented. The qualification here is 
important, for much of what Greimas attempts is dependent on 
Levi-Strauss's insights and he assumes that what he is doing will 
not prove significantly incompatible with the work of the anthrop-
103 
ologist". That their orientation to narrative and to myth is 
different is not at issue, but the line between them should not be 
hastily or crudely drawn. 
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There are, then,,two dimensions in Claude Levi-Strauss
1
 s work on 
myth, the first much closer to the concerns of Greimas than the 
second. The first, essentially articulated in his early work on 
the structure of myth, preserves a concern with defining a mythic * 
narrative in terms of the abstract formulations of a balanced logic 
104 
so beloved of Greimas, But this is quickly relegated to a minor 
significance not just in the face of more complicated material, but 
implicitly, through an awareness that such an Imposition may be both 
arbitrary and misleading. Rather than stamp a four term structure 
on one myth, or a series of myths, and thereby excluding much that 
might otherwise be relevantly included, Levi-Strauss, for example, 
in the Geste d'Asdiwal
 1 0 5
and in his Mythologiques
1 0 6
prefers an 
approach which seeks the codes at work within a particular corpus. 
An abstract logic is replaced by a concrete one. The tightness 
of a balanced structure gives way to an endless array of patterns 
and codes. Narrative is replaced by myth. 
More basically, the myth is replaced by the mythic system, and as 
a number of folklorists and indeed defenders of the Proppian approach 
have ruefully noticed, Levi-Strauss is not really concerned with 
the texts of specific myths but with the system within which these are 
to be f o u n d . T h e texts which he takes as the objects for analysis 
are only the means to an end - the identification of the basic thought 
processes of the primitive, as they are manifested in the mythic narratives. 
Let us be clear about what is involved in this change of perspective. 
We are firstly faced, quite obviously, with a change of scale. 
Levi-Strauss is an extrovert. The careful precision of formalism 
is replaced by an extravagant, thought not necessarily any less 
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precise, fusion of form and content. Whereas formalism 
destroys its object, his structuralism not only preserves it, but 
situates it; the tales are elements only of a cultural and 
intellectual system whose meaning is multifaceted. The search t 
for those meanings depends both on a sensitivity to the subtleties 
of their assumed logic and on a methodology sufficiently powerful 
to extract that logic from incomplete texts, even in the knowledge 
that the analyses will be endless. To follow the path traced by 
what Clifford Geertz calls Levi-Strauss's "infernal culture machine' 
is to follow not just the trajectory of a primitive culture in its 
attempts to make sense of the continuity and chaos of the natural 
world, but also to an undefinable degree to follow the rigorous 
1 10 
mental meanderings of an inspired anthropologist. 
Claude Levi-Strauss is not concerned with narrative as such, not 
if we mean by narrative the chronology of a specific tale. 
However, he is concerned with narration, and the codes at work within 
diverse texts, and which define their possibility. 
"....what I am concerned to clarify is not so much what 
there is in myths (without incidentally being in man's 
consciousness) as the system of axioms and postulates 
defining the best possible code, capable of conferring 
a common significance on unconscious formulations which 
are the work of minds, societies and civilizations chosen lit 
from among the most remote from each other." • 
Myths are told; in that sense they are narratives, and in that sense 
Levi-Strauss shares a common object with Greimas and Propp, but myth 
lies outside a specific telling, and in that sense his object is 
112 
different. " But like Greimas, Levi-Strauss is seeking universals; 
an anthropology of the tale, and though he is scathing as to the 
viability of contemporary myth, to make sense of his task we would 





s earliest attempts to come to terms with the problem 
of mythic communication confine themselves to a very small corpus 
of texts and to a consideration of the outlines of an appropriate 113 
method. His model is the linguistics of Roman Jakobson and 
Ferdinand de Saussure, of language as a diacritical system whose 
114 
basic operation is binary. But myth, as we have seen, is not 
language but metalanguage. It uses already constituted signs to 
115 
create new meanings. 
The analysis of myth, initially proceeding in a trial and error 
fashion, presupposes an ability to recognize basic units - mythemes -
which can be arranged in a pattern reflecting the diachronic and 
synchronic aspects of mythic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . ' ' ^ In order to preserve 
the latter, the synchronic, the need is to identify not isolated 
mythemes but bundles of them so that beneath the manifest chronology 
of a single and isolated myth a level of coherent expression can be 
established, which depends for its understanding on the
 1
spatialization' 
of its elements and on their temporal reversability. The model is 
that of an orchestra score where the text is read, as it is played, 
according to both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Myths have a 
harmony as well as a melody. Levi-Strauss can distinguish its 
sequences from its schemata; 
"The sequences form the apparent content of the myth; the 
chronological order in which things happen.... But these 
sequences are organized on planes at different levels (of 
abstraction), in accordance with schemata, which exist 
simultaneously, superimposed one upon another; just as 
a melody composed for several voices is held within bounds 
by constraints in two dimensions, first by its own melodic 
line which is horizontal, and second by the contrapuntal 
schemata (settings) which are vertical."117 
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Hi8 first demonstration of the technique, now well known, is his 
118 
analysis of the Oedipus myth, in which the elementary chronology 
of the narrative ,as told,is tabulated in an attempt to reveal the 
structure of the myth and how it is to be understood. Four columns 
are summarizable in terms of the overrating of blood relations, 
(most seriously in Oedipus' incest), the underrating of blood relations 
(actual and attempted intrafamilial killings), the slaying of monsters 
and finally the difficulties of walking straight and standing upright. 
The juxtaposition of the first two of these columns as against the 
second two, suggests to Levi-Strauss that the myth articulates one 
solution to the problem of the origin of man. The Greeks believed 
in the autochthonous origin of man, but at the same time were quite 
aware that human beings were actually born in a rather different 
fashion. By opposing denial of blood relations to their incestuous 
affirmation (difference versus identity) and the denial of the 
monstrous origin of mankind to the physical manifestations of its 
inevitability (lameness) the myth is turning over, as it were, this 
insoluble problem. 
If one were to add, as one should, all the variants of the myth, one 
would then be able to produce in their juxtaposition, not just the 
structure of one story but of the system as a whole. And Levi-Strauss 
continues his analysis by examining in the first instance various 
119 
accounts of the Zuni origin and emergence myths, where oppositions 
of life and death, permanence and change, are mediated by the 
categories of agriculture and hunting and by animals and birds 
associated with them. The mythic system, whose logic is presented 
variously by the different examples, is identified in terms of opposition 
and resolution, the latter the product of the activity of mediators, 
these beings ,or categories, which, as it were, are neither one thing 
nor the other.
 1 2 0 
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The result, at least of this early formulation, is the law of the 
permutation group - a law which is relevant to myth as such, and 
which is roughly comparable to the constitutional model of A,J.Greimas: 
Fx( a) ; Fy( b) * Fx(b): Fa-l(y) 
in which x and y are the functions of terms a and b, and wherein 
the opposition of the first part is 'resolved' by a process of 
substitution and inversion in the second; b, present in both halves 
of the equation acts as a mediator whereby first a is replaced by its 
opposite (a-1) and secondly whereby an inversion is made between the 
function value and the term value of two elements (y and a). 
Eili-Koija Kongas and Pierre Maranda illustrate this otherwise 
enigmatic formulation as follows: 
"....if a given actor (a) is specified by a negative 
function,(fx)(and thus becomes a villain), and another 
one (b) by a positive function( fy)(and thus becomes a 
hero),(b) is capable of assuming in turn also the 
negative function (by in the juxtaposition of two 
negatives, generating a positive result - my interpretation) 
which process leads to a 'victory' so much more complete 
that it proceeds from the 'ruin' of the term (a) and 
thus definitely establishes the positive value (y) of the 
final outcome. This time as a term (y) is specified by 
a function which equals the inverse of the first term."122 
In this anthropomorphisation of the formula its basic point is, I 
hope, made clear. In the Inversion and opposition of functional 
value and the value of its terms, the narrative resolves an initial 
contradiction: it ties a knot. This formula reappears in the 
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Mythologiques in terms of the mythic system as a whole. 
Underlying these relatively obscure and often difficult formulations, 
and underlying equally Levi-Strauss's canonic formula for the narrative 
lie a number of basic analytic principles. We can identify three; 
firstly the establishment of the binary at the heart of mythical 
thought; secondly the identification of the different dimensions 
of mythic communication, namely code, message and armature; and thirdly 
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the recognition of the different levels of coding potentially 
present in the mythic and the recognition that their analysis 
is (in a certain sense) endless, 
x 
Levi-Strauss*s advocacy of a binary structure at the heart of myth 
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has two aspects. He assumes that the distinction between an 
item and its opposite, a_ and not a, must be the simplest relationship 
in any activity of classification; and he extrapolates from above 
all Roman Takobson's work in phonology where the binary principle 
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seems to be at work significantly at a pre-semantic level. The 
naturalness of the binary is then both the naturalness of the activity 
of the mind, but also a naturalness to be perceived in the objective 
world. Not only does the mind think in terms of oppositions 
and difference, but the mind perceives that opposition and difference 
in otherwise unmediated nature. Species, for example, themselves 
are distinct. 
The analyses consequently take the form of a series of concrete 
oppositions which Ifevi-Strauss divines as being at work within a 
mythic text. So an opposition of eagle and wolverine is an opposition 
of high and low, sky and earth, along the axes of hunter; the 
opposition of eagle and vulture is one of carrion and flesh eating 
bird, of rotten and raw. Using these and similar categories the 
mythic structure opens out like petals of a flower. But it is 
a destructuring-structuring activity in ignorance of the chronology 
of the text, and dependent entirely on the reversible logic of 
similarity and difference though which Levi-Strauss assumes the 
primitive constructs his world. It also involves, oppositions 
which are content specific and tend to avoid the purity suggested 
by the a, not a category. Levi-Strauss's binariness tends to elide 
contradiction and contrariety. 
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This apparent reduction of the activity of mind and the complexity 
of its texts to such a simple operation has been much criticized, 
127 
and, to a degree, misunderstood. That our thought is exclusively 
binary would be an absurd a proposition as a suggestion that it never 
/ 
is. Levi-Strauss himself is aware of its limits. 
"... the binary model we sketched is not enough. It 
permits the abstract definition of values which present 
a limiting character, but not the translation of concrete 
properties and the measure of degrees of proximity. To 
be able to do this, one would have to elaborate an analogical 
model where the initial and final positions of each myth 
would fit into a multi-dimensional space, each of these 
dimensions providing a parameter along which would be 
arranged, in the most convenient manner, the variations 
of the same semantic f u n c t i o n . " '28 
Here the binary becomes an heuristic device; elsewhere it has 
ontological significance. This is an ambiguity which is the bain 
of any mature consideration of Levi-Strauss'8 work. 
The second dimension of Levi-Strauss's analysis of myth involves 
a consideration of three aspects of the system; armature, codes 
and message, to whose interaction I have already referred in discussing 
the identification of the system as such. By armature Levi-Strauss 
means the invariant properties of two or several myths; for example 
two myths (say M^ and M]^ in The Raw and the Cooked) are both 
129 
involved in the articulation of the relationship of fire and water. 
The code relates to 'the patterned functions ascribed in each myth 
to these properties'; it defines the dimensions in which the opposition 
of water and fire are articulated. Typical levels of coding 
considered in his analysis of myth both in the Mythologiques and 
elsewhere, are those of the culinary, astronomical, sociological, 
accoustic and so on. I will return to the implications of these 
levels shortly. Finally the message: this relates to the subject 
matter of each individual myth; what the myth is manifestly about. ' 
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"I can define the relation between the Bororo myth (M^) 
and the Sherente myth ( M ^ ) by stating that when we 
move from one to the other, the armature remains constant, 
to code is changed, and the message is reversed." 130 
The point, in general, is that the mythic system is the product of the 
interweaving of these different threads of discourse, and rather like 
a plait made of three strands, consistency and difference, structure 
and position,are what constitutes its integrity. To recognize 
that in the juxtaposition of two myths one dimension (the armature) 
remains constant, that the codes have changed, but the message is 
entirely different, suggests, at least to Levi-Strauss, that he 
look for another myth where these relationships are inverted. Here 
the myth will present a further and contrasting message but along a 
similar armature and perhaps with different codes. Needless to say 
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Levi-Strauss, in The Raw and the Cooked, finds just such a myth, 
the Sherente (M
l 2
^) myth which returns the analysis to the starting 
point and to the Bororo via a transformation of code and message. 
The subsequent analysis in then undertaken in terms of the various 
codes through which the origin of fire and water are articulated in 
each of the myths, and also in other myths which are selected to 
illustrate and to enhance particular points of interpretation and 
logical interconnection. 
The most illuminating illustration of this plaited movement is to 
be found in his analysis of the six variations of the Guiana, Tupi-
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Tucuna and Ge myths about the origin and loss of honey. Here, 
within a methodological framework which defines the set in terms of 
a change in either the nature of the dominant species of animal or 
in Its sex, but not both at once, and by constantly referring to the 
ethnography and ethnozoology of the tribes whose myths they are, 
he traces the ways in which the dominant message and its codes defines 
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the spherical and the musical structure of the mythical system 
as a whole. 
There is, however, a certain unresolved tension here and it brings 
us to the third of the methodological dimensions of Levi-Strauss's 
analysis: that of the potentially endless and multivaried levels 
of coding present in myth. 
On a number of occasions Levi-Strauss draws attention to the obvious 
difficulties associated with his task. This is most significantly 
expressed in the Overture to the Raw and the Cooked; 
"There is no real end to mythological analysis, no 
hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking-down 
process has been completed. Themes can be split 
up ad infinitum. Just when you think you have 
disentangled and separated them, you realize that 
they are knitting together again in response to the 
operation of unexpected affinities. Consequently 
the unity of the myth is never more than tendential 
and projective and cannot reflect a state or a 
particular moment of the myth. It is a phenomenon 
of the imagination, resulting from the attempt at 
interpetation; and its function is to endow the 
myth with a synthetic form and to prevent its disinteg-
ration into a confusion of opposites.^3 
The confidence, then, with which subsequently the system of myth 
and its structural interconnections, is defined, is dependent on a 
selection of privileged dimensions. For example it is the opposition 
between earth and water which seems to Levi-Strauss to be the central 
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one in the stories about Asdiwal, an opposition most clearly linked 
to the economic activity of the Tlingit and Tsimshian Indians whose 
myths they are. In the first volume of the MythologiqueSthe 
culinary opposition of the raw and the cooked establishes the main i35 
path along which the analysis runs. The system, therefore, 
is quite clearly a construction. As such^though the analysis might, 
and in Levi-Strauss's case certainly does, generate coherence and 
sense, it is never entirely free from the arbitrariness with which it 
(as all aspects of culture) began. 
-201-
Let me create some of the redundancy so beloved by myth and so 
disapproved of in accounts of this sort by summarizing and 
developing some of the points made so far. 
s 
On a number of occasions in his work Levi-Strauss deliberately 
addresses himself to questions of methodology. On the one hand, 
as for example in his 'Comparative Religions of Nonliterate Peoples', 
his propositions specify the very basic operations involved in the 
type of analysis which he advocates. 
"1. A myth must never be interpreted on one level only. 
No privileged explanation exists, for any myth 
consists in an interrelation of several explanatory 
levels. 
2. A myth must never be interpreted individually, but 
in its relationship to other myths which, taken 
together, constitute a transformation group, 
3. A group of myths must never be interpreted alone, 
but by reference: (a) to other groups of myths; 
and (b) to the ethnography of the societies in 
which they originate. For, if the myths transform 
each other, a relation of the same type links (on 
a transversal axis) the different levels involved 
in the evolution of all social life. These levels 
range from the forms of techno-economic activity to 
the systems of representations, and include economic 
exchanges, political and familial structures, aesthetic 
expression, ritual practices, and religious beliefs."'
3 6 
Here we are offered, by now a number of fairly obvious directives, 
which taken together demand that the analysis of myth must be multi-
faceted and neither dependent on one text nor even on texts exclusively, 
for the context, specifically the ethnography of the societies in 
which the myths are told, is of vital importance. The extent to 
which Levi-Strauss's analysis of myth is dependent on his knowledge 
of the ethnography is often overlooked. Even though he acknowledges 
that such dependence is provisional .provisional that is on the expansion 
of the understanding of the system sufficiently so that all the 
information necessary for subsequent decoding can be found within it,' 
137. 
the dependence is real and continuous. To relate a myth or a series 
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of myths to their host society, is to provide for a way of reducing 
the arbitrariness inevitable in the selection of levels or in the 
138 
ordering of transformations. Myths for example which reflect 
the social structure most completely can be thought of as primary, 
those which do so but less completely, or less directly, can be 
1 39 
considered secondary transformations. 
/ 
On the other hand Levi-Strauss's methodological excursions involve 
a consideration of the more intangible qualities of mythical 
140 141 
analysis: their exhaustivity , their redundancy, their dynamic 
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nature, their truth, the relations of form and content, 
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and the transcendence of narrative. 
It is this last dimension which I want to discuss in a little more 
detail, because, of course, it relates directly to the concerns of my 
analysis. Very simple, and quite obviously, L^vi-Strauss's work 
involves a transcendence of the chronology of a text - and this 
doubly so. Not only is chronological ordering replaced by a 
structural one, but the single text is immersed in a system of texts. 
"...every myth is an organized totality: the development 
of the narrative throws light on an underlying structure 
which is independent of tie relation between what comes 
before and what comes after" '46 
This is not to suggest that the chronological and serial ordering within myth is 
entirely ignored, but only that it must be of less significance, both for 
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Levi-Strauss, and by implication for the natives whose myths they are. 
However, beneath this distinction of chronology and structure lies 
a parallel but more basic one: that between the syntagmatic and the 
paradigmatic. Indeed here the relations are not so clear cut, 
for depending on the initial perspective a myth can be considered 
syntagmatically in terms of the chronology of its units whose 
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significance depends on paradigmatic relationship, or it can be 
considered in toto as one unit of a paradigmatic set. The 
(M303) 
analysis of the important Tacana myth / in From Honey to Ashes 
is a good example. It reveals that "the syntagmatic chain 
formed by this myth can be changed into a paradigmatic set for the 
interpretation of any of the myths of which it is a transformation, 
while those myths in their turn would form a paradigmatic set capable 




Mythical thought, the evidence for which is presented in the myth, 
for Levi-Strauss therefore, defines the world net so much in terms 
of things, but in terms of a body of common properties, "expressible 
in geometrical terms and transformable one into another by means 
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of operations which constitute a sort of algebra." 
The narratives with which we (and he) are concerned are reducible to, 
and themselves constitute primary units of a field of abstract 
relations whose interaction is a clue to the activity of the mind 
of man. There is then, in the patterning of these categories an 
identification of a certain level of communication, let us call it 
mythic. In its independence of a specific chronology, and even in 
its precedence over that chronology, it seems very much the property 
of an oral culture whose tales are not so rigidly informed by the 
150 
linearity of a literate society. An explanation of this level of 
communication in contemporary texts is at once an explanation of the 
maintenance of the oral tradition and a measure of its significance. 
I hope to be able to illustrate in Chapter 6 in what ways this can 
be done for television. 
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One final postscript from Levi-Strauss which seems, as ever, to 
muddy the waters but also to warn again excessive dogmatisim 
in the definition of what constitutes the essence of myth. In 
conversation with George Steiner he said this: 
"There are probably the same mythical structures recurring 
here and there. But I would not claim that they are the 
same everywhere. It is quite possible that when we have 
made sufficient progress in the study of mythology we 
shall arrive at the conclusion that there are several 
species, and not only one. This I don't know yet." 
IV 
The time has come to draw the methodological strings together • and 
to present a model for the analysis of narrative. There is a 
temptation to add also a model of the narrative, but that remains 
to be determined. This study, hopefully will begin that process, 
but the epistemological and ontological problems associated with 
the notion of structure seem irresolvable. It will be as well 
briefly, to remind ourselves what they are. 
There are two related aspects: firstly the question of whether the 
structures really exist, or whether they are only the product of 
the analyst's imaginationjand secondly whether the results gained 
through structural analysis can in any meaningful sense be falsified. 
but 
To attempt an answer to these questions is to reduce/not to erase 
the ambiguity associated with the method. The object is the 
unconscious - the cultural rather than the individual unconscious; 
and certain assumptions are made about it; it is assumed to be 
rational, though not necessarily exclusively so, and it is assumed 
that in its activity it creates order in a world of chaos. It can 
be demonstrated that what is produced in that activity is ordered, 
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and that order is a precondition for a minimal degree of communication. 
It is self evident that people act in an ordered fashion. What is 
being attempted is the identification of the links between manifest 
action, in the broadest sense, and latent structures such that the ' 
former becomes explicable in terms of the latter. Insofar as 
structures are acted upon, or acted within, they can be tested. 
That testing depends, as Raymond Boudon points out, on the nature 
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of the object which we are studying. We assume it is systemic. 
If we can define its limits and if these limits are clear and real, 
then testability is possible; if they are not then we cannot directly 
test our results. The difference between a kinship system and a 
social system, between Levi-Strausslan structuralism and Parsonlan 
structural-functionism, is crucial in this regard. But this testability 154 
is not the same as falsification in Popperian terms; as we have 
seen the notion of structure itself is based on assumptions which 
in the final resort are arbitrary. In that sense all that can be 
done is to offer an account, of course philosophically based, but 
theoretically grounded, which within the limits it itself defines 
and within limits defined in reality by its object, offers coherence. 
This coherence is provisional. It is also metaphorical. Structures 
therefore are neither real nor the product exclusively of a fertile 
imagination. As Jean Piaget suggests structures exist somewhere 
"between the theoretical design partially related to the observer's 
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decisions and the actual organisation of the behaviour to be explained." 
Our texts then are real. We do tell stories. We do produce and 
listen to narratives. The object of our investigation is clearly 
defined. It is quite obviously ordered. It makes sense. On the 
other hand our analyses of that sense, our explanations of it, may be 
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various and they will be endless. We can improve on them, but 
we cannot finally and unambiguously choose between them. In the 
absence of these final criteria, criteria which it has been argued 
do not even exist in the natural sciences, we are forced into 
making judgements of adequacy in more humble terms. Although, as 
we have seen, in the last analysis the theory on which our perception 
of structure and structures is based is arbitrary, we have criteria 
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for choice at our disposal, which some would call aesthetic, others 
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economic, and which in terms of generality, coherence, simplicity, 
even elegance make one more persuasive, more adequate even,than an 
other. The claims of structuralism are those, and the ambiguity 
is intended, of a positive hermeneutics. It is an ambiguity centrally 
grounded in the activity of the human sciences, an ambiguity explored 
preeminently by Max Weber, ' ^ a n d restated though in different terms 
by Claude Levi-Strauss in his own recent defence of his epistemology. 
"The value of the epistemological model offered by 
structuralism to the human sciences cannot be compared 
to the models available so far. Structuralism uncovers 
a unity and a coherence within things which could not be 
revealed by a simple description of the facts somehow 
scattered and disorganized before the eyes of knowledge. 
It also does this more economically, with a very small 
number of principles, axioms, and rules which, in a variety 
of domains, have proved their fecundity. But structuralism 
doeB not presume to contain the truth. It is content to 
say that things are a little clearer today than they were 
yesterday." 
With this epistemological excursion undertaken, but not forgotten, 
I can now outline, in summary form, the model of the television 
narrative which will be empirically illustrated and explored in the 
subsequent chapters. 
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The model presented in figure 3 is that of the narrative which 
and the previous one 
discussion in this chapter/would lead us, I hope, to expect. It 
is of course, a schematic presentation and should be treated with 
caution. It is itself a summary. '162 
A MODEL OF NARRATIVE 
EXPRESSION 
Substance 
(e.g. in television/film: image, noise 
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The primary distinction that can be made is between content 
and expresion; a distinction which reflects the obvious fact that 
the same story can be told in different ways by different media. 
In the context of an analysis of the television narrative the 
expression is the chronological ordering of, pre-eminently, 
picture and sound. To understand its form we define its constituent 
units; the simplest of which is the shot, the most complex of which, 
in its juxtaposition of visual and aural patterning, is the sequence. 
In television or in film the visual is, in a certain sense, preeminent. 
By virtue of it we are made aware of space and movement, and of 
discontinuities which may or may not (each is significant) synchronise 
with the non-spatial movement and discontinuities in the aural 
dimension. Picture and speech sometimes coincide, sometimes they 
do not. Movement through a televised text is uneven but controllable. 
It is also controlling. Our perception of the content of a text 
is mediated - precisely - by the patterns imposed on it by the nature 
of video tape or film strip. The units defined at this level are 
basic, but transcendable. They are transcended as soon as one moves 
attention away from the medium to its content, away from expression 
to substance. This movement is, of course, circular. We are able 
to make distinctions of expression because we have already understood 
the content. We can focus on the set of codes that define the 
particularity of the medium because we have already understood, 
unconsciously perhaps, those codes which make the text coherent, 
that give it sense. 
Associated with this distinction in the hands of Christian Met*, is 
the distinction between film and cinema, between the specifically 
1 
and exclusively filmic and that which is available to the film to use. 
-209 -
In a parallel sense we can suggest a distinction between television 
and the televisual. The narrative of television is the narrative 
of expression, the chronology of sight and sound, the chronology 
of pre-eminently though not exclusively, of video. It is a • 
chronology of the camera and the microphone, of cut and continuity, 
of. movement of body and of movement of voice. 
The televisual narrative, on the other hand, is the narrative of 
content. It is the what rather than the how. It is heard and 
seen, of course, but it is not dependent on the particular combination 
of sound and vision that television generates. It is the narrative 
available equally to television or to film, to the theatre, to the 
novel, or to myth. We can say, quite obviously, that all these 
different media could tell the same story, albeit in a different 
way. 
That difference, however, imprecise, is nevertheless important. 
Narrative becomes televisual because it is televised. A tale is 
altered and limited in its telling by the medium of expression 
through which it is told. There are then two sources of constraint 
within a televised text: the constraint of television, of its 
expression, and the constraint of the.televisual, that which comes to tele-
vision already (partially) defined. It is to this, to narrative as 
such, that we need now to turn. 
The content of the narrative, like its expression, has two 
dimensions: form and substance. The latter is easy to deal with 
analytically but far from easy in practical terms, for what acts as 
substance of the content of the television message, as for all other 
so-called mass media of communication, are the events, attitudes 
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and values of the everyday cotnmonsense world. What becomes the 
164 
substance of the content (strictly the purport ') has a life 
of its own outside the specific narrative which includes it. 
To understand the narrative, then.involves stepping outside it, 
and this stepping outside in turn Involves a familiarity with all 
the codes at work in the culture which acts as its host. This 
is, in any sense, an impossible task. In distant societies, both 
in time and space, the problem is eased but not erased by the 
relative simplicity of the culture, but also the relative- poverty 
of our ethnographic knowledge. In our own society we are faced 
with a complexity and with rapid change; our knowledge of it, never 
strictly ethnographic, is suffused by doubt and contradiction. We 
are inside it and no amount of theoretical distance can avoid the 
ultimate impossibility of the complete understanding of the content 
of our own culture. It is like disentangling a ball of string 
from the inside. 
More accessible perhaps, though not without its difficulties, is 
the form of the content, the narration as such. The bulk of this 
chapter, in terms of the theories, pre-eminently of Vladimir Propp, 
A.J, Greimas and Claude Levi-Strauss, has been devoted to it. 
The narration has two dimensions, both present but not always 
equally, and different genres of story-telling can be identified 
by the relative strength of one rather than the other. On the 
one hand the diachronic, on the other the synchronic, or what have 
been called here the chronologic and the.logic. Narratives are 
told both in time and space, or, following Levi-Strauss, in non-
reversible and reversible time. They consist of events, subjects/ 
objects and descriptions, just as sentences consist of verbs, nouns 
and adjectives. 
4 211 -
In its analysis, we can and we have distinguished various levels. 
To speak of chronology is to speak, like Propp, of morphology and 
function, of significant units of action. A function is significant 
in terms of its contribution to the movement of the narrative as a . 
whole; it is significant if its absence would alter the sense of 
the narrative, or its integrity. Functions are acts, and acts may 
be of different types, and of different modalities- intentioned, 
threatened, completed, incomplete, successful or unsuccessful. Not 
all acts, however, have the same functional significance. The 
preparations leading to a murder are only significent once the murder 
has been attempted; and it is the act, be it successful or otherwise, 
1(j6 
which will be functional in the Proppian sense. A manifest act may 
be functional in more than one way; equally a number of different acts 
may together fulfil one function.
1
 ^ 
However, this same unit, which in the morphology can be called the 
sequence,has a different value in the context of reversible time of 
the narrative's logic. L^vi-Strauss identifies the movement as 
between sequence and schemata, and short of inventing a more barbarous 
neologism in a text that already has its fair share of jargon, we 
168 might accept this distinction. 
Narratives,and especially mythic narratives, contain therefore a 
double movement, and the actions of the hero, in their sequence, do not 
by themselves contain the full measure of meaning. These actions are 
metaphorlc - in A.J. Greimas' terms they are anthropomorphic - and 
they enact logical transformations much more central to the integrity 
of mythic communication. At this level of analysis the concern is more 
with the contextualization and connotation of the act. But even this 
can be pushed further, to the level of a formula or logical model, 
and then the concrete is left far behind. This involves a reduction 
-212-
of the logic of narrative, indeed the reduction of the logic of 
169 
any semiotic system, to the play of an abstract formula. And 
this reduction, finally, suggests and attempts to define in what 
I 70 • 
narrative's basic units consist; its balance and its equilibrium. 
What links, in effect, the function and the qualification, the act 
and the category, and temporal and the intemporal, are the actors 
in the narrative themselves. Let us be clear about what we mean 
here. We are no more concerned with individual characters in a 
play than we are with actors who, on television, play them. The 
1 7i 
notion of 'actant ' (acting unit)' defines a reductive level at 
which the various characters in diverse narratives, can be seen to 
be functionally identical. The acting unit, be he the hero, the 
villain, the dispatcher, the dispatched, the sort for person;- or 
helper/opposer, exists by virtue of his involvement in functional 
acts, an involvement which whilst still at the anthropomorphic level 
moves the narrative from one category to another. The hero in his is 
movement from situation to situation, from act to act,/transformed 
by virtue of his different involvements. No only is the chronologic 
defined by these movements: the hero having gained help, triumphs 
over the villain and finds his happiness; but the logic also follows 
that movement; the hero, now on earth, now among the stars, now with 
the help of a jaguar, now with the help of a tortoise, defines the 
pattern of meanings which the narrative also produces and upon which 
it depends. 
The transformations effected through the function of structure and 
qualification, chronologic and logic, generate a coherence which in 
172 
its particularity we might wish to call the discourse. We can 
talk of narrative discourse, of the television discourse, but we 
can equally talk of sub-discourses, that of the play, the documentary, 
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the advertisement, the news and so on. There is no reason why a 
model such as this should not be useful in defining the various discourses 
in which narrative is manifested, to define the particular balances 
of chronology and logic, of variation in form and substance of » 
expression, as well as the differences of substantial content which 
distinguish them. 
I began this chapter by quoting the enigmatic Marshall McLuhan: 
"There is simply no time for the narrative form borrowed from print 
technology." Television, in its picture and its synaesthesia 
destroys chronology. I don't think that it does. Rather, television 
through the electronic technology of sound and picture shifts the 
balance in the pattern of its communication away from the dominance 
of linearity and towards the equilibrium of reversible and non-reversible 
time. In this it reasserts the particularity of mythic narrative -
the balance and resolution of the novel and the familiar, of stability 
of change, of frustration and achievement. Television's narratives 
are mythic; they are in equal part mask, mirror and exemplar. 
Such narratives are defined as much by their form as by their function. 
Within them the work of reading has, very largely, been done. The 




 is constrained by the rigour of its structuring. Mythic 
narratives are, in everything but detail, largely predictable. In 
television this is also the case. Mythic narrative also, despite 
the unique chronology of a given text, is bulled within an eternally 
recursive system in which endings are relativized and beginnings 
insubstantial. Television, is equally, both endless and beginningless. 
The model I have suggested for the study of narrative allows us to make 
some of these distinctions and to explore them both for television and 
for other media. It is the task of the next two chapters to illustrate 
hr>w fcM nrforhf" b* rfnniS-
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CHAPTER V 
INTIMATE STRANGERS. MORPHOLOGY 
In this and the subsequent chapter I wish to explore the structure 
of a television narrative. I intend to show in what ways a series 
of television drama programmes follows quite closely the pattern for 
the telling of tales already outlined and also that it constructs 
its meanings in ways similar to the myths discussed by,pre-eminently 
Claude Levi-Strauss. The television serial drama works within a 
convention and that convention has both diachronic and synchronic 
dimensions. It has a clearly defined chronology and it constructs 
its meanings concretely, 
I am not offering a proof or even an experiment in any strict sense. 
Any conclusions, subject as they are to the epistemological 
qualifications already discussed, cannot be extended much beyond 
the examples themselves. However there is very little in the 
experience of watching television dram which would lead me to 
expect that what seems true of this series will not also be true 
of others. Indeed this series, concerned as it is with the details 
of personal relationships much more than with the unequivocal action 
of say a thriller or a detective drama, might be expected to be 
less overt in its narrative structuring, or even less dependent 
on such structuring. The narrative of test and combat, of alienation 
and integration, of success and failure is clearly more apposite to 
drama of the latter type. If it can be shown to be relevant to 
a drama series of the order of Intimate Strangers then that 
demonstration could well be expected to have greater significance.* 
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The set of programmes selected for analysis was the series 
Intimate Strangers, produced by Richard Bates for London Weekend 
Television and broadcast in thirteen weekly episodes between 
September 20th and December 13th, 1974. They were shown at * 
9.00p.m. on Friday evenings, peak viewing time and were watched 
? 
in between 4,344,000 and 5,874,000 homes throughout the country. 
A certain number of more or less intuitive considerations led to 
3 
the choice of this series. Firstly, it was felt, generally, 
that the television drama, given the amount of time devoted to it 
in the schedules, had been relatively poorly studied. The drama, 
and particularly the serial drama, seemed to represent as much as, 
if not more than the news, for example, a central dimension of 
television's production. Secondly it seemed that a contemporary 
drama (contemporary both in time of writing and in subject), would 
of its very nature be more likely to illuminate the problems with 
which I was to be concerned, more likely to reveal the structures 
associated with folktales and myth and hence more likely to act as 
a paradigm for further analysis. 
Thirdly, and for similar reasons - the concern to reduce as much as 
possible complications in the analysis - it seemed reasonable to 
choose a series of plays which was written specifically for television 
and which also contained both complete serial and complete episodic 
narratives. And finally it was hoped to avoid somewhat the problems 
associated with authorship by choosing a series that was written 
and/or directed by more than one individual. 
Intimate Strangers fulfilled all of these criteria, though it was 
not, as I've already mentioned, a series of crime or adventure, and 
therefore perhaps unlikely to be as transparent, as 'dramatic' as 
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anything of that sort. It was contemporary, in both senses, 
and written especially for television. Each episode, although 
incorporated into the series as a whole with its own narrative 
coherence, was itself narratively self-contained. In addition 
to the normal group involvement in the production of a television 
series (camera, sound crews, make-up, set designers, actors, etc.) 
there were four directors, four writers and a producer involved 
in its creation. 
The programmes were recorded off-air on to video-tape. The copies 
used for the analysis were, unfortunately, in black and white. 
II 
I would like, in what follows in this chapter, to discuss the chronology 
of the narrative in its two dimensions, that of the series as a 
whole and that of the episode. I will do so, in the first instance, 
by summarizing the plot of the series in a relatively simple and 
undetailed way, and then continue by discussing it in terms of the 
model of folktale narratives already presented. I will do the 
same, in more detail, for one particular episode, episode 6, and 
then, referring also to the narrative structures of the other 
episodes, more briefly summarized in appendix 8 , I will discuss 
the implications of this part of the analysis as a whole. 
There are two methodological points which I would like to raise 
at this stage. The first has to do with the problems of discussing 
an audio-visual text in writing only. These are problems which, 
short of providing a set of tapes to accompany this discussion, are 
insuperable. There are two aspects to this problem. One cannot 
hope to convey the detail, both in its arrangement (mis-en-scfcne) 
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and in its movement, of the visual image. Any discussion of it is 
necessarily subject to selection, and necessarily subject to the 
relative arbitrariness of individual perception. Fortunately my 
project does not depend on the minutiae of the visual image, although 
it is of course dependent on the image as such and my perception of 
it, But I am less concerned with the details of camera angle, point 
of view, size of shot, or the intricacies of editing than with being 
able to point out in relatively unambiguous terms dimensions of action 
and movement, and of the specifics of location or dress. I can 
point to, for example, a particular location as being in a garden, or 
an office, and to a man in a tie and suit or on the other hand in shirt 
sleeves and tieless, with a minimum of ambiguity and, for my purposes, 
the maximum of significance. This is not to say that other aspects 
of the image will not be present or, for other purposes, important. 
The second dimension to this problem of transcription has to do with 
the narrative itself. Its more or less unselfconscious description 
necessary for and prior to analysis as such, involves, inevitably 
a reduction and a translation. The summary of a narrative, particularly 
of one drawn from another medium is just that, a summary, and therefore 
subject to question. Indeed such a summary description is structured, 
and subsequent analysis could well be open to challenge on the basis 
that what is being analysed is not the original text but the summary 
of it. Once again, short of referring to the original texts, there 
is no way of checking the accuracy or relevance of the summary, and 
even then no way of defining it as final and totally adequate, as 
true. If narratives are structured then one can identify and 
summarize them. If they are not then no summary description will 
prove any better than another or more correct. This is the first 
-227 -
circle from within which this analysis seeks to extract itself, 
but I freely acknowledge that it is inside a circle where I begin. 
The second methodological question also involves a circle, and that 
has to do with the fact that both text and analysis are both the 
produce of, and articulated within, the same culture. In one 
sense, this seems to me not as important as it might be, for theory and 
method itself, if offered both with care and an awareness of limits, 
provides some of the distance between the text and the resulting 
analysis, which is more obviously present were we to be involved 
in the texts of a distant and different culture. 
But the Implications of this difference need to be noted. In the 
case of an analysis of myth such as undertaken by Claude Levi-Strauss, 
4 
Marcel Detieme or Edmund Leach,/ what is involved is the elucidation 
of meaning which may well be appreciated, albeit unconsciously, by 
those who utter and hear the myths, but of which we, without the 
benefit of such an analysis, can make little s e n s e . S u c h accounts 
as these mythologists offer may well be difficult to substantiate 
but it may be equally correct to suggest, as Peter Caws does of 
Levi-Strauss'8 work in particular, that "Its greatest contribution 
has been to claim for the intellect a territory which we had all 
but abandoned to the absurd."^ 
This whole relationship of analyst and object is clearly very different 
where that object is a television programme and where the analyst is 
a member of the culture and society that produced it. The problems 
are not so much of generating conclusions that seem valid, but of 
making these conclusion convincing to those who will read them; 
to those who are equally members of that culture, and who by virtue 
of their involvement in it and as members of a television watching 
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community, will in one sense have no need of such analysis. They 
understand what they are watching already. The dangers here are 
not of surprise or contradiction but of the banal and the obvious. 
The claim for the intellect this time is for a territory that had 
all but been abandoned to the trivial. The task is not to illuminate 
what we have not previously understood, but to suggest the rules 
according to which we understand what we do. The conclusions should 
be illuminating, but they are unlikely to be entirely surprising. 
Ill 
The Series Plot 
1. It is early morning. Joan Paynter is in the garden, Harry Paynter 
her husband of some thirty years, is getting dressed upstairs. 
They meet for breakfast in the kitchen, and discuss their future 
holiday and the likely events of the day. Harry, as usual, leaves 
for work. His journey involves a drive to the station in his 
yeteran Bentley and a train journey to the city, where he works 
as a production manager for a publishing company. At work he 
delegates a job to a young member of his department. Later, 
at a lunchtime meeting with his solicitor Harry is told that 
their usual holiday cottage, which they had attempted to buy, 
had been sold and furthermore that their holiday there was now 
impossible. 
Harry returns home to find daughter Kate in residence and faces 
Joan with the news. An argument ensues. Kate attempts to 
ameliorate the situation, and though not without some difficulty, 
Harry persuades Joan of his new holiday plans. After some 
friends' thirtieth anniversary party, they make peace, but on 
the following morning, Sunday, and the day when they are due 
to leave for their holiday, Harry is called urgently to the 
office. A problem has resulted from his delegation and Harry 
must go and sort it out. He will meet Joan at the ticket barrier 
at the station. He arrives just in time but as he reaches Joan 
he collapses, and the train leaves without them. 
2. Harry is recovering in hospital after a heart attack, and Joan 
is warned by their doctor that he has been lucky and must be 
very careful in the future: no smoking, little drinking, much 
exercise. Joan brings him home and settles him in bed, while 
the rest of the family gather - Kate, and other daughter Judith 
with her husband Matt. Matt provokes Joan with his apparent 
insensitivity about his father-in-law's illness. 
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The recovery progresses, and Harry, Joan and Kate are relaxing 
in the garden when Bob, the company secretary arrives to 
discuss Harry's future. Bob wants to persuade Harry to take 
an early retirement, and that refused, he then promises to 
find a way of keeping Harry at work in the company. The new 
job, although well packaged, seems to Harry to be worthless. 
He walks out at lunchtime on the first day. On his return 
home he tells Joan of what he has done and the two of them 
move apart. Harry goes into the garden, Joan runs upstairs. 
3. Harry and Joan arrive, (Joan is driving a hired car) for a 
holiday in the Lake District. Harry is still expected to 
take it easy. He walks round Coniston, while Joan unpacks. 
He discovers the presence of Ruskin, an old hero of his. 
They meet the Lansons; he is a retired soldier who 
coincidentally served with Joan's late brother during the 
war. Harry and Joan reject the offer of a joint walking 
trip and subsequently their relations with the Lansons 
become estranged. Phoebe Lanson breaks down over dinner 
when reminded of the loss of their own child. The holiday, 
otherwise, continues, with Harry and Joan thinking of the 
future and remembering their past. However, a message arrives 
for Joan from Bob, Harry's old company secretary. It seems 
that Joan has been talking to Bob without Harry knowing. He 
is angry, and after a row, they decide to return home. 
4. Harry is under pressure, especially financial pressure, to find 
a job. He sees the bank manager who reluctantly agrees to 
keep supporting Harry's overdraft. Later Harry meets with an 
ageing publisher in London who cannot offer him a job, but 
does suggest someone who might be able to help. 
Tom Daniels has a new business locally. He offers Harry a 
directorship of his printing works, although at a small starting 
salary. Harry promises to think it over and suggests to Joan 
that they invite Daniels, and it transpires, his secretary/girlfriend 
to dinner. After dinner Daniels offers a share in the business 
in return for a contribution of £20,000. Harry hasn't got it, 
but he intends to raise it. His search, finally, leads him 
to a city money lender. Harry baulks at the interest asked 
and returns home empty handed. 
Joan has been against the venture from the start but they 
momentarily sink their differences on Harry's return, for 
it is Judith's birthday and she and Matt are at home when 
he arrives. However Tom arrives angrily. He has found 
out about Harry's attempt to raise money and he calls the 
whole deal off. Harry is dejected, but he remembers an 
advertisement that Matt has seen in a local paper. He goes 
to ring but it is after hours. 
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5. Harry and Joan are at breakfast, but Harry is reluctant to 
go to work. Work, when he does arrive, is a small printing 
works in a converted chapel. Harry is a superior sort of 
salesman. There is nothing about Foster, the boss, or the 
two minions, Dale and Foster's secretary which he likes. 
He is not busy. He comes home for lunch and dawdles. He 
is starting to drink. His family life becomes increasingly 
strained. He has a row with Judith and he does not talk 
to Joan. 
A day or so later, stepping out of his routine, Harry makes for 
the local at lunchtime. He meets Pat there, the owner of an 
office bureau, and they have lunch together. After some 
hesitation Harry agrees to go to London with her the following 
Thursday. Joan is lied to. 
The trip to London involves lunch, a visit to an art gallery, 
and a roof garden tea. Pat suggests they go to bed together 
but Harry demurs. They part friends, but Harry returns home 
irritable. He tries to talk to Joan but fails, and can only 
shout at her. 
His work seems to deteriorate. He rejects an offer of 
3 lunchtime drink from Pat, and finds himself back home 
with his family; Joan, for whom he buys the Chinese vase 
that she had wanted (though it is the wrong one), and 
Judith and Matt, to whom he lies about his work. 
But neither family nor work provide any consolation. He 
is threatened by Foster and is dispirited by Judith and 
Matt's continual rowing. He rushes round to see Pat, only 
to be attacked and vilified by her. Pat leaves him alone 
in her flat, drink in hand and almost in tears. 
6. Harry is drinking before breakfast. He is responsible for 
an idle works and threatened by Foster. He must produce some 
worthwhile orders or else. Help comes in the shape of an 
old friend, Stephen Kenyon, who unwittingly suggests to Joan 
that Harry's recent trip to London might not have been what 
she believed it to be. 
That evening Harry is not hungry. He gets drunk and lies to 
Joan about his trip to London. Joan has to put him to bed and 
as she does so she checks in Harry's diary. She finds out 
that he has been lying. Kate's subsequent arrival does not 
really help matters, and Harry has a row with her too, envious 
of the amount of money she is earning. 
However, the deal with Kenyon, first explored in London, and then 
confirmed at lunch in Tunbridge Wells with Foster present, seems 
to generate new hope. But while they are signing it, the 
apprentice Dale jams a potato up the exhaust of Harry's Bentley 
and the ensuing explosion prompts Harry to attack him. 
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Jobless, Harry returns home and Joan and he face each other 
with their past and lack of future. A cathartic row leaves 
both exhausted and dejected. 
Early next morning Harry finds Joan walking alone in the 
garden, and the first tentative steps at reconstruction are 
decided upon and later tested on Kate. Harry is proposing to 
start up on his own; the house and the car are to be bold. 
Harry has found a bookshop in Tunbridge Wells. It is run by 
an ageing Miss Temple. There is a flat above and Joan 
accepts the inevitability of their move. Harry begins to 
familiarize himself with the bookshop and the bookselling 
business, while Joan tries to interpret and disguise the 
nature of their move to her friends. The car is sold, and 
they agree to sell the house. 
The contract for the purchase of the bookshop is agreed and 
they move in. Harry becomes involved. He is happy. Joan 
misses the house and on a visit there to tend the garden, 
meets the prospective buyer and her children. They discuss 
their menj Joan is anxious and upset. 
Matters are made worse by the falling through of the sale of 
their own house. Harry goes to London to see Bob and asks him 
if he can take his own pension early. Bob refuses. Meanwhile 
Joan, left to look after the shop, refuses to serve an old 
friend after a certain unpleasantness. 
Harry arrives home to find the shop closed and Joan absent. 
He goes round to the house and finds her sitting disconsolately 
in the darkened, empty, sitting room. She feels his gain to 
be her loss, and although Harry persuades her to return to the 
flat, her doubts and sorrow remain. 
Joan is going to London for the day to buy curtain material. 
At breakfast, Harry noting her rather dowdy appearance, 
suggests she also buy a new dress and dressing gown. 
On her arrival in London she buys curtain material, a dress 
and dressing gown and shoes, and loaded with purchases, she 
walks into a hotel. She meets there an old friend, Lionel, 
who has just been stood up by a girlfriend. Lionel, she learns, 
is divorced. He buys her a drink, lunch, wine and takes her up 
to his bedroom for coffee and brandy. He persuades her to 
try on her new clothes. She is seduced. 
Joan's initial dissatisfaction and feelings of guilt are 
assuaged as they talk and she gains some insight into marriage 
and into sex. They make love again, and it is now her turn 
to cross-examine Lionel. He discusses his marriage and his 
loneliness, a conversation continued during tea in the restaurant 
downstairs. 
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They both go home separately: Joan to Harry, Lionel alone on 
his train to Manchester. At home, in front of the television 
and later in bed, Joan discusses her day with Harry, but in 
the face of limited interest fails to tell him very much. 
The morning of a busy day. Harry is very involved in the shop, 
but Joan is depressed and distracted. She puts off a friend's 
invitation and goes to the sale of their old furniture. She 
leaves in tears. She goes to their old house and meets 
two prospective buyers. She feels rejected and Harry attacks 
her inability to contribute and her general lethargy. He tells 
her to go and see Maurice, their doctor. 
Joan does go and see the doctor, but sees instead of her 
usual, a Doctor Bowers, his female partner. She is given 
much advice and resolves to pick herself up by involving 
herself in Harry's life. 
Her first attempt to make contact with her old friends is 
rebuffed, but she goes shopping; then on to the hairdresser 
and that evening prepares Harry a special meal. It is, however, 
cut short, because Harry has to go to his painting class. 
Joan offers to meet him and his fellow class mates in the 
pub afterwards. 
That evening she does join him, and they all get on quite 
well. 
The following Sunday afternoon they are in their bedroom together. 
Harry is drawing and Joan asks him about painting and about 
bodies. She persuades him to draw her naked. He accepts the 
challenge and the two of them discover in conversation and 
finally physically a new basis for their relationship. 
Another Sunday. As Harry and Joan get up, he suggests that 
they buy a double bed. They go to church. Judith and Matt 
come for lunch, but have a row about a prospective trip to 
Canada. 
Judith is pregnant, but she has not told Matt. Indeed her 
decision to come off the pill was a unilateral one and Matt 
doesn't know about that either. He does not want children 
for the time being. 
Joan and Harry decide to spend the day in London and 
despite strained finances they buy a bed. While they 
are trying them out, they meet Kate and boyfriend Bob (Harry's 
old company secretary). Later the two of them have lunch, go 
to a movie and Joan spends a little time in a baby shop. 
Meanwhile Judith is consulting a doctor about an abortion; 
it fails. She is told to face Matt with what she has done. 
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On Joan and Harry's return they find Judith outside the door 
of the. shop. She and Matt have had a row and Matt has walked 
out. The following morning Harry goes round to sort it out 
with Matt, and together they return to patch up their quarrel. 
Kate arrives to complete the family. 
11. Harry and Joan travel to London for the Remembrance Sunday 
service, an event which prompts their own recollections of 
the war, their childhood and their early years together. 
This is continued with the help of a photograph album when 
they return home. 
He suggests that Joan start selling antiques in the shop, 
but Joan is disinclined. Another meeting with Harry's 
classmates in the pub is followed by their mutual comforting 
in their double bed. 
They find themselves subsequently at a party where old 
friends congratulate them for their courage and determination 
and where their own togetherness is reflected in a row that 
separates another couple. 
They visit Portsmouth together, Harry has (apparently) 
persuaded Joan to buy some antiques and they spend some 
time at an auction. They also meet in their old wartime 
local an old seaman whom they recognize and who insists on 
their going back to his place. They find the whole event 
uncomf or table. 
However, Joan manages to buy some good pieces, and they 
drive home well satisfied. 
12. Harry and Joan travel to London to see their accountant. 
On Tunbridge Wells station, they meet an old colleague who 
tells them of big changes at his old place of work and that 
they are looking for a new production manager. The news 
at the accountants is gloomy. The bridging loan, because 
of the unsold house, is crippling. 
But on their return Harry is 'phoned by Bob, still at 
Turnmill, who says that the new boss wants to see Harry 
about a job. They are both uncertain, but next day Harry 
travels to London and is indeed offered a responsible and 
well paid job. He has twenty-four hours to make up his mind. 
Lunch with Bob and a public relations lady is followed by 
an interview with the lady in her bed-sitting room. They 
have a long and increasingly intimate discussion. This is 
extended into dinner and the girl suggests they go to bed 
together, Harry says no, though they part friends. 
Meanwhile, the agent responsible for the sale of the house 
has been speaking to Joan. There is a buyer and Harry has to 
decide hy the following morning. 
-234 -
Th e following morning Harry indeed decides to sell the 
house and refuse the job. His description of what passed 
between him and the P.R. lady prompts Joan to tell him of 
Lionel. She is forgiven. Harry, though hurt, understands, 
and can accept it. 
In the middle of the night, Harry hears on the 'phone that 
his mother, in an old people's home, is dying. They both 
rush to her to her bedside to find her in a coma and a doctor 
waiting. They visit the chapel. 
The following morning they receive a letter from Kate saying 
that she is setting up house with Bob, and Harry and Joan 
plan how to spend their wedding anniversary. Harry is 
given a talking to by his doctor. His mother dies. 
Joan is buying and selling antiques, and Harry is busy too. 
Unbeknown to her, he has designed a bungalow which he plans 
to build with the money released by the sale of the house. 
Joan is delighted when she sees the model. 
In the evening there is a family party: Matt, Judith, Kate 
and Bob join Harry and Joan for champagne and dinner. Bob 
gets drunk and aggressive. He finds the family oppressive, 
and falls off his chair pulling table cloth, crockery and 
cutlery on to the floor. 
The following morning Bob is excused, accepted and subsequently 
more accepting. Kate and he have Joan and Harry's blessing. 
Harry then takes Joan to a field where he suggests their 
bungalow could be built. Does Joan like it? She does. They 
kiss and then separately, but together, pace their way round 
the imagined building. 
In the following morphological analysis of the series narrative 
I will, as far as possible, try and avoid cluttering the text with 
the various symbols which identify in the Proppian and the Greimassian 
schemes the different functions. These details can be found in 
Appendix 2 and 3. What I want to achieve, simply, at this 
stage, is to identify the chronological structure of the narrative, 
its linearity, prior to showing how that linearity itself can be 
interpreted in systemic terms within the framework of the equilibrium 
model of narrative suggested by A.J. Greimas. Again I will not 
insist on any formal correspondence between the functional notations 
of Propp and Greimas, for indeed, as I have already pointed out, 
these are -more hazy and less complete than might appear. Finally 
I will treat the analysis, for the time being only, as non-problematical. 
I wish to introduce, however, the notion, specifically discussed by 
A.J. Greimas, of the qualifying, the main and the glorifying tests 
into this initial analysis. They satisfactorily determine the 
three types of encounter the hero has during the course of the 
narrative and this is useful even though for Propp they are not 
distinguished quite in such terms. 
A brief glance at the suggested morphology of the series narrative 
(Appendix 4) will immediately call the lie to any idea that the narrative 
must consist in a single linearity, for it is clear that there is, 
at three points, duplication or triplication of functional sequences. 
It is clear that episodes 2,3,4 and 5, with minor qualifications 
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have the same functional significance, and this is similarly 
true of 7 and 8 and part of 9 as well as 10, 11 and 12. To a 
degree this has to do with the existence of multiple lacks (see 
below), but there are also other possible explanations. 
The general structure reveals itself to be closely identified with 
the classical Proppian model: an initial situation and lack 
defined (episode 1) is followed by a series of tests (2-5) each of 
which involves gaining help or support, prior to a significantly 
climactic struggle in episode 6. In a simple narrative this would 
be successful and subsequent tests would only confirm the achievement 
g 
of the hero. In this narrative however this significant struggle 
ends in failure and while the narrative preserves the functions of 
acknowledgement, transformation and wedding, they are manifested 
negatively. The narrative could have ended here, but it would have 
been incomplete, inresolved. A new narrative is called for, and at 




A new initial situation precedes a further series of qualifying tests 
whose hero, interestingly, is Joan rather than Harry. Once again 
these tests (7 and 8 and part of 9) generate another significant 
confrontation, successfully achieved this time. The three following 
episodes (10, 11 and 12) function as further, almost self-congratulatory 
units, and they in turn lead to a final episode which is predominantly 
concerned with the re-unification of the family, indeed the 'wedding* 
and transformation of the two heros. 
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Let us look at each episode more closely, bearing in mind that the 
concern is not with the details of its own functioning but in its 
functional contribution to the series narrative as a whole. Only 
in episode 6 and part of episode 9 do the two coincide. 
That the first episode is scene setting is obvious. Harry's 
relationship to Joan, their relationship to the rest of the family, to 
their environment, and to work constitutes in Proppian terminology 
an initial situation. Clearly too the heart attack at *he end of 
the episode, the catalyst of the action for the series narrative, 
functions as a lack. The precise nature of this lack, however, 
ta not so obvioua, for it la not iuat physical health.. Subsequent 
developments play out what is still either only implicit in^or 
causally dependent on^the action of the episode. What is implicit 
is the lack in Joan and Harry's relationship, let us call it social 
health. What follows as a direct result of the heart attack is 
Harry's loss of job, let us call it cultural health. I will discuss 
this more fully shortly. 
I am suggesting that there is implicit in this first episode an 
order, or perhaps more reasonably a violation of an order. This 
is implicit, but it is warranted for without it the lack which follows 
itself is unj ustified. We need to know, because the narrative 
subsequently is involved in effecting a resolution to the.question, 
why it is that Harry has a heart attack. There is in this episode, 
and indeed in the series as a whole, no clearly defined villain or 
dispatcher whose manifest involvement in the narrative at this stage 
would make these functions explicit. We can talk of fate taking 
a hand, and this indeed is perhaps the best way of identifying the 
deus ex machine. But we can also suggest that Harry is violating an 
ideal of moderation in all things, an ideal of social balance or 
equilibrium, which without begging too many questions seems to be 
the dominant preoccupation of the narrative as a whole. It might, 
a final paradox, even be In their hormalcy' that they have infringed 
some rule of behaviour, an infringement which identifies them as 
suitable characters for the subsequent narrative. 
Episode 2 begins with a series of announcements about Harry's ill 
health, his lucky escape from certain death, and his need to take 
it easy, to refrain from many of his normal socio-cultural activities. 




) are involved in this 
phase of the narrative. 
In what follows (Episodes 2 - 5 ) this particular lack of physical 
ill-health is heavily underplayed. Much more important is the 
lack of work (Episodes 2 and 4) and lack in their relationship 
(Episodes 3 and 5). But what unites all of these episodes is 
their inconclusivity. At the end of each the lack, be it cultural 
or social health, is restated clearly, as having been unredeemed. 
In each Harry looks for help in order to find himself, to re-establish 
himself as an integrated human being, healthy in all ways. Indeed 
this idea of an integrity of cultural, social and physical health 
is the underpinning lack which in these episodes are explored only 
partially. So in episode 2, this search for worl^ through the help 
of Bob Blake ,and in episode 4 ,through a succession of individuals, 
are both searches for a means to an end, that of the whole man, not 
the end itself. Similarly,though in a slightly different way, 
episode 3 and 5 function as means to an end, the context this time 
being lack of a relationship. In episode 3, he and Joan are looking 
for themselves in their past but remaining separate despite that 
search, and in episode 5 Harry's involvement with Pat fails to generate 
alternative help outside the marriage. 
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Gpisode six is more complex. Indeed the narrative is more condensed 
so that it seems fair to say that the series and the episodic 
narrative here coincide. The lack of work and of a relationship 
with Joan is made clear as is Harry's preparedness to remedy both. 
His involvements away from home have however a double significance, 
and there is room for alternative interpretations. The contract 
with Kenyon is clearly functional in a similar way to much of the 
action in episode two and episode four. But the help successfully 
gained in the sealing of the contract with Kenyon also is the key to 
his confrontation with Foster, the boss, and in the series as a 
whole, that rare species, the villain. This test then seems also 
to have more than just relevance as qualification: it is also a main 
test, which successfully completed, redeems the lack rather than just 
provides the aid for its redemption. This interpretation is 
reinforced by the action of Dale. The successful completion of 
the qualifying and main test is followed immediately by a second test, 
which, in beating Dale up, Harry fails. As a result he loses his 
job, his heroic status is denied and he returns to Joan a beaten and 
punished man. Rather than being revealed as a true hero, he is 
exposed as a false one, and the row which follows suggests a divorce 
rather than a wedding. 
My only anxiety about suggesting this interpretation, lies precisely 
in the weakness of the main test, and its ambiguity. It is, as it 
were, almost defined ex post facto by virtue of the clarity of the 
functions which follow. But its ambiguity is very much a product 
of the mode in which the narrative unfolds, in other words in the 
underplaying of the major dramatic action and potentially final 
confrontation. We will find the same problem in episode 9. 
-240 -
The last part of episode 6 establishes a new initial situation. 
In the discussion that takes place plans are made and Harry 
identifies his intention to act cn them. 
And this thread is continued in episode 7 with Harry's acceptance 
of self-employment and their move to a new home. The rest of 
episode 7 and episode 8 as a whole are similar in structure and 
functional significance to episodes 3 and 5. This time, Joan is the 
centre of attention; she is the hero, though the lack of social 
and cultural health remains the same. It is now Joan who has 
suffered the loss by their move: her work in the garden, and her 
relationship with Harry have been severely disrupted, not to say 
destroyed. At the end of each of these episodes, as in 2 - 5, 
that lack is unambiguously and negatively restated. 
Episode 9 is similar in structure to, though less complete, than 
episode 6, but like it series and episodic narrative to a degree 
coincide. Joan is dispatched by Harry to seek help for her general 
low spirits. She does so, and it involves her not only with the 
doctor but also in the conviviality of her contact with Harry's 
young friends. The doctor clearly acts as a helper/donor, but 
it is the latter encounter, together with the more intimate involvement with 
Harry where the functions of a qualification test and, most significantly, 
of the main test seem to coincide. Here the villain as such, is 
absent; ( perhaps it is Joan?). But it is clear that in the two 
encounters Joan's social and physical identity are re-established. 
Those lacks at least are redeemed. 
It is then in the redemption (actual or potential) of a lack that 
the main test gains its recognition. The qualifying test generally 
can be seen to be at one remove. Only the means of the redemption 
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of the lack are gained. That in some cases, such as this one, 
the two are relatively indistinct does not alter the significance 
of this analysis. 
Joan and Harry's love-making at the end of episode 9 is in every 
sense therefore a consummation, but it is also a hint of the 
positive ending of the series as a whole. In this legitimate union, 
in its rediscovery, the wedding (W) is suggested but not stated. 
What is absent from the episode are those functions which in the 
Proppian schema follow the main test, but precede the final crowning 
achievement. These functions are provided by the three episodes 
which follow in which, though again in slightly different ways, 
Harry and Joan jointly test their union, and their integrity, against 
the world. In episode 10, their children Judith and her husband 
Matt, and Kate provide the opposition. In episode 11 they are 
faced with their past together, but Joan also completes her identity 
by her cultural involvement in buying and selling antiques. In 
episode 12 their marriage is tested by Harry's involvement with the 
public relations lady and once again in the world of work, and by 
Joan's revelations of her affair with Lionel. Indeed it is these 
the 
episodes which confirm the centrality of/lack of social health, 
the lack in their relationship in the narrative as a whole. Harry's 
work, and his health are of little direct concern. 
The final episode in a quite unambiguous fashion suggests the functions 
of recognition, transfiguration and of the wedding. Not only is 
the anniversary party held, but Harry and Joan are dressed in new 
clothes and present a new face to the rest of their family. The 
'palace' too is planned as a just reward for their joint achievements. 
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The series as a whole, notwithstanding the ambiguities I have 
mentioned, seems to me to be an eloquent example of the sort of 
narrative Propp defines in his morphology, and as such has much 
of the folktale about it. Though obviously in the context of a 
psycho-social drama, where help is of an intangible (hut none the 
less real) kind, and where conflicts are not expressed in demonstrably 
physical action, the passage from initial situation to final resolution 
preserves essentially the chronology particular to, since Propp, 
the folktale. To say this now is not to prejudge what will 
inevitably be a more considered final conclusion, but to stake a 
claim for the relevance of such an analysis, and for its significance, 
before both relevance and significance get buried by the sludge of 
qualification. 
IV 
We can move a stage deeper into the analysis of the narrative structure 
of the series by focussing attention on both its movement and its 
balance. The question now is in what sense can this narrative be 
understood in terms of a balanced and transformational structure? 
A full answer must await the discussions of the next chapter where 
the many layers, often over determined, through which the narrative 
works its way, have been examined. 
In very simple terms, and quite obviously, the narrative of the series, 
Intimate Strangers, so far described, moves from one situation of 
harmony, albeit unstable, (Harry and Joan's life prior to their 
heart attack) to another situation of harmony, (the redefinition of 
their marriage and their future plans). That the second situation is 
different from the first and to an extent provides a resolution of it, 
a resolution demanded as a result of the events following the heart 
attack, ia also trivially obvious. But It Is this movement that does 
demand some discussion, not only because it seems of empirical relevance 
but because in the theoretical work of A. J. Gremas it is in terms of 
just such a transformational structure that the narrative, and narrative 
as such, gains its significance. 
What is missing on the other hand from this narrative as a whole, is 
a clear personification of two of the major 'actants' (acting units) 
and this makes the precise nature of the opening narrative above all, 
at least in Gremas
1
 - terms uncertain. The first episode, ending with 
the heart attack, the unambiguous lack, fails to identify either villain 
or dispatcher. In their absence and in the absence also of events which 
would suggest loss of identity (C3) and loss of power (C2), the narrative 
begins, in structural terms, rather weakly. We can postpone discussion 
of why this should be so and its significance,but we are left in the 
rather unsatisfactory situation of having to recognise the tacit presence 
of Harry'8 loss of identity(self recognition) and power in this first 
episode. The necessity to do so is premised on the clear evidence that 
each are subsequently sought for and restored as the narrative progresses. 
The heart attack is then the most clearly defined lack or loss, but as I 
have already noted, this loss of physical health is accompanied by a loss 
of cultural health (work) and social health (the deterioration in their 
relationship). The end which Harry works towards then has this triple 
valency. In order to be successful he needs information, both about the 
world and about himself, and power. He loses both implicitly in the 
first episode, though as we have seen from the morphological analysis so 
far undertaken, neither he nor a villain are involved directly in 
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reconnaisance and the receipt of information, and he is not the subject of 
a manifest deception. 
Fate is both villain and despatcher. Implicit in its workings is the denrial 
of the contract that Harry has with life and with his society. The heart 
attack either denies or reinforces his negative status and situation. He 
is not a complete man, either physically, culturally or socially,and while 
he is 
remaining in society/outside,tt. By his heart attack Harry has been literally 
transformed into a different being. His and Joan's subsequent action, as 
the narrative progresses, involve his (and their) reconstruction and their re 
incorporation into society. There is no return; the solution advances 
beyond the ruptured initial situation. The denial of their alienation 
and of the loss of order in their world, involves a new and different 
order. 
Episodes 2 - 5 and then 7 and 8 involve respectively Harry and then Joan's 
search for power, the wherewithal to effect their final reintegration into 
society and the regeneration of their coherent identity. In each case, 
faced with potential helper or helpers they are involved in a preliminary 
negotiation/JShough t IS5s^l i
e
oIten implicit) and in the achievement and non-
achievement of desired help. In Episode 6 and Episode 9 these functions 
are also present, though in the first their successful achievement is sub-
sequently denied. Episodes 10, 11 and 12 involve successful attempts 
at the reconstitution of their self-awareness and of their visibility -
both dimensions of knowledge and of recognition. Episode 13 completes 
the narrative by stating all three dimensions to be successfully achieved. 
Joan and Harry are transformed (C2), they are recognised as heroes (CI) 
and they are•remarried'(C3). Indeed in the last sequence and in their 
commitmentto the future they establish a new contract with each other, a 
commitment which simultaneously reaffirms the liquidation of the lack. 
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The ambiguities already noted in episodes 6 and 9 particularly with regard 
to the main test reappear here. The main test in which the principal 
lack is liquidated is only weakly expressed. It can be argued that for 
Episode 6 the contract and the job are presented as the most significant 
object of search, even though in Episode 9 it is replaced by a search for 
a relationship. The fact that the first fails and the second is successful 
does perhaps indicate the particular morality of the plot, that it is in 
human relations,not work, that the key to humanity is to be found, but 
at least for the time being this is beside the point. 
This discussion, albeit schematic, does suggest a number of points. 
Firstly, beneath the manifest complexity of a plot such as that of 
Intimate Strangers it is possible to determine a relatively simple 
patterning of events and movements. Secondly that this patterning 
initially discussed in morphological terms, can be understood also in 
structural terms and that this identifies the narrative as a coherent and 
balanced system. Thirdly that this system is articulated through a series 
of relations which involve above all the alienation, of integration of, 
principally, the hero/es and his world. Fourthly that that articulation 
involves in the movement of the narrative through time, but also as we 
shall see, of its movement through space, a series of transformations. 
These transformations affect both the hero and through the hero, the 
meaning of the narrative as a whole. It is in the actions of the hero and, 
in this case, his helpers, opposers and the object of his desire, that 
this message is anthropromorphically generated.lt is not the case, of course, 
that all meaning is generated from within the narrative. A great deal of 
the meaning of the story is dependent on the familiarity which its audience 
has with the culture within which it is being articulated and on which it 
depends. However, once that is accepted, then it is equally correct to 
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say that in the movement of the narrative itself, a movement specifically 
but not exclusively, dependent on its structural arrangement, meaning is 
created independently of that particular cultural context. 
The final point is this. The narrative of Intimate Strangers, analysed as 
a whole, betrays very closely a structure which elsewhere is seen to be 
particular to the folktale. We are presented with an initial situation 
in which there is a rupture, in this case multiply expressed. The hero, 
firstly Harry, then later Joan, and implicitly both of them together 
undertake to seek for redemption. The form of their search depends 
on the particular nature of the lack. We have seen there are three 
dimensions, natural health , cultural health and social health. 
The search itself is in three stages. An initial series of tests or 
encounters in which the hero looks for assistance, help or advice, is 
followed albeit weakly in this case, by a confrontation in which the 
redemption of the lack itself is the object of the encounter. These 
tests and there are two of them, the first unsuccessful, the second 
successful are followed by a series of further tests whose object is to 
confirm the achievements so far gained , and to do so in a way which 
establishes the hero's status. The series narrative ends with the 
materialisation of the results of their search. The lack is redeemed. 
Joan and Harry are reunited together with their family. They are, indeed, 
reintegrated into their society. Order is restored. 
The only complexity at this level of analysis is the duplication which 
follows Harry's failure in Episode 6. That duplication also involves 
a change of hero. Joan then follows, though less intently and less fully, 
the narrative path which Harry has already defined. Her success in 
Episode 9 confirms his narratively subsidiary success during the preceding 
three episodes. From this point, the end of Episode 9, Harry and Joan act 
as joint heroes. 
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152 
It will be worthwhile to examine in an inevitably more detailed way 
the narrative of a single episode. Let me look at Episode 6. 
A fuller summary of the plot of this episode follows: 
Harry begins the day with a brandy and over breakfast rejects both 
Joan's offer of fish pie for lunch and her joke about the alcohol on 
his breath. He arrives at work to discover it idle, the workers sitting 
on their machines. He is responsible. Harry runs to his office, 
opens the mail and makes a call to a local school in the hope of 
an order, only to find that Foster, his boss, is already there. He 
opens a drawer, takes out a quarter of brandy and drinks from the 
bottle. 
Meanwhile Joan, busy with her housework, receives a telephone 
call from an old friend of Harry's, Stephen Kenyon, who wants to 
get in touch with Harry about some work. Kenyon had only just heard 
of Harry's heart attack, a piece of information which makes Joan 
suspicious. 
Back at the works Foster intrudes and Harry is given both a talking 
down and the threat of the sack if a large order is not produced 
and produced quickly. By the evening Harry is both depressed and 
drunk. He won't eat and lies to Joan about his previous week's 
trip to London, a visit during which Joan believed he had met 
Kenyon. Bedtime is an occasion for Joan to help Harry into his 
pyjamas but also to check the truth of his story in the diary once 
he is asleep. She realises Harry has been lying. 
Next day, Saturday, Joan gardens while Harry and Kenyon meet in the 
City. The deal is, in principle, agreed. Kenyon will come down to 
Tunbridge Wells and see the work after the weekend. Harry, delighted, 
but slightly the worse for wear, and having driven his Bentley into 
Joan's wheelbarrow, arrives home to find daughter Kate in residence. 
Kate's present of a bottle is eagerly accepted. 
Sunday morning finds Joan finishing her gardening and leaving for 
church. Kate and Harry, both involved in their work, discuss some aspects 
of the printing industry, a discussion which leads to a row, 
principally as Kate points out, over the fact that she earns 
considerably more than her father. Joan's return and interruption 
serves only to fan the flames. Kate stamps out of the house. 
However, tempers cool and the following morning Kate and Harry 
make up. His lunch with Kenyon and Foster goes well and the deal 
is agreed. Later, in Harry's office they sign it. But while this 
i is going on an apprentice, Dale, plans and executes a practical joke; 
he jams a potato up the exhaust of Harry's Bentley. The ensuing mild 
explosion prompts Harry to run into the works, find Dale and attack 
him. He is pulled off by Kenyon and Foster. 
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Joan returns that evening to find Harry alone in the dark. He 
tells her of the loss of his job and of the attack. They are 
led into an increasingly heated and desperate analysis of their 
past together, Harry's old and more recent 'affairs', and their 
lack of future. They both end up exhausted and defeated. 
Early next morning Harry awakes to find Joan's bed empty. He 
quickly dresses and discovers her walking in the garden. She does 
not want to come in. They begin to discuss their past and to 
discover the possibility both of coming to terms with it and of 
being able to make positive decisions about their future. Harry 
wants to work for himself. They realise the enormity of the 
proposition and the implications - the selling of the house, the 
car, the discovery of who their friends really are. They test 
their ideas on Kate who is delighted. 
Finally, after finding themselves separately in situations redolent 
of the past, Joan and Harry come together in the garden. They 
express their mutual fears and anxiety but they resolve to face 
the future together. Hand in hand they walk back to the house. 
I have analysed this episode in terms of a modified and extended 
9 
model of Metz's 'grande syntagmatique' the significance of which, 
for present purposes, is two-fold. Firstly it produces a break-
down of a continuous narrative in autonomous units of signification, 
autonomous that is with respect to the signifier (the form of the 
expression), to the specific medium through and in which the narrative 
is expressed. In what follows the numbered segments correspond to 
these units. Secondly, and more generally, the Metzian type of 
analysis centred as it is on a text's signifying process, allows 
us to recognise and acknowledge the relative complexity or simplicity 
of that construction. The number and nature of the autonomous 
segments recognised in this manner goes some way towards identifying 
a particular genre, or style of story-telling, a genre or style 
exclusively linked to the technique and technology of its telling. 
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This type of classification is important in two other related ways. 
Juxtaposition of segments defined in terms of the signifier with 
those defined in terms of the signified (more strictly in terms of 
the form of the expression and the form of the content) allows us 
to appreciate one element of the dynamic of the narrative - to 
be understood in terms of the coincidence or non-coincidence of 
the units of the two levels of analysis. And secondly such analysis 
allows for a way of establishing the similarities and differences 
between one aural/visual medium and another - say film and television -
as well as of establishing at the level of the signifier, differences 
between one style of television making and another. 
But, as I have already suggested, the principal concern of this 
thesis is with the narrative rather than with the particularities 
of the carrier of the narrative and so the autonomous segments 
of the episodic televisualisation of Intimate Strangers are presented 
without further discussion.'^ 
Once again, also, the detailed analysis of the text, this time of 
episode 6, is presented in Appendix 6 and 7. The first presents 
the morphology, following Propp, and the second transforms that 
into a structural arrangement. I will attempt a summary here. 
To some small degree the opening sequence assumes some knowledge 
of prior events, though the force with which Harry's early morning 
drink is presented is sufficiently clearly the breaking of a 
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prohibition; the narrative, by virtue of it, is remarkably 
self-contained. Joan is the first potential helper or denier of 
help, and her failure to respond or provide what Harry seems to 
want suggests the ongoing lack in their relationship.'
1 
But Harry's basic preoccupation, and since he is still the 
centre of attention, the narrative's main concern, is with his 
work, and his actions away from home. On arrival he learns of 
his failure to produce enough orders to keep production going 
and of his boss, Foster's attempt to fill the breech. Foster is 
* 
a complex figure, morphologically. He appears to be both 
dispatcher; he challenges Harry to get the orders, to fulfil 
the task, but he is also a villain, in the sense that it is both 
his potential disapproval and his apparent hold over the key 
to Barry^s cultural existence that he "becomes someone to \>e 
defeated. (2,4 and 5). 
Joan too (6) comes close to villainy, and is so far as she 
acts treacherously, then it seems that her involvement with 
Harry increasingly signals a move from a potentially helping 
relationship and therefore from tests of a qualifying nature, to 
a potentially confrontational relationship and therefore to a main 
test (see 19). 
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A good part of the narrative, (8-14) in which Harry and Kate 
are involved, sparring with each other, and during which Joan 
goes to church is, in terms of the movement of the narrative, 
fairly neutral. The impression one gets is of a more or less 
deliberate postponement of tension, after Kenyon and Harry 
have agreed to follow up the deal, and before it is finally 
agreed. Kate is clearly a potential helper, though at one remove 
both from Harry's involvement with work, the first of his likely 
main tests, and from his involvement with Joan, the second. 
Her support which is finally gained (14, and in another context 
21) is, as it were, of a limited nature. The 'magical agent', 
the knowledge that Harry takes with him of her understanding of 
his situation, is of narrative significance, chronologically, 
but also of significance in articulating the fluctuations in 
Harry's kinship relations. 
The completion of the contract with Kenyon and Foster is, (15 and 17) 
as we have already seen, of double significance functionally. 
On the one hand the qualifying test, in which Kenyon is the 
potential donor, is successfully completed. Harry gains the 
contract which is the key to his success in establishing his 
security at work. In the signing of the contract, then, Foster's 
threat is averted. Foster's villainy is annulled. 
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Harry's involvement with Dale (16 and 18) is therefore functionally 
clear. He stands to confirm or to lose by this supplementary test 
all his previous gains. He loses them, and with that loss with 
its accompanying denial of his heroic status, and his punishment 
as a false-hero, he returns home. 
In the context of the episode and the series, segment 19 has 
multiple functional significance. An initial skirmish with Joan 
which leaves them as far apart as ever is followed by a major 
confrontation in which the lack in their relationship is finally 
made absolutely clear. As a result both Harry and Joan, but 
particularly Harry, ends defeated; the relationship is in tatters 
(W-). Joan's function is complex, and to a degree, ambiguous. 
Her involvement in this segment and previously, as potential helper 
in 
and hence/the various qualifying tests which Harry undergoes, is 
overlain by her villainy here, which in the context of their marriage, 
is suggested by her failure as helper and her opposition to Harry's 
actions. However, having said that, Harry's failure in the world 
of work suggests that he too, could be construed, momentarily, as 
the villain. The ambiguity is significant. It derives from each 
of their separate failures. It is the ambiguity of exclusion. 
In their failure they have found themselves outside the clearly 
defined categories and roles assumed to be central for the effective 
functioning of a marriage and they have found themselves, in their 
darkened room, to be, momentarily, outside of society. 
The dawn (20) brings with it a new narrative, or perhaps more strictly 
a new move in the narrative. Harry finds Joan walking by herself 
in the garden. Together they discuss the past and the future. 
They agree to act, to effect a change in their circumstances, and 
their plan is tested on Kate (21). The last two segments which 
function most clearly as connectives, confirm that the past has 
gone, and that with some anxiety, they are ready to face the fiiture. 
Once again implicit in this morphological analysis of episode 6, 
is the way in which the narrative articulates rupture. As it 
happens,that rupture which is threatened in the opening segment 
is maintained through Harry's subsequent failure. We begin with a 
lack and a threat, and we end with failure and that lack magnified. 
What follows, in the last few segments of the episode, announces the 
continuation of the plot. Without them we might be excused for 
seeing the plot as a tragedy, and that through no fault of his own 
(fate the villain) Harry has failed to defend the surplus (job, 
marriage, family, health) which in other stories might be the object 
of search. There is then, in this episode a certain negatively 
fully if 
expressed equilibrium. We can recognize it more/follow the narrative 
in terms suggested by A.J. Greimas (Appendix 7 ), 
The central narrative, that is prior to the announcement of the new 
move ,consists in a movement from rupture (A) to rupture (A). Harry's 
drinking is symbolic of his denial of a contract with the world and 
it is also a violation of a specific prohibition - not to drink. 
The move ends with the reaffirmation of that rupture in which Harry 
and Joan together deny their contract with each other and by 
implication with society as a whole. In a sense one can say that 
they have suffered a social heart-attack. 
Between these two points of the narrative, the search for recognition 
(C^), for power (C^) and for the object of desire (C^) la pursued 
and each of the tests is associated with one or other of these 
dimensions of search. Harry's initial involvement with Joan looks 
for help (C„), and its failure defines his lack of relationship (C,). 
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Subsequently, in what is a repetition of that test, Joan's actions 
suggest all three of the ways in which Harry is deprived. In her 
duplicity about the diary, she is both seeking information, deceiving 
Harry and threatening him. It is manifestly their relationship 
which is now the object of search in this episode, and henceforth 
in the series as a whole. It is the key to both Joan and Harry's 
social and cultural, and even physical renewal. 
The encounter with Kenyon and with Kate separately and together 
involve Harry's search for the means to act, for power, and his 
conflict with Foster is a conflict over goods. Equally obviously 
his thrashing of Dale, the glorifying test, deprives Harry of his 
potential heroic status, and of recognition, both by himself and 
by others, of his success. And this situation is repeated with 
Joan. So at the end of this encounter we are faced with a hero 
who has failed (A), who is punished (C^), impotent (C
2
> unrecognized ( C ^ 
and whose contract with society has been exploded (A). We are, 
as it were ,back at the beginning. 
While, as I've already suggested, there would be no absolute 
necessity for the narrative to continue at this point, it does so, 
and it does so by establishing along the three dimensions of knowledge, 
power and desire the three axes of the ensuing narration. Harry and 
Joan in their discussion in the garden affirm their own lacks; they 
attempt to discover something of the reality of their situation, 
to understand one another and to establish thereby their ignorance 
of each other. Secondly they reveal the lack in their relationship 
and in their relationship with society. Finally, and as a consequence 
of both of these moments they realise their own past impotence. 
Nevertheless they decide to make a go of it (A^) and as a preliminary 
test their ideas on Kate. The stage is set, as it were, for a whole 
- 2 
new movement of the narration. Episodes 7 to 13 develop and 
complete both this new movement and the narrative as a whole. 
VI 
I have suggested that the narrative of Intimate Strangers, both of 
the series and of its episodes substantially follow a similar pattern 
and that pattern is one which links these narratives with the folk 
narratives previously discussed by Vladimir Propp, and to the model 
of narrative in part derived from Propp and elucidated by A.J. Greimas. 
This is significant, obviously, not just in these terms, but in so 
far as it has been shown that these texts present a narrative whidi 
is in substantial part like that of the folktale; that beneath what 
seems so contemporary and particular, lies a level of expression 
which links that contemporaneity and particularity, the product of an 
industrialized, literate culture, with the cultural products of past 
societies, neither industrialized, nor so essentially literate. If 
there is something universal in the telling of stories, then the 
albeit very limited data presented here, at least suggests that that 
hypothesis remains plaisible. Indeed the chronological narratives of 
Intimate Strangers, are clearly accessible. The telling of these stories 
depends on a temporal logic which is already familiar no less to us 
than to the audience of the folktales of Russia or of France or of 
12 
pre-Columbian America. 
This suggested continuity is not however in any sense an identity. 
The narrative of Intimate Strangers,as are the narratives of all 
contemporary tales are particular, .both in terms of the particularity 
of our culture and society, but also in the sense that each text 
itself is unique. The analysis of Intimate Strangers has produced 
enough evidence of its particularity for this statement to be obvious. 
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But before discussing some of these dimensions in terms of the 
problems and ambiguities that the analysis has raised, I want to 
say a brief word about the analysis in general, and above all about 
its static appearance. 
It goes without saying that a Proppian methodology seems to obliterate 
13 14 
what Roland Barthes and, following him, Seymour Chapman have 
called the risk of the narrative, and what I have called its uncertainty. 
The morphology is of a completed narrative and is dependent on its unity 
for without it no functional or morphological analysis would be possible. 
Claude B r e m o n d i n discussing both Propp and Greimas is at pains to 
make this point clear, but Bremond, as I have already suggested, in 
his own way overcompensates for this absence, and produces a scheme 
for the analysis of narrative which deprives it of its unity and 
fails to recognize its closure. Narratives are both structured and 
therefore in a certain sense closed; they have a beginning and an 
end; but they are also open, in the sense that as the narrative 
progresses there are a number of possibilities, a number of choices 
available to the acting units. 
Logically, at any one point in the narrative, for example say the 
result of a contest, there are four possibilities; that it will be 
successful, that it will fail, that its result will be complex and 
affect the different acting units, or actors, in different ways, 
or that it will be neutral, that final success or failure is withheld.-
The uncertainty of the narrative, its risk, consists in the uncertainty 
as to which of these possibilities will be the one taken. Given the 
number of such choices that both acting units, and hence producers and 
audience, have to make in a complex story, then there are obviously a 
great number of potential narrative variants. But however great a 
number of ways of telling a story there are, measured in terms of the 
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different paths the action can take, not only are they 
limited, but that limitation is reducable to a permutation of only 
four basic choices. This dynamic, of a strictly limited uncertainty, 
is implicit in the Proppian model, and hopefully, in my discussions 
so far. It does not take much to bring it to the surface. It 
certainly does not involve a rejection of the formalism which has 
been used to open up the narrative, whatever other reasons there 
J 6 
might be for rejecting such an approach. Narrative risk, I 
suggest, consists in this limited certainty or uncertainty and we c m 
recognize it once we acknowledge that the outcomes of particular actions 
are neither pre-given, nor entirely free, but articulated through the 
codes of narrativity, a most significant one of which is that of its 
chronology. 
However, there is a further point. The assumption that a narrative 
is, in its own terms, closed, and that within that closure there is 
a precise and to a large extent predictable chronology makes following 
a narrative itself a more not a less, involving task, Firstly 
because certain of its functions can be left implicit, and have to be 
available to the reader, or audience, if he wishes to make full sense 
of the chronolgy; and secondly some functions, in their interconnection, 
can be left incomplete, for example it often happens that the three 
moments of a test are split up - the hero and the potential donor meet, 
the test is undertaken, but the resolution of the test is delayed. 
Here, in morphological tersm, we can recognize the dynamic of the 
narrative, that is its delay and its significant absences. Neither 
would be available or explicable without the assumption of the sort 
of model as being central to the narrative as I have assumed and argued 
for here. 
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It remains, nevertheless, to outline what seem to be particularities 
of the narrative of Intimate Strangers, an outline which perforce 
leaves open the question of their significance and their typicality. 
They begin with and may also subsequently stem from what I have 
called the mode of the narrative. Mode is not a very precise term. 
I want to be able to suggest that Intimate Strangers, for example, 
stresses the passivity rather than the activity of its characters, 
limits the extremes of action, dwells on the exchange of meanings 
rather than of goods, is prepared to weaken the contrasts of black 
and white and deal more often in various shades of grey. The notion 
of genre, is too specific, and style too personal; mode identifies 
in a very general way, the contextuality of a narrative, its 
atmosphere, its orientation. Without wishing to labour the point, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that the drama of Intimate Strangers 
is one of understatement. In its understatement we are involved 
more with the intricacies of social interaction and psychological 
development, than with overt action either physical or mystical. 
Now while it is the purpose of the argument that this is irrelevant 
as far as the recognition of the morphology of the narrative is 
concerned, it seems fair to suggest that it is the mode of the 
narrative which has produced the absences, ambiguities and 
difficulties associated with that morphology. I have noted a 
number in my account thus far. Let me, briefly, bring them 
together now. 
Clearly in a narrative such as that of Intimate Strangers, in its 
realism and in its close concern with the events of the everyday, 
the function which in Proppian terms calls for the receipt of the 
magical agent, has to be interpreted in metaphorical terms. 
The heroes in this narrative, essentially Harry and Joan, both 
separately and together gain help and support of an intangible 
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nature rather than a magical agent as such. Rarely is anything 
handed over, except perhaps money (ep. 7 and implicitly in episode 12), 
which is in any way directly effective in the pursuit of the main 
object. But help is given and refused, advice is often offered. 
This seems trivial and indeed it is, except that in so far as the 
particular content of a function is important if it is for example 
consistent in identifying the coherence of a narrative and what I 
have already loosely called its mode. 
The narrative of Intimate Strangers has further dimensions which 
reinforce its consistency. It may be remembered that the narrative 
proper of the series begins with Harry's heart attack. It seems 
at that point, that this event is entirely fortuitous, and so it is. 
No villainy has been committed, Harry suffers passively, and it 
is this passivity, and the absence of any overt villainy which sets 
the pace for the rest of the narrative. 
There are two points which arise from this; the first has to do with 
the nature of the lack, and the second with the lack of a villain. 
To deal with the question of lack first. There are in the series 
three dominant lacks, each motivating one main thread in the narrative. 
k lack, as we have seen, is assumed to be more subjectively felt and 
initially a passive imposition, whereas villainy implies something 
more objectively determinable and entirely imposed by an identifiable 
agent. They are, obviously, in an asymmetrical relationship, 
villainy will generate a lack, but a lack can exist without villainy. 
In the series as a whole there are three interdependent lacks. 
The first, and the catalyst, is the lack of natural health, as it is 
primarily felt by Harry - his heart attack and its physical consequences. 
But this is quickly forgotten. From episode 3, to episode 12, when 
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he goes for a check up, Harry's physical health, and hence this 
natural lack, is scarcely mentioned and is even narratively 
insignificant. 
The second of the three lacks, that of work (lack of cultural 
health) which follows immediately from the first becomes much 
more central. Harry loses his job, and his singular involvement 
as hero until episode 7 is oriented in terms of remedying that 
particular lack. His solution, to open a shop with living 
quarters above is not without its significance as I hope to show 
in the next chapter. Essentially however this lack is redeemed 
by episode 7. Subsequently, though much more weakly, in 
episode 11, Joan also has to remedy her lack of employment. 
The third lack, which,albeit implicitly, precedes the heart attack, 
is the lack in Joan and Hariy's relationship, in their marriage. 
This lack I have chosen to call social. The lack in their 
relationship affects Joan and Harry differently and unevenly, but 
when it becomes the central narrative preoccupation, as it does 
for example at the end of episode 6, and from episode 9 onwards, 
it demands that they act, jointly, as heroes. Marriage itself 
becomes the object of search and they the seekers; and this is 
different, obviously, from the more classic form in which the 
princess is the sought for object, with the hero a singular seeker. 
Despite this complexity, however, there is no real problem in 
identifying a hero for each of the episodes and for the series 
as a whole. But of the six acting units identified by Greimas 
in his reformulation of Propp's similarly oriented discussion 
only two, the hero and the helper/denier of help, are consistently 




 sees as of a different order of relevance, 
is occasionally visible, most particularly in episodes 8 and 9, 
v when Harry dispatches Joan. The receiver (destinataire) does 
not appear in this series at all, and if Culler is correct no
 ( 
more is there a place for him in the Proppian classification. 
The hero fills this position. Indeed, and finally, the object 
of search is, as we have seen, only implicitly, and then not 
always, an acting unit. 
If this is so then this 'folktale
1
 is articulated by a hero and 
hi8 potential helpers. Villainy is rarely personified. Dispatch 
is dso rare. Hero and receiver are elided and the object of 
search is either a good or an idea, 'work' or marriage. 
The actorial structure though relatively clear, seems to fall 
short of the full complement defined by Propp and Greimas as 
1 8 
being central to the folktale , As it stands the actorial model 
of the series narrative of Intimate Strangers could foe expressed 
diagrammatically as follows: 
Helper/Non-helper 
\ > 
(Dispatcher) ^ Hero — ( V i l l a i n ) Object of Search 
(Receiver) 
1 9 
The most significant absence is that of the villain. Although 
occasionally appearing in the episodes (Foster 6) his appearance is 
not often unequivocal. More often what overt villainy there is is generated 
by other acting units; for example, Joan as potential helper in 
episode 6 commits villainy in her involvement with the diary, so 
does Harry as hero, in his attack on Dale and on Joan. In one 
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sense the narrative has refused to name the opposition; it has 
refused its own negativity. Evil as such has been dissipated; 
if it appears then it does so in a distant and unrecognizeable 
(unrecognized) form. The characters never face it. In a 
second sense, and more obviously the villain is internalised. He 
blends with the hero and the helper/opposer. Villainy and evil 
are either too distant or too close to be clearly conceived. 
Initially villainy, as I have already suggested, has the character 
of fate; subsequent villainy has the character of an inner struggle. 
In a psycho-social drama such as this the hero is a complex figure 
at war with himself, acting indeed as his own dispatcher. 
To be able to say as much, and to recognize its obviousness, is 
perhaps a function of our ability to bring to a narrative like 
Intimate Strangers such a model as this. On the one hand the 
absences are significant; on the other the drama still lies in 
their presence. What might be suggested then is that in addition 
to seeing an absence, we are also able to recognize compression, 
and that part of the task of reading such a narrative as this lies 
in the ability and the necessity to prize the actorial layers 
apart. 
There is further, though more complex, evidence of this compression 
in the role of seducer. Seduction is central to the narratives of 
episode 5, where Harry fails to consummate his involvement with 
Pat, in episode 8, where Lionel successfully and unambiguously 
seduces Joan, and in episode 12 where the public relations lady 
fails to seduce Harry. Joan's seduction is, as I have said, 
unambiguous. She is clearly the seduced, Lionel the seducer. 
But Harry's two involvements are more equivocal; he is both 
seducer and the object of the seduction, and likewise his female 
oppdsites. 
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It is tempting to treat the seducer as a separate category, as a 
separate acting unit, and to treat seduction as a unique act. 
But seduction is no more than a particular act; it is the content 
given to a test whose functional significance may be in terms of 
providing help/opposition, or the redemption of the lack itself. 
Those involved are the heroes, the helpers and the villains. 
The presence of seduction in a narrative is noted more for its 
semantic than its syntactic effectiveness. While the seducer is 
subsumable under existing categories of acting units, and the act 
of seduction is of differing functional importance depending on its 
place in the narrative, seduction itself is never anything more 
than a powerful agent of transformation, never less than a serious 
20 
threat to an existing relationship, The implications of this 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Therefore the consistency of the mode is further defined in terms 
of the relative weakness of the main test, a weakness which follows 
logically from the lack of explicit villain. Obviously, without 
a villain there can be no struggle with him. Other functions too 
seem absent; branding and pursuit above all. Both once again 
would seem to be more relevant to a narrative of explicit action, 
though branding can be seen to have some metaphorical visibility 
and perhaps in episode 9 Joan's lack of clothes and Harry's painting 
of her constitutes some form of marking which this function suggests. 
However this is probably stretching a point. 
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I am suggesting that these particular qualifications, which seem 
to be consistent with each other, define a particular mode of 
narration. I am not suggesting that, by virtue of them, the 
Proppian model for the analysis of narrative now becomes irrelevant. 
On the contrary, it is by virtue of the formalist and structuralist 
analysis so far undertaken that these observations have become 
possible. 
But there is clearly more to it than this. The narrative of 
Intimate Strangers seems to have much in common with the narratives 
explored by Propp and formalistically reduced by him. In so far 
as that model is effective in defining the particularity of the 
folktale, or more specifically of what he calls the fairy tale, and 
in so far as that model or variations of it have been used to define 
in an equivalent way the folktales of other cultures and other times, 
then this analysis suggests that Intimate Strangers too, has much 
of the folktale about it. 
How much of course, is the leading question. Each is the product 
of an oral dimension of culture; but folktales as we come to know 
them are imprinted by the literacy of those of who have come to 
record them and of course such a series of plays as Intimate Strangers 
is filtered through a still dominantly literate culture. Clearly too 
there are differences in the nature of performance and in the 
manifest content. But each is ephemeral, the product of the moment, 
and their themes and, of course, their structure, are similar. 
If the folktale>is ephemeral by virtue of the lack of literacy of 
those involved as creator and audience, the television drama is 
ephemeral by virtue of the technology, and of the values of the culture 
which presents i t . T h a t ephemerality encourages variation and change, 
but at the same time keeps these variations firmly in hand. The folktale 
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and the dramatic narrative have to be instantly and unequivocally 
recognized as such. It is central to the argument of this chapter 
that that recognition is premised on the anticipation of an already 
familiar chronological structure. 
We are concerned then with the repetitive but ephemeral communications, 
whose novelty is outweighed by and dependent on the familiar. There 
is then underlying the apparent freedom which is suggested by the 
enormous range of subjects and treatments of television dramas, of 
which of course, Intimate Strangers is only one example, a kind of 
necessity, and that necessity has both chronological and logical 
dimensions. It remains to discuss, in the following chapter, in 
what the logic of the narrative of Intimate Strangers consists. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Intimate Strangers: - A Structure 
The statement of the empirically obvious can only be justified if the 
explanation of why things should be so close to what they seem is 
itself both unexpected and persuasive. This chapter is an exploration 
of much that is obvious or at least manifest in the texts of the series 
Intimate Strangers. It is obvious because we, as members of the culture 
to which the programmes are directed, recognize both consciously and 
unconsciously their content and the significance of that content. We 
understand its meanings; we speak its language. 
My aim is to explore the conditions upon which that understanding 
is based and to do so in a way that puts flesh on the skeleton of the 
narrative chronology already outlined in the previous chapter. To mix 
metaphors, my concern is with the meat of the narrative sandwich, one 
layer of which is the formal structure of interdependent functional units 
and the other the pregiven content of the text, the images and meanings 
which are the common property of our everyday world. The meat of this 
sandwich lies in the fusion of these two layers. * 
I wish to suggest that the way these meanings and images are 
incorporated into the television text and the way in which they fill 
out the narrative of such a text is open to the same kind of 
analysis of, and that the texts are remarkably close in their composition 
to, the stories, the myths and the folktales of preliterate cultures. 
I wish to continue to argue and to illustrate the thesis that at a 
formal level these television programmes maintain a way of narration 
that would seem in other circumstances the particular product of oral 
cultures. 
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The significance of this, is twofold. Firstly as I have already 
suggested it raises questions about the place of television in what 
is otherwise a predominantly literate culture, for example on ways 
of perception, and secondly it suggests that it would be possible 
to argue for continuity in culture; an argument that would itself 
raise questions both about the uniqueness of contemporary civilisation 
and about the intensity and nature of its change, but also about the 
relative coherence or incoherence of our culture and our participation 
in it. Finally such a suggestion might well incline .us to find what 
others have called the power of television as much in this consistency 
2 
and continuity of expression, as in its technology, and as much if 
not more in the cultural centrality of its messages than in its 
3 
ideological manipulation. These issues will be fully discussed 
in the final chapter. 
Structuralists have often noted the incestuous relationship their 
4 
activity has with the obvious. The splendour of Claude Levi-Strauss's 
analysis of South American myth is in significant part a result of our 
unfamiliarity with the entire corpus which he takes as his object; 
the very occasional banality of some of Edward Leach's analyses are 
equally the result of our familiarity with the Biblical stories to 
which he addresses himself. ^ The question that structuralism asks 
is much more the how, rather than the what or the why; the what is 
largely assumed and the why is largely unanswerable. The how is the 
result of what Roland Barthes calls the structuralist activity
 6
 and 
the how is never entirely surprising. Marcel Detienne completes his 
analysis of the Adonis myths of Ancient Greece with the following 
observation: 
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"... the paradoxical situation is that, in Greece, in this 
particular sector, the structural analysis applied from the 
outside turns out to be in agreement with the analysis which 
the Greeks who were contemporary with these myths elaborated 
from within. Neither Theophrastus or Philichorus of Athens, 
any more than Hesiod, would have felt themselves on unfamiliar 
ground confronted with an interpretation in which our only 
innovation has been to coordinate that decoding which the 
Greeks themselves had already initiated in the works that were 
parallel and, in many cases, complementary to most of the 
myths themselves." 7 
The dangers of the project are then clear; the path runs between 
the banal and the ridiculous, and when the concern is with the culture 
of our own time and place, to which we all in a certain sense have 
privileged access, that path is particularly stony. The distance 
which separates Levi-Strauss from his primitives, a necessary distance 
in the search for clarity and objectivity, protects his results. It 
is in the nature of things that he is an anthropologist and then a 
structuralist. When the object is contemporary culture and the 
•primitives' are ourselves, the reverse is true, the method, structuralism, 
creates the distance and in its use we become anthropologists. But as 
a result of this methodological and not ontological distance the analyses 
lose their protection; they become naked and they become vulnerable. 
It is for this reason, perhaps, rather than the presence or distortion 
of history, which is at the root of Llvi-Strauss's dismissal of the 
possibility of the structural analysis of the contemporary culture. 
But to dismiss out of hand the possibility of asking the same questions 
8 
of contemporary culture as of preliterate culture is clearly nonsensical. 
The problems are the same, indeed the answers may well be similar. We 
can recognise the specific character of the present without annihilating 
its relationship to the past. 
However, the difficulties of doing this are clear. When the mirror is 
held too close, the image is distorted. And this over proximity is 
not confined to the text, but extends quite obviously to that which 
supports the text, to the cultural and social context. 
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The need for ethnographic support for the hypotheses suggested by 
9 
structuralist analysis, though provisional, has often been noted. 
Much of Levi-Strauss's work consists in the cross referencing of what 
he has understood from the myths with what he knows from the 
ethnography of the tribes whose myths they are. Such reference allows 
him to argue for a very subtle interrelationship of myth and social 
structure, and for the suggestion that myth is in significant degree 
autonomous, its text sometimes reflecting, sometimes transposing what 
is known to be the case, say for example of the kinship structures 
of its host society.^ The ethnography upon which such a discussion 
is based is assumed to be unproblematical; but it is not and it is also 
certainly limited. And it is the paradox of this which makes some 
of its more astute critics realise that much of L&vi-Strauss'8 own 
deductions about the nature of myth are themselves particularly 
limited. 
In the analysis of contemporary society, however, what we know about 
it is both problematic and unlimited; the uncertainty at the heart 
of sociological understanding is well documented. '' We are faced 
both with the enormous complexity of contemporary society, a 
complexity which makes any generalisation about it almost impossible, 
but also with the squabbles in epistemology and methodology which 
makes even the most hesitant assertion of knowledge subject to ridicule. 
There is little or no ethnography of our own society against which 
our text can be unambiguously placed, and as a result the analysis 
which follows, at least until supported by many more of a similar 
order, must be treated as very largely provisional and partial. 
Without a drastic change of perspective the television programmes 
with which we are presently concerned will tell us nothing we do not 
already know; we will be blinded by and to the obvious. The 
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transcendance of these limits involves a change of perspective and 
a demand that we treat them as the products of an alien culture, 
that we become anthropologists, and that our texts become 
12 
anthropologically strange to us. Of course, this procedure
 { 
begs as many questions as it answers, not the least that it is in 
any complete sense impossible, and secondly that it assumes what 
it is the purpose of the analysis in this case, to assert - that 
our society and culture have preserved something significant from 
previous societies and cultures and that that something is available 
to structuralist analysis. But it also, given the lack of an 
ambiguous ethnography of our own society, forces us to draw on the 
tacit knowledge that we as members of that society do indeed have; 
we are all our own ethnographers therefore precisely because we are J 3 
members. Statements about work, or about fashion or about the 
relations between the sexes which bulk large in the following account 
have this uncertain and vexatious status, in part derived from a 
situation of membership and familiarity and in part from a methodological 
procedure which demands distance and unfamiliarity. The proof of 
this particular pudding lies very much in the eating. 
How then to proceed? I have established in the last chapter that the 
narrative presented in the programmes Intimate Strangers follows a 
pattern, and that pattern, in its morphology has much in common with 
the folktale, not least in its redundance and in its simplicity. 
In following the logic of action, of loss, redemption and of test, 
what I hoped to have achieved was a description of the framework 
of the narrative. This is the track on which the individual story 
with its characters and particularities of action and of meaning 
runs. Although dependent on our understanding of these meanings, 
that analysis did not explore or explicate them. In so far as it 
is possible to do just that, then this is the present task. 
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The model of the narrative in chapter 5 suggests that we visualise 
two levels of narrative transformation, that of the morphology 
(chronolo£3 and that of its logic. Strictly speaking this logic 
Is not a logic of the tale as such but of the system of which that
 : 
tale is but an element, and even more a logic of the cultural context 
within which the system of tales is embedded. This latter logic 
precedes its incorporation into the tale. The former logic, that of 
the tales system, functions, as it were, to translate the general logic 
and cultural codes into those more specifically useful for the narrative. 
The process involves a selection, a simplification perhaps, but it is 
the process basic to the generation of meaning within a tale and 
within a system of tales. A.J. Greimas is attempting a similar 
distinction, that between grammatical properties and narrative 
properties, and that between context analysis and the narrative model, 
and he makes the point in this way; 
"The context is presented in the form of 'content - fillings', 
independent of the narrative itself and taken up a posteriori 
by the narrative model. But at the same time, these content 
- fillings are already constituted contents; just as a novelist 
in the unfolding of his story gradually develops his characters 
from a name chosen at random, the process of myth-making creates 
actors which it provides with conceptual contents. And it is 
this diffuse knowledge of the contents shared by the Bororo but 
not by the analyst that constitues the code which must be 
broken." 
The proposal is then an exploration of the codes which in their 
application and combination generate the meaning of a particular 
text, its message. Whether this is, in the strict sense a semantic 
operation has been questioned. ^ The fact that the analysis is 
itself coded, and like the tales themselves, context dependent, 
would suggest that the operation is something less than a generative 
and rather more an interpretive procedure. Be that as it may, the 
messages are coded, and while we may argue about the meaning of the 
text (indeed it is the nature of the text that we will so argue) we 
will not dispute that these meanings are the product of discoverable 
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rules, The task is to identify, then, the levels of content through 
which the text is articulated and to define the units, A,J. Greimas would 
16 
call them lexemes, which act as formal points for this articulation.' 
ri 
We.need to be clear about a number of basic terms, some of which have 
already been used. The chronologic defines the level of story 
telling which is more or less fixed; it identifies the unity of a 
particular narrative in terms of its morphology and its functioning. 
The code, any number of which may be at work within a text, can be 
defined in terms of a specific and consistent level of the text's 
articulation, for example the alimentary code, the cosmological code, 
the techno-economic code and so on. The content fillings refer 
to those meanings available in the context of the presenting culture 
and which are used by the text and its system; it is through the 
particular context that the codes of narrative find their representation. 
The message refers to the series of manifest meanings derivable 
from a particular text; in principle endless, as many contemporary 
critics in their notion of 'reading' point out, nevertheless in 
practice quite limited as the same critics in their notion of 17 
'symptomatic reading' acknowledge. The message of a text is 
always problematical, and not the exclusive property of the text itself; 
what 1s encoded must be decoded, and each individual receiver will do 
18 
this, of course, in the last resort in an unique way. Each will 
derive a different message from the one text. The obviousness of 
this assertion does not belie the equally obvious but opposite assertion 
that the substantial agreement or coherence which surrounds the 
message of a text is the product, significantly, of the coherence 
of the text itself, and the logic of its construction. 
-275"-
More seriously problematical for the kind of textual analysis 
proposed and undertaken here is that of the definition of its basic 
or minimal unit. The range of terms and definitions available for the 
principle units in narrative analysis is legion. From Vladimir Propp's* 
J 9 * 
functions' the net is cast to include 'narreme', 'event',^ 
2 J 2? 2 3 
'eidon' ' 'videme/cademe' ,'lexeme' and 'function and 
indices'
 2 4
 . The first and last in this list, those of Vladimir 
Propp and Roland Barthes have both been criticized by B.M. Colby and 
Gerald Prince (who have suggested their own terms), for the lack of 
rigour in their definition of minimal units, a lack of rigour which 
each of the two latter authors attempts to rectify by specifying the 
precise rules of the transformation and interrelation of the units 
they specify. For example, B.N. Colby writes: 
"The main difference between the function and the eidon 
is that the eidon is defined in terms of higher order 
categories and sequence rules. The function is defined 
only as a specified narrative action." 25 
The significance of such higher order categories and sequence rules 
lies in Propp's failure, Colby believes, to recognise variations in 
plot structure other than in terms of 'deviance' from the basic 
26 
pattern. Such arguments have already been the object of much 
consideration (chapter 4) and no further comment is warranted here. 
Suffice it to say that attempts to move the study of narrative 
towards a transformational system similar to that of Chomsky's 
analysis of language, whether inductively (Colby), or deductively 
(Prince) seems to lead either to an over formalisation sufficiently 
removed from a vital narrative to make anything other than a minimal 
sense of it, or to a still basic classification of manifest units 
in which the postulated rules are limited to the identification 
of the unit's connection and exclusion, but which fails to allow 
any theorisation either about the specifically analysed text or about 
narrative in general. 
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Natural language and narratives are sufficiently different, as I 
have already pointed out, for the attempt to make procedures perhaps 
suitable for the one suitable for the other, of limited relevance. 
However, the failure to search for greater rigour in the analysis 
of narrative is one equally to be avoided. Propp's identification 
of the functional units at the base of the narrative, marks an 
27 
important principle of linguistic analysis, that of commutation. 
If the replacement or transposition of one unit by another would 
lead to an alteration or destruction of the sense of the chronology 
of the narrative, then that unit manifested in action or in event, 
becomes both significant and basic for the understanding of the 
narrative as a whole. With this in mind, one can distinguish between, 
as Roland Barthes and B.N. Colby do, for example, between primary 
and secondary units, those whose significance is fundamental and 
whose absence would destroy the narrative as such, and those whose 
presence adds richness to the narrative as long as they appear in 28 
an appropriate place. In this sense the minimal unit of the 
narrative which Propp identifies as a functional unit and which I 
have also called the sequence is not the smallest unit of the narrative. 
As the discussion in this chapter will presently reveal, the sequence 
of the chronology when transposed into the segment of the logic, 
while it remains the same unit, is immediately vulnerable to the 
disintegration of multiple coding in which even the flicker of an eye 
can have significance. But just as in the form of the expression 29 
band of the television text the shot was seen as the minimal 
unit, so too now, it is the segment. In neither case does this 
minimum preclude further and more precise analysis. Far from it, 
what it do68 preclude, however, is the locking of that analysis on 
to the manifest structuring of the text. Beneath the shot, and 
beneath the sequence/segment of the context of a narrated text, 
the number of interpretable units is endless. 
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The basic unit of the narrative text is therefore the functional 
unit identified in principle by Propp. I have distinguished the 
two modes, as it were - the sequence,the unit of action, significant 
diachronically, and the segment, the same unit of action significant 
synchronically. In each mode this unit is subject to further 
investigation and dissection. Any subsequent units of the text 
will be both dependent on, and contributory to, the sequence/segment, 
and will in any case be code specific. 
A number of further points arise. The number of codes at work 
30 
within a text will be great; some of them will be of greater 
apparent significance than others. They will be consistently more 
visible. Thus, for example, in his analysis of La Geste d'Asdiwal, 
Levi-Strauss identifies the geographical, the techno-economic, the 
cosmic and the social as the dominant codes through which the narrative 31 
is structured whereas ., in the Mythologiques, the alimentary 
and the acoustic codes are also subject of some considerable discussion. 
Similarly, in A.J. Greimas
1
 analysis of the primary Bororo myth it 
is the alimentary code (isotopy) which is judged to be more significant 33 
than the natural code (isotopy). In identifying a particular code, 
and in adjudging its relative significance for the narrative - both of 
which are empirical operations - the aim is to define a consistent 
thread of meaning. If a particular story is located somewhere 
specifically, and if the characters move from one location to another, 
the nature of their movements, the point of origin, of transition and 
of return is significant. So too, at another level, are the clothes 
they wear, or the colour of their hair. In this sense nothing in 
the narrative is irrelevant and relatively nothing is uncoded. The 
demand for the inclusion of everything in the story, and especially a 
myth, simultaneously with the demand for the identification of a 
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privileged or rock-bottom level of coding is theoretically apposite 
34 
though empirically impossible. It is theoretically appodte 
because without such a demand anything less becomes, rather than 
provisional, arbitrary and insubstantial; but it is impossible because 
not only can a text never be exhausted but also because the attempt 
35 
to exhaust it will deny it its truth. 
In the analysis of any text, and these television programmes are no 
exception, the identification of its codes and of their articulation, 
is therefore^n the Weberian sense,partial and provisional. One 
can, however, suggest that there are those, the geographical, the 
techno-economic, the social and the physical (biological), 
which are of greater significance than others (for example the alimentary, 
the acoustic, the fashion, the nominal, the colour etc.) The 
distinction,which of course will vary from text to text, significantly 
derives not just from the text itself but from our (my) perception 
of the most important dimensions of the structure of human activity 
as a whole; location, production, social relations and physical 
survival, respectively. 
How these codes manifest themselves in any given text will of course 
be specific to each text. One television programme, for example, 
can be located in the city where the principal movements of its main 
characters are from the office to the street; another, say Intimate 
Strangers, involves principal movements from home to city. Beneath 
these manifest differences one can distinguish, apart from their 
joint involvement with place, a distinction between a place of 
domestic security and relative inactivity, and one of alien Insecurity 
and action. One can even suggest that beneath these differences 
lies a simple but fundamental dichotomy of proximity and distance. 
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Working back from this dichotomy one can establish how its various 
manifestations are presented in different texts; how each generates 
its own particular message from the different codes at work within it. 
The binary distinctions with which the following account, along with 
others, is studded, have therefore a powerful heuristic significance. 
No claims are made for their privileged reflection of a basic mode of 
human thought, but a claim is made for their ability, even as a priori 
categories, to open up a text. As G.S. Kirk notes, some of the binary 
categories with which Levi-Strauss adorns his analysis have as much 
to do with the actual practice of living and of the experience of life 
of the Indians with whose myths he is concerned as with any fundamental 
thought process. The distinction between high and low, and near and 
far, is empirically significant and narratively important; it may 
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only incidentally be of ontological significance. 
It is however,the case that with binary distinctions a little goes 
a long way; the distinction between nature and culture in the techno-
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economic code, between life and death in the physical code, 
between here and there in the geographical code and between man and 
woman in the social code identify not just a basic logical, opposition 
but a logical opposition of consistent cultural importance. Much 
of the account which follows derives from an awareness of this and 
many of the arguments which seem to transcend the specificity of the 
detailed analysis are premised on the assumption of the potentially 
« universal significance of such basic categorial pairings. 
The relationship between code and message is significantly mediated 
in the person and the activities of the characters who appear in the 
narrative. The process which A.J. Greimas calls anthropomorphisation 
involves the quickening of the abstract categories through the actions 
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of the narrated. The acting units become, then, the carriers of 
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the action but also the focal points of the narrative's symbolic 
significance. As we have seen in an action of functional 
significance the narrative is moved forwards; and as we will see 
it is in the same action that a conceptual transformation occurs. 
In myth it is in the transformation of say jaguar into frog which 
is significant in the opposition of jaguar and frog; similarly 
in contemporary drama it is in the opposition of husband and wife, 
the murder of a villain by a cop, or even the change in the status 
of a hero to a villain, which is as much of conceptual as of 
narrative significance. 
Much of the significance is generated by the context in which an 
action takes place, though not all. Central, for example, to Kenneth 
Burke's understanding and definition of dramatism is the pentad of 
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act, scene, agency, purpose and agent. The notion of context 
here is therefore of some breadth. While the act, in Burke's 
terminology, provides the narrative with its movement, the agent 
(including presumably those passively involved in the action) is the 
centre of the narrative's meaning. It is not just a question of 
being able to list the basic acting units, present in the narrative, 
as for example Propp and Greimas and Barthes have already done, but 
actually being able to explore the narratively specific qualities 
attached to the acting units at any one time. What are their qualities? 
Are they male, female, old or young, black or white, good or bad and 
so on? And the same questions apply to the context of the action 
» (Burke's scene strictly). What is the nature of the location? 
How and why does the significance of an identical act, say work or 
murder, change as the location of that action, say the home or the 
office, also changes? Part of an answer to such questions,.which 
juxtaposes agent, act and scene, depends on a series of assumptions 
which any analysis must make about, among other things, what is 
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appropriate. A measure of the narrative's equilibrium (or 
disequilibrium) can be found in the appropriateness of agent, act 
and scene, and of their interrelationship. p
0
r example as 
we shall se, in Intimate Strangers it is immediately established 
that the garden is Joan's place; her activity in it, gardening, is 
natural for her and by and large narratively neutral, not so however 
Harry's. His occasional ventures into the garden either reinforce 
the loss of his masculinity (i.e. his loss of job) or signal, in 
anticipation, that loss. The garden, and gardening are not fcr him. 
Recognition of the how and why of this narrative appropriateness, 
which is an appropriateness of the static category rather than the 
dynamic function, is an essential part of being able to read a narrative. 
Indeed there are those narratives, and television narratives in 
particular, which depend very significantly on their congruence and 
which, as a result present texts, albeit often quite complex, of 
remarkable consistency. This pressure towards verisimilitude gives 
the televison text its overdetermined character; its processes 
of signification are clear, as code upon code speak the same message. 
As a result little of the televisual text is ambiguous. A television 
play is not like a poem. It is not built on ambiguity. Its tropes, 
the flashback, flashforward,slew-mix have nothing of the complexity of 
the contradictory and half-expressed meanings in which Sir William Gmpson 
so glories. ^ The television text is in C major, and although such 
a characterisation may be being exaggerated by an analysis which is in 
the same key, it is unlikely that the latter will deny us the 
possibility of recognising what little ambiguity there is within the 
former. The solidity of action, the visibility of space, will 
always limit the subtleties of character, the ambiguities of role and 
the hesitancies of motivation. Indeed motivation itself is a functional 
category, the product of reaction rather than action, definition 
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rather than speculation. it
 a
 truism that television, 
precisely in its combination of sound and picture, leaves little 
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to the imagination. Radio has a much greater facility here. 
In this sense, the television text is closed in a way more complete 
than any other, even that of the cinema, for the latter, in our 
culture at least, has been able to transcend the restrictions of 
narrative and has produced texts subversive of the degree zero 
writing, still, and perhaps always, the particular privilege of 
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television. 
The assumptions upon which the following analysis is based should by 
now be reasonably clear. Methodologically what will be presented 
is something rather less than a grammar, rather more than an 
interpretation. The problems of producing a grammar of narrative 
in the manner of a transformational grammar of natural language 
have already been discussed. The problems of presenting an 
interpretation under the guise of objectivity are equally obvious. 
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As Umberto Eco points out, even A.J. Greimas
1
 analysis of the 
Bernanos texts, disciplined and formalised though it is, is only 
one possible way of approachiig them. There is no certain privilege 
in such analysis, and as Eco again is at pains to point out, semiosis 
is endless and anything which freezes a single system at a certain 46 (arbitrary) point suffers inevitably as the result. 
The way of the work which follows has its origins in the analysis 
of mythical stories undertaken by Claude Levi-Strauss, and A.J. Greimas. 
In it I will be concerned to understand the television programmes 
in terms of what I take to be their structural arrangement and 
semantic construction. The categories which have proved so fruitful 
in the analysis of myth are, as it were, tested. The programmes 
seem to be, and I hope to show that this is the case, accessible to 
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the same kind of analysis as that undertaken by the two senior 
structuralists. That they are so seems, to me, significant. 
But that significance is not all inclusive; it is for example 
perfectly clear that the story of Harry has, albeit in its entirely 
mundane way, something of the Christ myth about it. It is a story 
of his (near) death and resurrection; of the construction of a new 
life and the treading of the steady path towards a Utopia. There 
is equally, and perhaps more immediately relevant, something of the 
culture hero in Harry. Deprived of social and cultural support 
in his loss of job and the disaster of his marriage, he constructs a 
world in which he becomes, in common parlance, the self-made man, 
and a contented active husband. 
These are the themes, and there will be others, which can be found 
in this text. Each could provide the initial impetus for a fully 
fledged and entirely consistent interpretation of the meaning or 
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message of the text. Each is a selection and each in a certain 
sense freezes the text in a particular way. There are no ultimately 
compelling arguments for excluding the ways offered by these inter-
pretations in favour of the one I am suggesting, except perhaps this 
one. What is being offered here grows out of a recognition that a 
narrative text is a construction, that it is systemic, that it is 
ordered, and that it is in its system and its order, that its sense 
is created. That to define and understand a system means to specify 
its rules, and to suggest in what way these rules are relevant to and 
provide the key to the understanding of an entire, specified, range 
of texts. To talk of rules is probably a little premature; to 
talk of patterned constraints might be more apposite. But whatever 
one wishes to call them, the exercise, and the justification for the 
exercise, is clear. If the tales told by the 'primitive' and by 
those in technically more advanced but still oral cultures can be 
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reduced and understood through a certain way of coding, can our 
own tales similarly be reduced and understood? ^ jf the answers 
provided by the analysis throw some light not just on the questions 
associated with narrative as a whole but also on the relationship 
between one particular culture and its narratives, then it would 
seem to me, the approach is worthy of consideration. 
Ill 
The predominant concern will be with the narrative of the series as a 
whole. The chronological, morphological, structure of the series 
narrative is in many ways a complex one, especially when compared 
with the simple narratives which have been listed as subjects of 
previous analyses. Instead of one lack, there are three; instead 
of a simple one move tale; there is a tale with two moves; instead 
of one hero, it could be argued that there are in fact three heroes 
in Intimate Strangers; Harry Paynter most obviously, Joan Paynter, 
and then Joan and Harry together. 
At the manifest level therefore we are faced with a series of television 
programmes involving a number of characters whose names we know and 
whose attributes we quickly learn. We watch one of them, Harry, 
have a heart attack. We recognise that his illness (lack of health) 
directly produces the loss of his job, (lack of work) and exacerbates 
his . shaky marriage (lack of relationship). We watch one episode 
( 2 - 6 ) 
after another " in which Harry's attempts to redeem the situation, 
k in particular the lack in his relationship and the lack of work, fail. 
We see his despair in failure (especially 6) and we follow his new 
attempts, successful this time, to find work. Meanwhile Joan is 
struggling; she feels the lack in her relationship and lives it 
(especially 7 and 8); she too, albeit reluctantly, finds work and 
even comes to terns with her own physical lack (the reference to her 
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menopause in chapter 9). Then, their individual lacks significantly 
resolved, Joan and Harry act together to affirm their relationship; 
and as it were, they act to reverse the movement of the initial 
causal chain; the successful redemption of their marriage generates 
an atmosphere in which they both find security in work, and almost 
incidentally, Harry is declared fit and well (episode 12). 
How is this, I think relatively uncontentious reading articulated; 
what are its elements, what is its message? We can provide some 
substance to these questions by exploring the manifest level, the 
content, of the programmes a little more fully. The simplest way 
to proceed will be to treat each lack with the narrative thread that 
it engenders separately. 
The Physical Lack 
Harry's heart attack is the deus ex machine of the narrative as a whole. 
Although preceded by the events of the first episode, everything which 
follows is dependent on it, even though it subsequently becomes 
displaced as the central concern of the narrative. Harry's lack of 
work and lack in marriage quickly assume dominance. Episode 2 
immediately following his attack and episode 3, in which he and Joan 
go on holiday together, centre in part on Harry's recovery; his 
passive convalescence in the garden, his active recuperation in the 
Lake District. Little more is heard of his illness until episode 9 
when Joan and their doctor discuss it in the context of her own 
symptoms, until finally he is cleared, after his mother's death in 
episode 13. 
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Still at the manifest level it is possible to make a number of 
observations about the context in which Harry's near death and 
subsequent recovery is treated by the narrative. The location 
of the main events is important. His heart attack occurs, after 
a hectic few hours at work in the city, at the railway station. 
He is about to go on holiday. The railway station is a point of 
transition. Like airports, motorways, derelict buildings and so 
on, they have a marginal significance in contemporary culture. 
Things happen there, especially in our narratives, which do not happen 
in the relative security of home and hearth. How often do we see 
murders committed and villains getting their come-uppance in these 
marginal locations? Harry's heart attack occurs at a natural site 
for a cultural death. 
His natural recovery, especially in so far as it takes place in the 
two subsequent episodes occurs in what is, for us in our culture, the 
most appropriate location: close to nature. First of all in his 
garden at home and then on holiday walking in the Lake District, 
Harry recovers sufficiently for his physical health to no longer 
become a preoccupation of the narrative. To all intents and purposes 
it is by virtue of his contact with things natural, albeit mediated 
in the environment of home and hotel, which effects the cure. 
The search for health, then, involves Harry in little that is 
narratively complex. He moves away from his customary areas of 
involvement, above all his work, and his journeying is extended to 
a place where he had not been since before his marriage. The Lake 
District awakens many memories of the past, for him and for Joan, 
and it is, in a sense, of symbolic significance that these figures: 
Ruskin, Donald Campbell, Joan's dead brother Peter, and the vital 
but anachronistic figures of Hector Lanson and his wife, as well as 
Hitler and Christ, surround him in his period of recovery. Each of 
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them are marginal figures; all except Lanson are dead, only memories 
- even Lanson
1
s son has disappeared. Figures from the past therefore 
are used, as it were, as helpers in the search for health. More 
direct help, in this search, are the doctors. 
There are a number of doctors, the specialised agents of physical 
recovery of our society, present in the narrative. Harry has his 
own doctor; white, respectable, late middle-aged, who is centrally 
concerned with the heart attack. But doctors appear at three other 
points in the narrative. Firstly (episode 9) when Joan goes to see 
Maurice, Harry's doctor, about her depression and unhappiness, and 
finds herself face to face with Jennie Bowers, white, smart,middle-aged 
and postively female. She provides an instant and natural cure for 
Joan, uncomplicated by the prescription of medicines. Then there 
is the unnamed young doctor who refuses to carry out the abortion 
which Joan and Harry's daughter Judith wants because she has become 
pregnant without the consent of her husband. Finally there is the 
doctor who attends Harry's dying mother. Young and black and very 
proper. He is unable to do anything to help. The doctors in 
Intimate Strangers, are examples of an important group of figures of 
mediation and help in our culture and can be classified in the 
following way:-
Table 1 
Doctors (Physical Lack) 
White/Black Young/old Male/Female Cure/No Cure 
Pratt (1.2.13) + - + + 
Bowers (9) + - - + 
Abortionist (10) + + + 
Mother's Doctor (13) - + + 
(where + signifies the first and - the second element of the opposition, 
± signifies a middle position and +/- signifies both). 
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The point of presenting such a table at this stage of the discussion 
is simply to illustrate, albeit very superficially, that this particular 
group of characters, like any other, are constructions. Their 
deconstruction in this manner, reveals how and from what, each doctor 
in this case, is constructed. Each opposition defines one aspect 
of a particular code, that of colour or race, age, sex and effectiveness 
from which a mutually exclusive choice can be made. To explore the 
structure of a message, then^rather than its content, would involve a 
consideration of the range of significance of each of these codes. 
Emphasis is switched from the integrity of a character to the coded 
elements which make it up. It would be difficult however, to take 
such an analysis much further without the consideration of a greater 
range of texts. One might be tempted to suggest from this that 
female doctors do not need any medication - mediation to cure their 
own; and that the black doctor is an appropriate agent (angel) of 
death. But this is in a sense too speculative and intuitive. A 
study of the imagery of the medical practitioner in television dramas 
would nevertheless tell us a great deal about our culture's perceptions 
of these significant figures. 
The Social Lack 
The lack that quickly becomes visible in Joan and Harry's relationship 
antecedes but is seriously exacerbated by his heart attack. Their 
search now separately, now together, is consistently visible in the 
narrative, and by virtue of the three agents (one acting unit) who 
are involved, it is quite a complicated task to follow it. 
We can begin by considering the events in their sequence. Much of 
the dynamics of their relationship is centred, quite naturally, at 
home and the full significance of the domestic geographical code will 
be discussed below. 
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The series opens with Joan strolling in the garden while Harry finishes 
his toilet in the upstairs bedroom. Harry looks down at her; she 
does not notice him. This picture is reversed at the end of the 
episode 2 after Harry's loss of job and a major row with Joan. Then 
he is in the garden and she is at the upstairs window. When he 
comes to look up towards her, she has moved away. In the meantime 
their togetherness and their distance has been played out in the 
kitchen at breakfast time and in the other rooms of the house, their 
sitting room, Xheir dining room and their bedroom. The latter is the 
setting for significant nonactivity. 
The resolution of the initial conflicts in the first episode, which 
centre on their coming holiday, stems from activity outside the home 
however. Kate, their daughter, ,provides help as a result of a drink 
with Harry at a pub; and Joan herself is won over at the golf-club 
dance. But the negative intrusions into the marriage also come from 
outside; the loss of the holiday cottage is announced at the city 
pub by Harry's solicitor, the heart attack occurs at the station, 
Harry loses his job in the city. Home is clearly an island of 
potential security more or less passively subject to the shocks of 
disaster and repeal which the outside world seems to generate. 
This pattern of the playing out at home of the conflicts generated and 
the solutions granted abroad is one that continues throughout the series. 
The most directly serious threats are those of seduction; and each 
time a seduction appears possible (episode 5, 8 and 12), Harry or 
Joan must travel to the city. Equally the attempts at cure prior 
to episode 7 involve, just as in the case of Harry's physical health, 
a movement away from the strict boundary of the house, to the Lake 
District holiday (episode 3), and to the garden and to early morning, 
(episode 6). 
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Once they leave their first home and set up shop and house in the 
same building, the conflicts become more intense. Joan has lost 
her garden and with it her territory and natural space. But Harry 
has cut himself off from the city. Their old house becomes a 
beyond, and Joan returns to it. It is empty and there is no resolution 
to be found there. The break in their marriage is exaggerated too 
by her seduction by Lionel, and it is only the doctor Jennie Bowers, 
and the meeting at the pub with Harry's young school friends, which 
brings them, finally, together. 
The subsequent action (episodes 10-13) in which they act, mostly, 
as joint heroes, allows them to take their newly found togetherness 
into the various locations which had previously been threatening. 
In episode 10, .for example, they go to the city to buy a bed, have 
lunch and visit the cinema. The tensions and the agony of marital 
relationship have been left behind, in Tunbridge Wells and in the 
persons of Judith and Matt, daughter and son-in-law respectively. 
In episode 11 this togetherness is played out in the city again (the 
Remembrance Day service) and In Portsmouth, against the background 
of their rediscovery of their past and the slight change in Joan's 
status. 
Episode 13, coda like, revises the themes of the early part of the 
series; the threat of the city to their relationship: both work 
and seduction. The threat is resolved in the shop below the flat. 
The final coming together occurs upstairs in the sitting room. The 
final episode, also, has an ambivalent significance in terms of this 
lack, apparently so clearly resolved. The last episode in which 
Harry takes Joan to a plot of land where he proposes to build their 
new bungalow revises the dichotomy of home and garden in a r expansion 
of the domestic space with its potential for conflict. The ambiguity 
of the message is further emphasized as Zarry and Joan pace out the 
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boundary of the bungalow in the middle of the field; each doing 
the same thing but in opposite directions, while we the audience, 
as if in a helicopter, ascend slowly until their figures are lost in 
the surburban landscape. 
Figure IV The dynamic geography of Intimate Strangers Sky 
Culture 
Nature 
This might hesitantly, be reformulated as 
House(garden): Countryside(city) ^ Flat(shop): Landscape(sky) which is a 
close approximation to the narrative formula 
Fx(a); Fy(b) ~ Fx(b); Fa-l(y) 
suggested as central to the movement and definition of the mythic 
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narrative by Claude Levi-Strauss. 
Here the dominant oppositions are of house and garden, house and city, 
city and garden. The flat-shop opposition involves a compression 
of the dualism of work and home and a denial of garden, but this is 
overcome, at least potentially by the end of the series; though 
in the absence of a real house or a real garden a landscape only is 
visible. The resolution of the original opposition is not actually 
effected. 
The purpose of this account is to illustrate one of the particular 
consistencies and patternings at work in such a narrative. Here both 
the lack, the search for, and the redemption of, a marriage relationship, 
is explored in close accord with place. Indeed as we will see shortly, 
an understanding of the code of space is essential to an understanding 
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of the dimensions of much of the action and to its overdetermination. 
It could literally be said that there is a place for everything. 
However, clearly there is more to the working out of the social 
lack, the lack in Joan and Harry's relationship that the ramific-
ations of place and space. Of great importance are those who are 
involved in the actions associated with its redemption, both as 
hero and most particularly as potential helper and opposer. 
Whereas in our discussion of the physical lack the number of mediators 
was small and relatively clearly defined, here the number is larger, 
and at least as far as the potential helpers are concerned, as opposed 
to the seducers, an amorphous group. The relative ease with which 
the doctors could be identified, and classified in part reflects 
their significance in our culture. In practice, as in the narrative, 
they act as mediators, placed on the boundary of nature and culture, 
where they bring cultural cures to restore natural health and sometimes 
the reverse. Their capacity to intervene between life and death 
makes them potentially and actually powerful figures. 
Jennie Bowers (episode 9) though narratively relatively inconsequential, 
has this function, though doubly so, for it is her advice (woman to 
woman) which forces Joan to do something herself about her relationship 
with Harry. But the directness and unambiguity of Jennie Bowers' 
intervention as helper is unique. Problems of marriage and relationship 
are less overtly the source of professional advice in our society, 
though increasingly they are becoming so, and even that advice is not 
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The range of helpers, and these are the most central, seems quite wide, 
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though a number of points about it could be suggested. This series 
seems to value and give potency to the unmarried; here neither Kate 
nor the young people are married and Jennie Bower's marital state is 
not mentioned. Each in his own way, as a working, active young 
person, acts positively to ameliorate the distress caused by the lack 
in Harry and Joan's relationship. Those who fail, or exacerbate 
that lack, albeit unwittingly, the Lansons and Diana, are married and 
not working - though their marriage in each case is, like Harry and 
Joan's, flawed. The Lanson's only child disappeared fifteen years 
ago (and without children no marriage is complete - episode 3); 
Diana's husband is still in Sri Lanka and in any case a previous affair, 
which she and Joan discuss, effects her status as a completely social 
figure. Help it seems, in order to have a chance of success, must 
come from characters whose attributes are contrary to those of the 
heroes. 
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And that help, in its extreme form, in seduction, is more potent 
still when it is offered in marginal situations. The three 
seduiers are, of course, a much more clearly defined group; in this 
case being female and young is a recipe for failure. Their territory,
 t 
like that of the helpers, consists in locations which, structurally, 
are mediatory: a pub, a hotel, a roof top, a bed sitting room. 
The message, superficially at least, seems to be that the most 
powerful magic results from the juxtaposition of the opposite in 
character and the ambiguous in location. Unsurprising perhaps, but 
a hypothesis worth testing. 
The Cultural Lack 
The third lack is work. After his heart attack, Harry is offered a 
sinecure in his old office by the company secretary, Bob Blake. It 
is a non-job, and this negative situation, either literally no work, 
or work which is demeaning or intolerable and therefore something less 
than work, is the situation which is maintained until episode 7. For 
the first half of the series therefore this is the lack which dominates 
the narrative and Harry's search for work, for material security and 
so on, follows classically, the pattern of journey, test and failure. 
The successful redemption of the lack, paradoxically, is of little 
narrative consequence, for it functions mostly to dramatise the lack 
in their relationship and Joan's perception of it. Eventually this 
lack is redeemed (episode 8/9) and interest in it is only maintained 
through Joan's limited search for work - in her case the buying and 
selling of antiques. The nature of this resolution, that is the redemption 
of the lack in terms of a job that involves no production, but only the 
buying and selling of objects (books and antiques), will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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Too much work contributes to Harry's heart attack. Too little, 
subsequently, drives him to drink and to Pat. The balance achieved by 
being his own man, with the bookshop, protects him from the public 
relations lady and from the temptations of a seat on the board of his
 } 
old firm (episode 12). 
The drama of this search, however, falls to episodes 2, 4, 5 and 6. 
Here the spatial and actorial determinants of the narrative are 
clearly revealed, and the plot itself is at its most clear and 
unambiguous. The lack is revealed as a result of Bob Blake's 
intervention (episode 2). In episode 4 the offer of a partnership 
results from a visit to an old publisher in London, and leads to a 
second visit to London to find money to pay for his share. In the 
next episode he has found a job nearer home, but he hates it and does 
little or no work. He finds Pat, and once again finds himself in 
London. Finally in episode 6 with the same local job, it appears that 
with the help of Kenyon, he has gained a contract. But his attack 
on the apprentice destroys what little hope there was of security and 
success. He returns home a beaten man. 
Geographically the dominant opposition here is that between home and 
city. The city is a man's world; it is the world of work; but 
without a job it rejects Harry who has to find work closer to home. 
The clarity and strength of the initial opposition is weakened: first 
when he finds a job in Tunbridge Wells, and then (episode 7) when he 
finds his work beneath his home. Joan too, in a parallel movement, 
is deprived of her work in the garden, and from episode 7 onwards, but 
especially in episodes 11 and 12, Bhe is also encouraged to work from home. 
The possibility, a product of their increasing confidence in their work 
and their relationship, that they will build a house in the field that 
Harry has found, is narratively significant not just becuase it is the 
last sequence of the series but because it poses the same spatial 
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question and opposition with which the series began, though transposed 
to a new level, (see figure JV) 
Harry's failure in work, up to and including episode 6, is symbolic 
of his failure as a man, and the various contributions to his failure, 
over determined by the non-consummation of his relationship with Pat, 
all generate this transf6rmation. Harry moves from the hero of the 
resurrection to an anti-hero and villain. Indeed his subsequent, 
though understated success with the shop, is 'villainy' as far as 
Joan is concerned. Even in his success, his heroic status, ia, at 
least for the time being, denied. 
This movement too, implies the potent status of the city, a potency 
emphasised in the familiar metaphor of it as a jungle. Man's 
cultural activity there is taken to such an extreme, that it becomes 
a danger similar to that of the untamed (uncultured) nature of a forest. 
The city takes culture to a point beyond itself, a kind of super 
culture which is at the same time a bursting of the cultural bonds and a 
transformation of them; the culture of the city, though a product of 
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man's activity, is like nature, beyond him and beyond his control. 
The solution to this contradiction is offered in terms of Harry's 
withdrawal from the city, but because it involved the loss of his 
manhood, it is hardly an efficient compromise. That this, however, 
is a fundamental problem for the narrative, as for our own society, 
is beyond question. Its implications and resonance will be discussed 
more fully below, as also will the change in the nature of Harry's 
work, that from production (the manager of a production department of 
a book and part-work publishing house) to that of non-production, 
almost consumption, when he starts buying and selling books. 
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Table III 
Helpers/Opposers. (Cultural LAck) 
Male/Female Young/Old City/Non City Successful/Unsuccessfu 
Bob Blake (2) + + + 
Geoffrey (4) + - + 
Mancroft (4) + - + 
Daniels (4) + 
Harvesty (4) + + + 
Foster/Dale (6) + +/-
Kenyon (5) + + + 
Mrs. Temple (7) - + 
Accountant (12) - + + 
R.B. (12) + + + 
The message to be read in this table of the helpers and opposers in the 
context of this cultural lack seems to support what I have already stated 
about the city. In terms of this classification the city is the domain 
of the young and the male and Harry does not profit by it. The 
potential helpers who are older, Geoffrey and Mancroft are slightly 
less extreme in their opposition; they, for example, postpone 
judgement and move Harry one step along in his search. The difficulties 
are only postponed in the case of Foster, who gives Harry his job in 
Tunbridge Wells. 
However, the clearest contrast comes in the shape of Mrs. Temple, the 
owner of the bookshop, who sells to Harry and instructs him in the way 
of bookselling (though their discussion is principally about the buying 
of books; episode 7). It is ironic, one might think, to see that in 
a world of work, when convention has it that the young thruster holds the 
key to success, that it is the retiring old lady bookseller who provides 
Harry with his magical agent. Harry is, literally, transformed once 
again, by this transaction, although the solution to the problem of 
-298"-
work is not an unequivocal one; he loses his manhood, and he takes to 
woman's work. 
IV 
I have presented some of what seems to me to be of the most significant 
dimensions of the narrative within the framework of the manifest thread 
of the physical, social and cultural lacks which are at the centre of 
the plot of Intimate Strangers. I propose in this section to explore 
the codes which underlie and constrain these dimensions, and to do so in 
particular in a way which illustrates the redundancy at work within the 
text. 
The four basic codes of the text, are most obviously the following: the 
geographical, the techno-economic, the social and the physical. Each is 
articulated respectively though the basic oppositions of proximity and 
distance, of nature and culture and the transformation of the one into th 
other through work, the opposition of male and female, and finally the 
fundamental dichotomy of life and death. The choice of these codes is 
warranted by the manifest context of the text, though there are clearly 
others of significance. As I have already suggested, in principle, 
everything in the narrative text is coded. 
1) The Geographical Code 
The action is placed significantly in three areas: the home, the garden 
and the city. The first two are established in the opening sequence, 
and until episode 7 are constantly reaffirmed, and the third is equally 
of continuous importance, until its influence is denied in the final 
episode. Home and garden are together opposed to the city in terms 
of proximity. Their distinctiveness is underlined by the activities 
associated with each and their privileged actors. 
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Further there is a fourth 'place' which completes the structure in the 
sense that it complements and opposes the home in the way that the city 
complements and opposes the garden. The city and the garden are both 
places of work, but the former is both distant and distinctly cultural,* the 
latter close and significantly natural. The clarity of that opposition 
is mediated on the one hand, domestically, by the home, and on the other 
by a group of transitional locations, such as church, pub, hospital, which 
are united in their distance and in their ambiguity. In churches, in pubs, 
in hospitals, men are faced with the limits of culture, either cosmically, 
narcotically or medically; at home men are faced, in their marriage, with 
the limits of nature. Whereas the city and the garden are uncomplicated 
in their opposition and in their structural position, home and'church' 
are more complex, acting as mediators, on the one hand on this side of 
nature (home) and on the other, on the far side of culture (church), 
between city and garden. 
The basic geographical code schematically looks like this: 










and this is the basic structure within which the action is undertaken. 
Given this we can begin to understand the narrative significance of the 
various moves of location, in particular that of episode 3, where they 
-300"-
go on holiday. The countryside becomes in terms of the above scheme a 
natural there and the move both increases the distance and strengthens 
the opposition between nature and culture. If Harry needs to recover from 
the effects of the city, although he begins in the garden (episode 2), the 
return to natural health must be undertaken as far away, both geographically 
and logically, as possible. 
Another move, that from the home and garden to the flat and shop, includes 
a weakening in the opposition, both in terms of the denial of nature (the 
sale of the house and the loss of the garden) and the bringing of culture 
closer to home (the opening of the shop under the flat). Once again there 
is a logic here which the narrative quite reasonably exploits; a consolidation, 
compression and a minimisation of the difference and the conflict between 
nature and culture; reculer pour mieux sauter. 
Schematically we can represent the moves as follows: 
Figure yi Dynamics within the geographical code 
a) Episode 3 b) Episodes 7-13 c) Episode 13 last sequence 
C C C 
H Ch. H Shop Ch PROXIMITY DISTANCE 
^Njk Flat 
G (Culture-proximity) H < 6 > Ch 
F 
v)' 
(Country) G G 
(Nature/Distance) 
C - City S - Shop 
H » Home F - Flat 
Ch • Church etc. 
G • Garden 
The last movement, albeit only potentially, involves a return to the basic 
structure and at the same time a reassertion of the difference between home 
and garden (proximity) and city and church (distance); within the narrative 
distance has been denied only to be re-established visually as we, the 
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audience, ascend heavenward. Harry and Joan's proximity and familiarity 
become our distance and strangeness. Indeed our position in this final 
tableau is the one most understated in the narrative as a whole, that of 
the church. 
The dynamic within this code is of two kinds. The first has already been 
made apparent, albeit implicitly. It is a movement within the categories 
of the code as the action develops chronologically. This is a movement, 
dialectically produced, by the interaction of message and code, and of 
logic and chronologic: events, tests and transformations at one level, 
effect the balance of the geographical categories at another. The 
second dimension of the movement is, however, more obvious and here 
the journey becomes a significant mediating category. Not every movement 
is marked in the narrative, but given the significance of this cbde every 
marked journey is at the same time a mediation, involving those who take 
it in a transformation. So Harry and Joan's journeys to the city, often 
accompanied by noise (especially during their return from seduction or near 
seduction) becomes significant both chronologically and logically. The 
movement from a situation of extreme culture to one in which culture and 
nature live in uneasy compromise (home) is in mythical terms, an extreme 
one and often fraught with danger. Journeys are important dimensions 
of narrative; their significance lies not only in the potential for 
narrative postponement, but in their categorial mediation. 
2) The Social Code 
The action of the narrative centres around the home, and around Harry and 
Joan's marriage. Much of the significance of the drama involves the re-
lationship between them and other related figures. The relations between 
the sexes are therefore of prime concern. Both Harry and Joan, as a result 
of the events and the tests which they face, change their positions re-
spective to each other and with respect to the rest of the world. The 
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manifestation of these changes is indeed in their geographical 
movements; in these changes of location is expressed the threat to, 
and the changes in, their social status. 
To begin with, there is a very clear distinction of male and 
female, expressed, as I have said, primarily in their territory: 
Joan's territory is the garden, close to nature. Harry's is the 
city, close to culture; and the home where the events of their 
marriage are played out is, in a sense, their joint territory. 
Marriage is seen as an imposition of culture over nature; a 
primary but always vulnerable institution where the natural 
(instinct, passion, etc.) and the cultural (the rules of social 
intercourse) meet. 
After Harry's 'death' (episode 1), he briefly attempts recovery 
in Joan's garden and then in the country, again Joan's territory, 
emphasised by her previous visit before the war. Subsequent develop-
ments take Harry back to the city, but his failure in a man's world 
is unambiguous. His illness has left him less than a man and in his 
return home, in his setting up shop and even in his final involvement 
as architect of the new home, he has moved closer to womanhood. 
Joan meanwhile moves in the opposite direction; after Harry's failure, 
which is her failure too, she loses her garden, her naturalness, and 
becomes involved in the world of business, buying and selling antiques. 
She moves closer to manhood. 
These movements, and particularly Harry's, are articulated in the 
context of other relationships, both positively and negatively 
expressed. Given the basic geographical schema (above) we can add 
















The characters who emanate from the different locations, but who are not 
logically tied to them, given this classification - above all city-women, 
become potentially threatening. And correlatively if a character finds 
himself or herself in an opposite location, that itself is potentially 
threatening. What is interesting, as far as this series is concerned, 
is that Harry maintains his integrity against the threats of city women 
(less potent because not in their 'natural environment') whereas Joan, 
herself not at home in the city, succumbs to its male representative 
(doubly accented in his liminal significance - he lives in Manchester, 
beyond the city territorially, and logically, in his predatory actions). 
It does seem that, beyond the garden, it is still very much a man's world. 
For example again, although it is a female doctor who provides the advice 
which seems to transform their marriage, it is advice given to Joan who in 
turn transforms it into a series of cultural activities, hair-do, shopping, 
cooking, each of them not just to please Harry, but in terms of the code, 
to bring her closer to him. 
The movement in this narrative, parallelling that of the spatial movements, 
involves therefore not a blurring of the boundary of man and woman, male 
and female, but at least provisionally (the final sequence leaves the 
possibility of any reworking open) the bringing of them closer together. 
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The opposition between man and woman expressed by the opposition of city 
and garden is weakened by a pulling in of the action towards the home: 
work comes home, and home is the site (the church also) where man and woman, 
nature and culture, somehow reach their unstable compromise, in close 
proximity to each other. The movement through the narrative is expressed 
then in these terms, that of a weakening of the opposition of man and woman, 
though of course, at a manifest level, both Harry and Joan gain confidence 
in their new-found togetherness. 
The second dimension of movement is within the code and within the 
relation of the sexes: here it is sex and conversation, and the opposite 
of both, sleep, which act as mediators between male and female. If sex 
is the most extreme form of communication between man and woman then sleep 
is the most extreme form of non-communication. Each in a certain sense 
is natural. Conversation, polite and angry, informed or boring, finds 
itself between these two extremes. It is therefore the most neutral 
of mediations. In sex, sleep and conversation not only are the manifest 
relations of the marriage expressed, but each is a significant and dynamic 
element of the social code. 
3) The Techno-economic Code 
The dimensions of work now follow the scheme already outlined. We can 
distinguish between cultural work and natural work, that is 'work' done in 
the city by men and work done in the garden by women. We can also 
distinguish, importantly, between production and consumption. 
That the category city - men - work versus garden - woman - work is so 
clearly defined in the series can be illustrated once again by referring 
to the women who in the series seem to transcend their categorial limits. 
Both Pat and the Public Relations lady, in one sense clearly the doyennes 
of city life, are in another, less unambigously so. Pat runs an employment 
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agency in Tunbridge Wells. She therefore helps men find work (at least 
it is only to men that she refers when she describes her work). The 
Public Relations lady is also not directly involved in production; she 
too is concerned to sell Harry to the public. Equally Kate, the only , 
other significant female worker in the series, (Judith a more marginal 
figure, actually also buys and sells in a store) is not involved in 
production, but in translation. Her appearance in the garden is, to 
be sure, (episode 1 and 2) as a nonworker, but she is happier to be there 
than Harry is. 
But the techno-economic code, apart from having either a cultural or 
natural dimension, also involves the difference between production and 
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consumption. Once again both space and sex role are clearly opposed 
as producer and consumer at the beginning of the series. Harry goes off to 
the city to work as a production manager. Joan goes to the saleroom to 
buy an antique and do the rest of the shopping. Her friends are involved 
in a similar way. 
Their joint failure in their respective activities - Harry's failure in 
the city, and Joan's failure to keep her garden forces Harry away from 
production, and Joan towards it. Each movement, like that of their sex-
roles, weakens the opposition between them. Harry buys a bookshop, and 
starts selling books. Joan is eventually persuaded to buy antiques (we 
never actually see her sell them, and her single attempt to sell a book 
to one of her friends (episode 7) ends in failure). As a result, Harry 
becomes less than a producer, though his distinctiveness is preserved 
by virtue of his design of the new house, and Joan becomes more than just 
a consumer,though here the weakening of her economic position is even less 
than that of Harry's. But the change in their economic status allows them 
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to work together; and this is approved by the narrative once again in 
the final sequence when they, together but separately, work in a field 
(garden to be) in their pacing out of the house's boundary prior to its 
construction. 
Diagrammatically the structure of the techno-economic code can be presented 
in this way: 
Figure VIII The techno-economic code 
*work without cultural production: only selling - buying.v 
+work/life without natural production: ho gardening. 
The Physical Code 
The fourth and final important level of coding to be recognised in 
Intimate Strangers is that of the physical; here the opposition of life 
and death is the most significant. This code is perhaps not as clear-cut as 
some of the others; it has something of the cosmic or transcendental 
about it, but it nevertheless is manifested in the text in terms of Harry's 
heart attack and as such relates once again and underlines the geographically 
based scheme already elucidated. Together with the categories of nature 
and culture each of the four areas of activity is identifiable in terms 















Flgure IX The Physical Code 
Cltx 
Cultural Death 
Home Church etc 
Cultural Lif Natural Death 
Garden 
Natural Life 
Harry'8 'death' is the product of overwork and his involvement with 
the city; his recovery is the product of his time in the garden and 
in the countryside, affirmed finally by his deeper immersion in home 
life and the bringing of work there. The natural 'death' associated 
with church, and with other transformational locations, appear as so 
53 
often with the church only marginally. In episode 3 and again 
in episode 13 Harry's relationship with the past, in the first case 
with heroes that have long since died, in the second with his mother 
who is dying, is accompanied by visits to church. But even here he 
is something of an outsider. Joan has to intercede for him and to 
lead him in prayer. She is after all, by virtue of her nature, 
closer to and more involved in God. The only exception to this, and 
it is a significant one, is again in the last episode. Harry and Joan 
go to Church together, but more importantly Harry is portrayed, after 
that almost ritual dinner with the family as the great architect. His 
mother has died her natural death and now his and Joan's mortality is 
suggested as they become two tiny specks in the bourgeois wilderness 
of the field, garden and house of Tunbridge Wells. 
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If we were to integrate the codes so far discussed, the ensuing 
structure would present a remarkable consistency and simplicity. 
Figure X Summary Structure 
City 










Proximity: Nature: Female: Life: Production 
The significant movement within the narrative is away from, and a 
denial of, the city, its maleness and its association with death en d 
dangerous insecurity. But that denial equally involves that of the 
garden, the natural world of woman and life. What is asserted therefore 
by the compression of the structure into flat and shop is cultural life 
and the balanced and relatively secure existence of male and female, 
and of consumption. The corollary of this, finally but only implicit^ 
stated in the final shot, is of a natural death, a death equally of man 
and woman and a recognition of the natural limits of mankind. The city 
at its worst is a super-culture; its very life is murderous. The 
church, equally distinct, is by virtue of its equilibrium (the balance 
of nature over culture) much less threatening though equally a location, 
though of a different order, of the transcendence beyond the cultural. 
Therefore the fragility of man's cultural existence is constantly being 
affirmed - through excess in the city, in its weakness in marriage and 
in the mediatory role of the church. Given this, the garden, most 
strongly the preserve of nature, is an escape though, in a man's world, 
not a very significant one; nor is it particularly potent in its 
curative or threatening action. (the city's super-nature takes over 
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Therefore whereas for a primitive, nature is the source of all that is 
threatening, for us, at least for those of us who read the text of 
Intimate Strangers, that boundary between the known and the unknown, 
the controlled and the uncontrolled, has been transformed. The city 
is the jungle and the journeys to and from it, as we have noted, are 
fraught. Why else would Joan put on her fur coat to travel to London? 
What other significance can be attached to the noise and the complexity 
of the journeys there and back? Why is Harry (episode 4) accosted by 
an old friend in a railway train compartment and told about the dog 
eats dog of the city? Why finally is the journey of the agent of 
disaster, Bob Blake (episode 2), given so much stress, whereas Kenyon's 
(episode 6) is not? 
I will return to the problems of interpreting the messages of the text 
shortly, but I would like first of all to draw attention to the other 
levels of coding, too complex for a detailed analysis to be undertaken 
here, but which fill out, as it were, the bare bones of the structure 
so far described. 
It is tempting to pursue the structure of multiple codes to a smaller 
scale and to enquire whether, or to what extent, it manifests itself 
within the domestic geography of the home. Much has been written on 
the significance attached to different areas of social space and to 
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the relationship between that and the space of the wider society 
In our own society, though we are familiar enough with the different 
functions each room of the house would be expected to fulfil, we are 
less aware that these areas may be the expression of a simple logic. 
However, the fact that in Intimate Strangers the four significant rooms 
of a house are all given due weight leads to an enquiry as to how they 
might be related to each other. Rather more tentatively, perhaps, 
than earlier in this chapter, I suggest that the domestic geography of 
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Of course, women are also recipients of Joan's culinary largesse, 
but again in the series only five times; once with Daniels' secretary 
who does actually spend much time in the kitchen, and the other four 
times are with the daughters, Kate who does not help (she has links with 
the male world) and with Judith who does. Harry's only attempt to 
help occurs when he is drunk and angry; in other words less than a man. 
Eating is a natural activity; it is also in the dining room a public 
one. 
The other opposition brings together the sitting room and bedroom, 
the former the domain of cultural conversation and natural sociability, 
in public, the latter of natural communication and its denial of it in 
sleep, in private. Conversation is opposed to sex and Bleep as I 
have already suggested. The dimension of the public and the private 
only reinforces that opposition. 
Kitchen and dining room are linked also in their relative proximity; 
each is the location of an unchallenged 'gender in dominance'. 
Equally and centrally linked are the sitting room and bedroom, each 
the site of conflict in active communication; a communication unmediated 
by the production of food. Dining room and kitchen are, as I have 
suggested, metonymically related; sitting room and bedroom, metaphorically 
so. 
The relationship between this coded structure and that of the global 
geography of the series turns especially on the change in the relationships 
of sex-role and activity. Whereas in the world, man is the cultural 
producer and woman is the natural consumer, in the home woman is the 
culture producer and the man is the natural consumer. The threshold 
becomes not just the site for change of values, but the site of a fundamental 
transformation in social and cultural i d e n t i t y . T o speculate that 
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Harry and Joan's house (and then their flat) can be summarised as 
follows. The differences and similarities between it and-its codes, 
and those of the structures of the whole will be immediately obvious. 
» 
Figure XI Domestic Geography 
Dining Room 












Female; Cultural production: Private 
A word or two of explanation is in order. As before, there are two 
orders of opposition, in this case that between kitchen and dining 
room, and then that between sitting room and bedroom. The kitchen 
is the private world of female cultural activity. It is Joan's 
territory par excellence: she is at home there, Harry is a guest. 
In the kitchen, Joan works, she transforms food and prepares meals. 
Only breakfast is eaten jointly by them there, all other meals, apart 
from Joan'8 lonely snacks (episode 2 and 5) are eaten in the dining 
room. It is private; the only strangers allowed in are women, 
(episode 4, Daniels' secretary). Opposed to the kitchen, and metonymically 
related to it obviously, is the dining room where men, often publicly 
and in the presence of women, naturally consume the food that has been 
prepared elsewhere. In the dining room Joan is the servant and the 
helper - Harry receives - whether he choses to eat (4) or not (5). 
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what Is true for this television series is true for life is tempting. 
We might avoid that temptation but only partly by suggesting that it is 
at least more clear on television. 
Much has been written on fashion as a signifying system, the code 
almost non plus ultra for a culture so dominated by the visual, and 
one in which the finest distinctions of status can be expressed and 
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recognised. In everyday life our experience of the clothes we 
wear is a multi-sensual one; we can recognise colour and texture as 
well as cut and combination. Our judgement is informed in relation 
to time (last yeai^s fashion) and place (not suitable for Ascot); to 
occasion and judgement of personality and natural aesthetic ("mutton 
dressed as lamb"). Distinctions of sex role, of expressions of 
exclusion from, or denial of, established degrees of status, are all 
expressible in the clothes we wear (or do not wear). As Marshall 
S a h l i n s ^ ^ suggests our clothes are almost totemic in their relationship 
not just to the natural order of things (cloth, colour) but also in their 
emblematics. Culture is created and signified (indeed in the same 
process) at a level which is both individual and social, by the clothing 
industry. 
The complexity and range of the codes of fashion are worth noting. 
In colour and in texture (black/white, silk/linen) and in both cut and 
combination (skirt/blouse, shirt/tie) a web of meaning is generated. 
The complete outfit, in so far as it aims for correctness or grammaticality 
(e.g. consistency in a current fashion of clothes and accessories) 
presents the perfect equilibrium of individual selection and cultural 
expectation. To produce a grammar of fashion would therefore be a tall 
order, not just in terms of the complexity of its levels but also in its 
instability; for the relation of a langue and parole is much less 
certain than that of natural language. Roland Barthes' attempts to 
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generate such a grammar depends on the descriptions that fashion 
magazines construct to distinguish one garment from another, not of the 
visibility of the fashions themselves; and Marshall Sahlins has also 
withdrawn, in an otherwise fascinating analysis, from the totality of * 
the t a s k /
5 8 5 
The problems of deciphering the code of fashion on television are on the 
one hand more simple, on the other hand not more so, than doing it within 
the culture at large. It is simpler because the code is less rich: not 
texture, and for some no colour, make the visual impression less full. 
On the other hand, the process by which fashion on television is created 
is the same as the one by which it is created in the world beyond, 
though the first is generally dependent on the second. In other words, 
the signifying of clothes on television is dependent on the general 
process of signifying in fashion, though as we have seen in terms of the 
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dominant codes, likely to be more unambiguous in its meaning. 
I do not propose here, to explore in detail the intricacies of the code 
of fashion. The task, even for one series of programmes such as Intimate 
Strangers, would for obvious reasons be too enormous and would demand a 
study of its own. The point I wish to make however, and to support 
illustratively, is that fashion constitutes another lever of expression 
which in its most basic employment in a television series such as this, 
operates to support the dominant codes of place, sex-role and techno-
economics. In practice, in the production of a television drama, a 
great deal of attention is given to the clothes and to the details of the 
environment; the effort to create a consistent verisimilitude is great. 
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Just as in the relation between action and place, where the judgements of 
appropriateness are so fundamental, so too in the relation of fashion 
and sex-role/place/economics, the same judgement is at work. Those 
who work wear working clothes, those who entertain likewise; women and 
men most obviously are distinguished by their appearance. The 
significance of this most recent excursion into banality is that it is 
by virtue of it, that the mediatory figures, as far as the action is 
concerned, can express their transitional or transformational function 
by the clothes they wear. Kate can, and does wear trousers, for example; 
Pat does too; both she and the PR lady in their separates (skirt and top) 
wear shirts. Joan more determinately perhaps, in terms of age and sex, 
always wears skirts. For her, significant narrative events are marked 
not by the detail of dress, but by her coats and by the change of 
hairstyle. 
Harry's progress through the series is marked, in what may seem to be 
an obvious fashion, in terms of suit and striped shirt and tie (work) 
to jacket, trousers, soft collared shirts (no work), to open necked 
shirts and trousers (work in the shop). His outfit is clearly opposed 
to that of Tom Daniels in episode 4, who faces Harry's suit with shirt 
and tie but with sleeves rolled up. Joan's transformation into worker 
is marked by the replacement of her fur coat (worn on the trip to London), 
the most 'natural' of her outer garments, by that of a sheepskin, the 
skin of a domesticated animal. 
The pertinent oppositions from which the code can be constructed are 
barely suggested here. Within the relative crudity of space and the 
basic elements of work and sex role^ fashion articulates a subtle and often 
vital system of signification. It is vital not only because through it 
we can make judgements of status and action without actually knowing 
anything more than about the clothes we are seeing, but also because 
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given our understanding of basic distinctions of place and sex role 
and so on, we can make judgements on the appropriateness of a particular 
item of clothing or of a particular outfit. Whereas in the real world, 
such a judgement generates a particular response in social action, * 
in the television narrative, such judgements are of functional 
significance. Drama is created in, among other things, the relationship 
of clothes, action and place; and in particular in the disharmony or 
conflict within that relationship. To be wrongly dressed, just as to 
act inappropriately, is significant not just on its own terms but as a 
marker for the future course of the narrated action. Fashion then is 
one, perhaps the most important visual marker in the overdetermination 
of television's drama and in the creation of verisimilitude. 
I have less to say about the other codes, mostly because of their potential 
complexity, but also because not enough information is given in the text of 
Intimate Strangers. Names for example, just like each item of clothing, 
though more interestingly, because less the result of conscious deliberation, 
speak of and about characters/
6 0
^ The names are coded if we wish to 
look at them in that way, once again between male and female (and their medi-
ators); and there are those with natural and those with cultural 
connotations. We have perceptions of names as strong or weak, those 
of strangeness and familiarity, of tradition and novelty. Once again 
the dimensions are many, and the fascination immense. In so far as 
these, and other names speak to us, then they are coded. It is my 
contention that naming too is a part of the overall, generally multi-
dimensional coding of the television narrative. Even if we neither 
know nor care to think of a connection between lion and Lionel, the woman 
eating seducer, and the biblical Daniel and Daniels the aggressive 
businessman, the connections however superficial, can be and need to 
be explored. Indeed the two slightly unwordly characters Harry and 
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Joan meet on holiday in the Lake District, introduce themselves as 
Lanson Cias in Champagne "^and my wife Phoebe ('fas in wave4'), Lanson's 
own first name is Hector and their significance as representatives of 
some mythical past, opposed to the mundane reality of Paynter Ohs ' 
in dingy
1
^ is freely recognised within the text. 
The acoustic and alimentary codes, so apparently dominant in the myths 
of South and North America are not so clearly represented here. The 
preparation of food seems no longer to have great significance as a 
part of transition between nature and culture. That boundary has moved 
beyond the culinary, and in a certain sense is now to be found around 
the back, represented both in the distinction between home and country, 
but also in a much more equivocal but powerful way between home and city, 
where the city appears as a culture beyond. The preparation and 
consumption of food therefore has much more to do with the reinforcement 
of sex roles than with this other vital mediation. Narratively it also 
functions to postpone the significant action and to provide an environment 
(social) where transformations occur, where deals are done, conflicts 
are generated or resolved and so on. Similarly there is little 
evidence for the elaborate acoustic coding which Claude Levi-Strauss 
unearthed in his analysis of South American m y t h s . N o i s e as such 
seems to be generated and therefore functionally important often when a 
significant transformation or mediation is undertaken (in Intimate Strangers 
journeys to and from London, especially those prior to and after seduction 
or near seduction), where it seems to signify danger or when there is a 
conflict in an otherwise harmonious arrangement of the different codes 
(again in Intimate Strangers, when Harry mows the lawn). Music, of 
course, is used conventionally to introduce and to close a particular 
narrative episode. In Intimate Strangers it accompanies the text only 
twice. Once when Harry and Joan go to the cinema and then it is on the 
•-317-
soundtrack of the film, and secondly when the P.R. lady puts on a record 
which might have accompanied her seduction of Harry. To talk of codes 
in this connection is probably premature, but nevertheless not theoretically 
incorrect. 
One final point. In much of the discussion of codes above, the 
dichotomy of nature and culture appears often, and is seen to be 
illuminating in many ways and for most of the codes that have been 
disentangled. In one sense this seems, for a society like ours, to be 
an odd dichotomy with which to begin, and indeed one whose appositeness 
is open to question. It is, however, empirically, of great importance; 
its explanatory usefulness suggests the difference between what we take 
to be a part of nature and what we take to be part of culture is of 
continuing significance. That this is not entirely fanciful, nor not 
indeed simply the result of the arbitrary imposition of a method on to 
an otherwise unexplained piece of date, is supported very much in our 
ways of speech, and in particular in the metaphors and similes used, 
for example, in this series itself. Thus, as we have already noted, 
the city is a jungle, and in it men claw (episode 4) each other. In 
another context, machines become women (Harry's car), or if they are old, 
dinosaurs (episode 5); businesses are born (episode 4) and can or 
cannot be milked (episode 4). We can be as right as rain (episode 4) 
or of a sunny disposition; we rabbit on (episode 5) and we cannot teach 
old dogs new tricks (episode 5). People become transport (5) and refer 
to themselves, rather than their cars, as badly parked. These examples 
collected from two episodes of the series written by two different 
authors, are meant only to be suggestive. The significance of the 
metaphor, inter alia, but importantly, lies in its transgression of the 
culture/nature boundary. Machines become humans or animals, and the 
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supreme product of culture, the city, conspires in the same way, and is 
( 6 
expressed in the same terms, as the jungle of old. 
V 
Implicit and sometimes explicit in what has gone before, which has 
purported to be a discussion of the various levels according to which 
a television drama series is coded, has been an interpretation. The 
question of how we are to understand the message that these codes generate 
is not one, as I have already suggested, which will admit of an unambiguous 
answer. It is for this reason that I have avoided presenting a dictionary, 
a lexicon, 
as a key to the reading of a text such as Intimate Strangers. 
While It might be possible to generate something in the way suggested by 
A.J. Greimas 
or on the lines outlined by Jerrold Fodor and Jerry A. Katz 
(63^ 
in theixearly paper it seemed, rather like a dictionary of dreams, 
to be of little general relevance. Much more useful then, hopefully, 
was an outline of the principles according to which a text such as this 
was constructed, the generation of a structure rather than a list of words. 
The structure is then a key to the understanding of the message of the text. 
The garden, the city, the kitchen and the bedroom are in Levi-Straussian 
terms concrete categories, categories full of empirical reference, which 
the text takes from the world of experience and whose ordering in the text 
is a measure of our culture's capacity to understand Itself. However, 
whatever is said about the message of the text in terms of a statement 
derived from its structuration, that message is never final and the 
structuring is never c o m p l e t e / T h e r e is a space between the structure, 
however full and the totality of the text. It is in that space that any 
interpretation must find its way; given the relative unsophistication of 
the proposed basic structure, but also the relative unsophistication of 
the text, the interpretation is indeed a provisional one. 
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We can begin by saying that at one, Important level the series Is about 
Harry and Joan Paynter, their marriage and family relationships and 
about the way in which they both face, in these relationships, the implication 
of the events following Harry's heart attack. And if we being here, at > 
the level of plot, then we can recognise the three problems with which the 
narrative has to deal; the problem of physical health, that of 
relationships - in particular that between husband and wife, and that of 
a man (and to a lesser extent, a woman) and his work. 
With the model of myth elaborated by Claude Levi-Strauss in mind we can 
then go on to ask, through the narrative, but beyond it, what it is that 
which 
each manifest problem has to do with the society/acts as host to these 
stories. Is there, then, in any sense a significant problem, a significant 
contradiction, within the society which at this time one might expect 
popular texts such as this to explore? Most centrally, and quite obviously, 
there appear to be two. The first concerns the changing and often 
conflicting balance in the relationship between man and woman; and 
secondly and correlatively is the problem posited for both, in family 
and in marriage, by the changing demands of work in an industrialised 
and post-industrial society. 
Both of these problems are real and vital. They are not the concoction 
of the media of mass communication but arise as a direct result of the 
inherent conflicts of industrial society and in particular an industrial 
society which still bows to the liberal democratic traditions of equality, 
fraternity and liberty.^^ These problems are no less real than 
those of cross - cousin marriage which the Tsimshian Indians must face, 
above all because culture cannot and does not provide a simple solution. 
It cannot because there is no simple solution; but on the other hand it 
must, in a sense, because each individual in the society, as he moves 
through it, has to find a solution for himself. 
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In many ways, and predictably enough, the answers, or attempts at 
answers, which the text of Intimate Strangers presents, are conservative, 
but they are no less interesting for that. Despite his various trials, 
Harry remains master of the household. His position as culture-hero 
is restated in his plans to build their new house, and his cultural 
centrality is reaffirmed in the way that the various women who surround 
him continually act as mediators. The women are marginal beings, either 
threatening (Pat and P.R. lady) because they are outside marriage, or 
supportive (Joan) when she is contented within marriage. Their marginality 
is that of being closer to nature than man and in the likelihood that in 
a male dominated society and culture, women can be used to define those 
margins. Seduction and cure both involve negatively and positively an 
attempt to de-culture man, to bring him closer to nature. Correlatively 
these women who seduce or cure, define for man the limits of his world, 
the world of the masculine, the world preeminently of culture. For 
women the problem has different connotations. The clarity of this 
boundary has been eroded and to a significant degree women's naturalness 
is being denied in contemporary society; in her incorporation into 
masculine culture her traditional role and significance is being 
threatened. 
The solution offered by Intimate Strangers is by no means conclusive. 
Firstly Joan is middle-aged, her children have grown up and so her 
particular solution only involves her relationship with Harry. Even 
that begins by her adjustment to his l i f e / * ^ Her subsequent involvement 
as the buyer and seller of antiques is a very small move in the direction 
of serious cultural activity; she is still essentially a consumer, and 
still essentially a marginal being. 
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Harry's solution is more positive and involves a greater movement, 
although even this is deceptive. The denial of city - work, and the 
withdrawal to suburban work is accompanied, as we have seen, by a 
change in its quality. Harry is no longer a producer; and he too 
» 
takes on women's work (literally - he replaces Mrs. Temple as the 
manager/owner of the bookshop). This denial and this move is articulated 
spatially in their move to live above the shop and in Joan's loss of her 
garden. 
In every way therefore the narrative suggests withdrawal, a withdrawal 
above all from the extremes of city and garden, a withdrawal from 
nature and from super-nature and from the margins. It is in this 
withdrawal, it is suggested, in the comfort of a categorial closeness, 
that the particular problems of relationships at work in an industrial 
society can be solved. There are no other solutions, for not one 
relationship in the entire series is anything less than imperfect 
measured against the ideal which Harry and Joan believe they have achieved. 
But this solution in its withdrawal, is at the same time a refusal to 
attempt the solution. Work in terms of production is denied; 
women's naturalness is denied; it is in a real sense therefore, a 
petit bourgeois, not to say Victorian, solution to a contemporary problem. 
And in a sense the narrative in its last gasp acknowledges just that; 
Joan and Harry even in their expected retirement, look to re-establish 
at least one part of the loss. It is not too fanciful to see their 
final pacing in the empty field as a further attempt to find in the 
wilderness a new resolution of these central concerns, and maybe their 
disappearance in this wilderness, as we the audience fly higher, signifies 
that the narrative recognises that in reality the only solution is in death. 
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At this level of explanation the message is clear; indeed it is part 
of my contention that television's narratives are particularly constricted 
in their ambiguity and this ambiguity is not just a product of the 
sledgehammer of a method which has been brought to bear. 
Intimate Strangers, by any account, is not the most simple of television 
narratives, compared to the Hollywood plots of city police or Californian 
private eyes, it is subtelty personified. But even here the structure of 
the text, both in its chronologic and in its logic, is clear and 
unambiguous. The narrative as a whole takes something from the folktale 
in the relative simplicity of its story and in its morphology, and 
something from myth in the structure of its context through the basic 
categories of concrete experience, and in the attempt to resolve a 
particular contradiction of the host society. It is therefore exclusively 
neither folktale, nor myth, but in its attenuation of these forms of 
narrative it demonstrates the continuity of their tradition and preserves 
the power in their communication. 
The relationship, then, between the text and the context is one of a filter, 
and of a reconstitution of the social and cultural sediment. If our 
world and our experience of it, is complex and ambiguous and if we are 
uncertain or insecure in its order, then the television narrative, like 
all the popular narratives of old, attempts to restate the outlines 
of the experienced problems of the everyday world. It does .so in ways 
which lock the apparent uniqueness of the moment to the substantial 
continuity of traditional narration. Its effectiveness and its power 
lies in this combination. Television, above all, is a machine for the 
reduction of the ambiguous and the uncertain. It is neither teacher 
nor priest. Rather it is a kind of cultural logician whose work 
consists in the continual and endless rearrangement of the elements in 
the contemporary manifestation of eternal dilemmas. Intimate Strangers 
was one, and by now probably a forgotten attempt to do just that. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Television and Society 
The argument is this. Television is a central cultural institution 
of our society. In its centrality it articulates the primary concerns 
of human existence and in ways which are themselves primary. These 
concerns, questions of life and death, of the familiar aid the strange, 
of male and female, of nature and culture, are incorporated even into 
our own advanced culture through the messages that television communicates. 
The forms of that communication are themselves basic; they are simple 
and one supposes they are effective; they consist in the mythic 
narratives, part myth, part folktale, and in magic and ritual. 
Television is not sacred; nor is it profane in any strict sense of 
the term. But the emotions and the power of the sacred are preserved 
despite the secularisation of television's manifest content. 
Television's effectiveness consists in its ability to translate the 
unfamiliar into the familiar and to provide frameworks for making 
sense of the unintelligible. It articulates difference but preserves 
that difference. And while it transcends the boundary of the 
acceptable and the known and seeks continually to extend it, it 
nevertheless marks that boundary clearly and unambiguously. Within 
that boundary we are secure and through television we are always 
within it. 
The boundary is both spatial and temporal. Both geography and 
history are in a certain sense annulled. Television is here, and 
it is now. Its images guarantee that and its content supports it. 
But it is its form, the logic of its narrative, which is the primary 
mechanism. And it is in its form that the continuity of culture, 
•-329-
its essential recursiveness, is preserved/
1
^ This measure of 
persistence needs, of course, to be understood in the context of 
a society which in its own terms is rapidly changing and which 
is visibly the site and source of conflict. But its persistence 
is not therefore to be only understood as false or alien or arbitrary. 
Television'8 communication relates directly to the common sense 
experience of everyday existence and the validity of that experience 
is guaranteed by its persistence. The everyday world too, has its 
boundaries and within them practical activity, economic, social, 
political, symbolic is undertaken in the security of the familiar, 
the predictable and the expectation of reciprocity. The commonsense 
world has its strategies but not solutions; we learn to live with 
contingency but do not transcend it. Our language and behaviour 
are premised on judgements of appropriateness and as J.L. Austin 
(2) 
acknowledges truth and falsity are no more than that. 
It is the language of television, in its restriction, which presents 
and illuminates the coherence of the commonsense world and its 
judgements of the appropriate. The language of television, in 
particular through its narrative structure, narrowly defines the range 
of expression and the limits of response. It is then, like all 
ritual communication, an uneven dialogue - though not as some would 
( 3) 
wish to argue, a monologue . Participation is indirect, as is 
its community, but both are present and fundamental in preserving 
its culture. And that culture, a folk culture, is created and 
maintained as all folk cultures are, through the oral communication 
of, by definition, ephemeral messages. Television, pressured by 
its own time and space, of schedule, of novelty and visibility, 
presents its messages in irrecoverable and irreversible time. 
• - 3 3 0 -
But the recognition and the memory of these messages is guaranteed 
by the reversible time of its structure and by the accessibility of 
simple chronology. 
Like commonsense, then, television translates history, political 
and social change, into manageable terms. For both, this translation 
is delayed and it is unquestioned. Marxism is correct. Television 
and commonsense do not enquire into why things should be as they 
are, only that they are so but have somehow to be lived with. It 
is tempting to ask on what other basis daily existence is possible 
- and television is indeed daily. But it is important to recognise 
that in this symbolic relationship with the everyday world television 
neither simply reflects nor defines, preserves nor changes what passes 
for commonsense knowledge and reflection. The relationship is 
a complex one and like the relationship between myth and the profane 
world in preliterate culture, its messages are neither distinct 
nor true to manifest experience. 
Television is therefore, playful; it is both literally and 
metaphorically a game; but in its rule governed performance, the 
(4) 
ending is both expected, pregiven and balanced. In this it 
compares to ritual. Many of our games are accompanied by ritual; 
many of our rituals are games. Television presents, and is, both. 
In Its eternal flow^"^ and in its intention it aims at balance; an 
infinite pendulum of the positive and negative, approved and 
disapproved, expected and unexpected. In television the full range 
of human and not so human possibility is presented - only to be 
denied; a denial precisely by virtue of its presentation on 
television. Our heroes and anti-heroes have enough of us in them 
for us to recognise our identity^^ but by their appearance on that 
screen, within the frame, that identity becomes estranged and in a 
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sense more attractive. In any event, like in myth, nothing in 
television is passible even though it is real; nothing is real 
even though it is possible. 
(7) : 
Television then needs to be taken seriously . It is not an 
aberration of twentieth century society, an excresence, or an 
irrelevance. It is, in its present form, which may not be its 
necessary form, the preeminent medium of centralised communication. 
It would be naive to suggest that it is the medium through which 
society communes with itself, for of course that society is neither 
homogenous nor free from conflict and contradiction. In it certain 
groups have access to the content of television and others are 
excluded, but the significance of this situation is perhaps not as 
obvious as it may seem and I will return to it, 
II 
In this context, what of the entirely modest contribution that the 
analysis of Intimate Strangers purports to be? Television drama 
takes up a substantial proportion of programme time and a drama 
series a substantial proportion of that. Drama,while not necessarily 
representative is certainly typical, and no television day goes by 
without its appearance, particularly in the afternoon. But despite 
this, the analysis of Intimate Strangers constitutes in no way a 
proof of the arguments offered about television here and in the rest 
of the thesis. Such a demonstration would need, were it ever to 
be possible, an altogether more comprehensive range 
of analysis. What it does do, I hope, is offer an illustration 
of the argument and make the formulation of hypotheses about 
television potentially more precise. 
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This enquiry has begun, and in a way, ended with a study of television's 
narrative structure. Such a structure gives any particular text, a 
programme in this case, its coherence and its identity. The levels 
at which it works seem significant: on the one hand its chronologic , 
the movement from beginning to end; on the other its logic, the 
synchronic pattern of system rather than text specific elements. 
The former reflects the structure of the folktale, the latter that 
of myth, though as I have argued there is no absolute distinction 
between the two, and most traditional oral texts are, like those on 
television, a mixture of both. 
The narrative of Intimate Strangers would appear to be paradigmatic. 
There clearly is a coherent narrative chronologic and that chronologic 
seems to be accessible through the model of the folktale that 
Vladimir Propp and others present, but even in terms of an analysis 
which is less precise in its specification the folkloric quality of 
these programmes is obvious. A. Olrik's stipulation of the basic 
elements within the folktale has already been referred to; in it he 
(8) 
suggests that a folktale consists of nine characteristics: the 
beginning of a folktale is gentle and rarely the most important 
part of the tale; likewise the story extends beyond the climax until 
it reaches a point of equilibrium or stability; the story itself is 
full of repetition, often three fold, which is used to give it body. 
The number of people involved is also limited; rarely more than two 
are present in a scene at one time, and rarely active at the same 
s time. Those that are, are often contrary, antagonistic to each 
other; the weakest will often turn out to be the strongest; the 
youngest often triumphs over the oldest. If two people appear 
in the same role they are presented as small and weak. But in any 
case both characterisation and plot structure is simple; "Only 
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such qualities as directly effect the story are mentioned; no 
clue is given that the persons in the tale have any real life 
9 
outside." In every degree the folktale is a simple story, 
therefore extraneous detail, and variety for variety's sake, 
are excluded in an attempt to make the text as concentrated as 
possible. 
In Intimate Strangers most of these elements find their place. 
The story indeed begins with a scene setting and ends with a perfect 
image of balance. There is much repetition, one episode after 
another fulfilling similar functions, and different characters, 
particularly the helpers or potential helpers following one another 
with consistent regularity and with often minimal narrative effect. 
The number and range of characters is limited, though perhaps not 
so much when compared with classic folktales, but the action is 
certainly centred on the hero who in this case appears in three 
manifestations, - Harry, Joan and the two of them together. Rarely, 
if ever, are one or the other of them out of shot. Other characters 
come and go, like thieves in the night; they are of no consequence 
an 
in themselves, only means to/end, and are quickly forgotten. Harry, 
too, named but still Everyman, by virtue of his initial misfortune, 
has to triumph over adversity; and Joan too, by virtue, as it were, 
of Harry's success, also suffers before the eventual triumph. These 
are the common folk, and they are fighting an unnamed adversary. 
Who then is the villain in Intimate Strangers? Why is he absent? 
The series, quite obviously, is not one of manifest conflict and 
physical violence. Villainy is not the prerogative of any one 
character, and the drama is therefore diffuse. The conflict has 
been internalised and generalised. In a sense one can say that 
no one is to blame for Harry's misfortune and no one will really 
help him except himself. And this is the bourgeois message of 
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independence in the face of unnamed and in any case ultimately 
irrelevant forces of society and history which Roland Barthes for 
example, sees at the heart of the culture of contemporary capitalism. 
Equally however, Harry's struggle is with society - a society which 
has excluded him by virtue of his triple lack; the message here is 
of one of discomfort, alienation perhaps, felt by those excluded 
and the choice is one that A.J. Greimas argues is essential to the 
Russian folktale, that between individual freedom and social 
respectability
11
 . The irony, of course is that Harry's bid for 
freedom - 'to be his own man' (episode 6 and 7) - leads with the 
directness of a bullet straight to the heart of social acceptability. 
In chapter 5 I suggested that the villain was fate, disembodied, 
beyond control, beyond history; it was chance, 'just one of those 
things', wliich brings Harry to his knees at the end of episode 1 
and which inaugurates the narrative. Chance too, as Max Horkheimer 
(12) 
and Theodor Adorno argue has its part to play in bourgeois 
culture - though as they fail to see, no more nor less, than in 
any other. In fact it is not chance, or not at least just chance, 
which generates the impetus for the story of Intimate Strangers, 
but it is a particular form of imbalance or extreme; Harry is 
working too hard; his involvement in the City takes him too far 
- beyond culture, to where culture becomes nature once again and 
is uncontrollable. It is the folktale's task to resolve that 
imbalance and to generate through its narrative progress not just 
the redemption of the initial lack or villainy but through that, 
the presentation of an ideal equilibrium. This much, at least, 
is what the chronologic effects. The Levi-Straussian formula, 
ian the Greimas/canonic structure are statements of just this, as is 
implicitly Propp's function W, the Wedding, and as such this drive 
(13) for balance is as much a part of the myth as of the folktale. 
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However, in the analysis presented in the thesis, the mythic 
narrative transcends the simple chronologic of the folktale. It 
breaks out of the presence of the text in two directions; firstly 
towards the society that acts as host to it and secondly towards 
the structure of mythic expression which has a much wider spatial 
and temporal relevance. Both movements are united in the concrete 
logic which is thereby no longer seen as being the exclusive 
prerogative of preliterate society. 
I referred to the arguments of Marshall Sahlins in the introductory 
(14) 
chapter. In advocating a pensge bourgeoise, he suggested that 
the way it was expressed was no less in terms of a logic of felt 
and lived categories as was any in primitive society. For him the 
significance of such an observation and indedd such a demonstration 
in the case of food and fashion, was to establish both a common 
logic and a distinct content within contemporary culture. This, 
indeed, is also my intention, and the narrative of Intimate Strangers 
supports it. It is a visible logic of place, sex and work through 
which the dilemmas of the strange, the contradictory and the appropriate 
are worked through, although in Intimate Strangers one set of cultural 
categories seem dominant - that between the country and the c i t y / * ^ 
The characters which play within these categories are of course, 
perfectly contemporary, their actions limited by what in the world of 
lived relations they would be. But in the compression of the play 
that world becomes mythic; its concreteness suffused and defined 
by its eternal logic. 
The analysis in chapter 6 has perhaps not been pursued far enough. 
(16) 
To do so would be an enormous task, and would in any case need 
to take account not just of other television series, but of the 
manifestations of the codes of contemporary culture in other media. 
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Indeed, in order to make some sense of the little I have, I have 
had to assume much about the world at large. The result is a 
series of simple and, in effect, over-determined structures. At 
the level at which I have chosen to explore the texts there appears 
a world and a logic of remarkable simplicity. It neither seems 
to present the extraordinary complexity of American myth nor for 
example the sensitivity to space and time which the Kabyle and 
Berber appear to show in their practice, both mythic and profane. 
It is tempting to say either that the method itself is blinding, 
or that there is a deterioration of mythic structure in contemporary 
society, or that one text is not sufficient to suggest the full 
(18) 
vitality of the system as a whole, I suppose that all three 
are partially correct though I am more inclined to suggest that the 
simple structure portrays a simple text and secondly that a simple 
text is only one among many in whose unity a more complex 
structure will be at work. Indeed the category of church (pub, 
hospital etc,) is one which is remarkably underpresented and under-
developed in the series. Given a wider range of texts, it and the 
other structural units could be further broken down in a way similar 
to the one suggested for the domestic geography. In such a way and 
in the acknowledgement that each category will appear in more than 
one structural arrangement, then the structure as a whole will grow 
like a crystal, endlessly, 
III 
Can the function of television be discussed? It is in many ways 
difficult to do so. The history of studies of the mass media, particularly 
film, radio and television have been dominated by a concern with effect 
(19) 
and with function. Current research can add to the basic stimulus 
and response model notions of "two-step flow and gatekeepers, uses and 
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gratifixations in the communication of a message; and in the 
in what channel 
awareness that 'who says what/to whom, model' is mediated by a 
culture and society whose complexity diffuses the previously 
assumed potency of the syringe/ ^  But despite this the direct 
influence of television on action, particularly on the action of 
children and adolescents is still a cause of academic and more 
(21) 
broadly social concern. 
It would be fair to say that Denis McQuail's conclusion in 1969 
still holds: 
"The assumption of great persuasive power of the mass 
media must be severely qualified. There is almost no 
evidence of the production of apathy or passivity by 
the mass media, nor of effects harmful to sociability 
and family life or likely to stimulate crime and violence. 
The assumption of unmediated contact between mass 
communicators and the individual has largely been 
demolished along with the image of an individualised 
and anomic audience situation."(22) 
The mass media are therefore functional, as Paul Lazarsfeld noted 
( 23) 
as long ago as 1948. They offer no serious challenge to the 
dominant institutions of society and overall tend to support the 
status quo. None of this is intuitively surprising, and so the 
question no longer becomes why or what, but how. And it is here 
the problems begin. The search for answers has lead to a greater 
concern with the messages themselves and with the desire to relate 
the analysis of particular communicated texts to a theory of (24) 
culture or ideology which will make sense of them. This is 
indeed the intention of this study, though in a sense still at one 
remove, for the notion of function however difficult it is to avoid, 
is still in many ways an insubstantial one. It assumes coherence, 
normality and consensus. It takes its measure from the persistence 
of institutions and while this has a certain validity (societies do 
cohere, action is norm governed, there is a degree of consensus, 
institutions persist), there is much in society, quite obviously, 
that is not like this. 
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Indeed, television, among the other mass media, is often given an 
analogous position to some functionalist theories in sociology; 
that it masks and mistakes the reality of the real world and 
generates by so doing, an atmosphere of misplaced and unjust 
(25) 
security. The correlation of television and the mythic does 
not, of itself, make the position much easier to resolve. 
J.S.R. Goodlad for example, in his discussion of popular drama, 
takes the functionalist position with regard to both myth and drama 
much to heart; myth and ritual have cognitive, expressive and 
instrumental functions; they inform the members of a community 
about its social structure, they act as tension releases, they help 
to exercise social control, and they accurately reflect the real 
life experience of the community. Drama in general, and television 
drama in particular, does likewise; it 'draws attention to the 
social order by contrasting it with disorder, to a morality by 
contrasting it with immorality; it reinforces prevailing popular 
opinion and reflects norms; it is unlikely to be dysfunctional 
either in terms of its specific effects or in general narcotically; 
even escape, in so far as it is a valid category, is positive; (27) it functions as a social lubricant
1
. 
Once again this seems 
both trivial and obvious on the one hand and empirically 
undemonstrable on the other. Just as there are myths and folktales 
which might appear to have no function, or to be positively antagonistic 
to existing structural arrangements, and Jack Zipes for example argues 
that the European folktales of feudal society were at least potentially (28) a spur to rebellious action, so too can one refer to television 
programmes, drama in particular, which might also be similarly 
(29) 
excluded. They are, admittedly, few. 
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No; as Max Weber admonishes, such arguments as these are of 
( 30) 
orientational use only. One has to look at the mechanisms 
within the texts and to the relationship between institutions; one 
has to examine the ways in which meanings are generated and trans-
mitted and to look at the symbolic structure of social existence. 
I have, in the preceding chapters, suggested one way of proceeding. 
Much can be gained by an examination of £he texts themselves and 
their structure. The nature of television's communication is 
restricted, and as such it both depends on and creates an audience 
of a particular kind; of course, composed of different individuals, 
with different needs and likely to respond differently, uniquely, 
to the messages they receive; but by the same token united through 
the reception of that message. This is the new folk, or rather by 
virtue of the persistence of the messages and in the way they are 
expressed, a resurgence of the folk. Television creates a national 
parochiality; traditional forms of sub-cultural experience and 
expression, the culture of the declining rural population of industrial 
societies, is on the one hand being destroyed by television, but on 
the other it is being preserved. Everything but the content remains 
and what is more it is no longer restricted to particular groups, but 
pertains and is relevant to the society as a whole. 
At this point, loud screams come from stage left: 
'Structuralism is the thought guaranteed by the State which 
thinks the present conditions of spectacular 'communication' 
as an absolute. Its method of studying the code of messages 
is Itself nothing but the product, and the recognition, of 
a society where communication exists in the form of a cascade 
of hierarchic signals. Consequently it is not Structuralism 
which serves to prove the transhistorical validity of the society 
of the spectacle; it is on the contrary the society of the 
spectacle imposing itself as massive reality which serves 
to prove the cold dream of Structuralism.' 
Perhaps. It is certainly the illusion of the common interest which 
32 
since Marx and Engels has been central to an understanding of myth 
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and ideology. And if even for Ernst Cassirer myth seems to roll 
up everything it touches into a unity, so to for Roland Barthes, this 
is also true of bourgeois ideology and its manifestations in mass 
mediated communication; t 
"Statistically, myth is on the right. There, it is essential; 
well-fed, sleek, expansive, garrulous, it invents itself 
ceaselessly. It takes hold of everything, all aspects of 
the law, of morality, of aesthetics, of diplomacy, of 
household equipment, of Literature, of entertainment. 
Its expansion has the very dimensions of bourgeois 
ex-nomination. The bourgeoisie wants to keep reality 
without keeping the appearances; it is therefore the 
very negativity of bourgeois appearance, infinite like 
every negativity, which solicits myth infinitely." 34 
For Barthes, of course, contemporary culture and its products are 
functional, and though he and Guy Debord, more spectacularly, see 
the continuity of myth, they nevertheless do not see its inevitability. 
That is the illusion; just as much as function is illusion if it is 
presumed to be necessary. Both I and Debord see contemporary culture 
as earthily transcendent; what distinguishes us is simply that what 
seems as a reasonable observation to me becomes the centre of his 
thunderous recriminations. 
The issue, however, is a serious one and it needs more careful 
consideration. It consists, it seems to me, in two related aspects; 
firstly the question of the relationship between history and structure; 
and secondly that between ideology and culture. I can only give a 
few observations on both now. 
IV 
"...in each of us, in varying proportions, there is part of 
yesterday's man; it is yesterday's man who inevitably predominates 
in us, since the present amounts to little compared with the 
long past in the course of which we were formed and from which 
we result. Yet, we do not sense this man of the past, because 
he is inveterate in us; he makes up the unconscious part of 
ourselves. Consequently we are led to take no account of 
him, any more than we take account of his legitimate demands. 
Conversely, we are very much aware of the most recent attainments 
of civilization, because, being recent, they have not yet had 
time to settle in our own unconscious."35 
- 3 4 1 -
I discussed very briefly, in the opening chapter, that blindness which 
contemporary culture has to its own persistences and continuities, and 
I suggested that it was perhaps part of our own ideology to make change 
into something of a fetish. Indeed it is, but such an observation
 k 
only makes an understanding of the perception of change even more 
difficult. What Emile Durkheim is suggesting above is that it is only 
immediate change, present history as it were, that is visible. Past 
history, the residue of previous experience and previous social change 
is buried in the unconscious. ' It is incorporated into our culture 
and constrains our action, perhaps through that incorporation. In a 
very real sense the everyday world is innocent of history, rather than 
blind to it. 
And it is this, its coherence which makes the commonsense world as it 
is and correlatively which makes television its extension, its 
mouthpiece and its support. Television, however, dramatises innocence. 
History, both present and past, becomes visible but transposed. If 
( 37) all history is a rewriting, a narrative whose story ends with us 
and which we believe accordingly, then television is, in contemporary 
society, a major contributor to that rewriting. 
In its rewriting, television, like myth, reissues the basic principles 
of classification. The history of historians is a chronology, in 
which events are linked through cause and effect and which are 
connected through time. For Levi-Strauss that history is the 'myth' 
of contemporary societies, the fundamental principle of intellectual and 
institutional development. In this, contemporary societies - he calls 
them hot - differ fundamentally from those which seek by the institutions 
they give themselves, to annul the possible effects of historical 
factors on their equilibrium and continuity. Historical time in 
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primitive societies is replaced by a real time which is cyclical, 
passive and sacred. 
"Mythical history thus presents the paradox of being both 
disjoined from and conjoined with the present. It is 
disjoined from it because the original ancestors were 
of a nature different from contemporary men; they were 
creators and these are imitators. It is conjoined with 
it because nothing has been going on since the appearance 
of the ancestors except events whose recurrence periodically 
effaces their particularity."(38) 
The question then, is not. so much whether this constitutes a mis-
interpretation of the primitive (for in part it must be), but whether 
and with what effect, such a sacred history does, or should disappear 
with literacy, technology, and class conflict. In a recent study of 
(39) 
the Western, Will Wright argues that it does not;
v
 history has 
replaced totemism as a classificatory system, and it has replaced myth 
as a mode of explanation of society. It has not, however, and 
probably cannot, replace myth as a ground for ordinary social actions; 
and for this reason modern myths are as structurally complicated and as 
socially important as the myths of primitive societies. I am inclined (40) 
to agree. It is the everyday world, the world of core values 
and beliefs, the heart and generator of all that is sacred in society, 
which is relatively untouched by history. And everyday experience is 
still dominated, as it must be, by the cycle of days and weeks and years; 
not generally by evolution or cataclysm (or even cause and effect). 
It is not to say that the everyday world is without vision or memory; 
indeed it sees further, and remembers more than the specialist or the 
scholar allows. And it does so with one purpose in mind, its own 
maintenance. 
The commonsense world is then a translation of history through structure 
into action. It is neither langue nor parole, but like myth in 
Levi-Strauss's formulation, in its metalanguage, it is both at once. 
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And mythic narrative is similarly formed; the final text is itself 
the product of the mutual constraints of history and structure; of 
present and past events rewritten to satisfy curiosity and emotion. 
The reworking of history which television undertakes, and of which * 
it is an expression, is a strategy for the repression of uncertainty 
and change. But it is a necessary strategy and not as Roland Barthes 
(41) 
would have it an aspect of the 'irresponsibility of man' '...Bourgeois 
ideology continually transforms the products of history into essential 
types. Just as the cuttlefish squirts its ink in order to protect 
itself, it cannot rest until it has obscured the ceaseless making of 
the world, fixated this world into an object which can be for ever 
possessed, catalogued its riches, embalmed it, and injected into 
reality some purifying essence which will stop its transformation, (42) 
its flight towards other forms of existence.' It seems perverse 
to suggest that it is the peculiar facilitiy of bourgeois ideology to 
grapple with reality in this way, as if the existence of classes and 
their endemic conflict in some way calls the lie to the consistency 
(and the inevitability) of such attempts. Class may be the right 
world but it is, by itself, the wrong measure. 
Despite the obvious connection between the institutions of the mass 
(43) 
media and political structure of society, a connection which has 
economic, administrative and symbolic dimensions, an understanding 
of these institutions and of their products can not be vouchsafed to 
the many analyses which deny a full contribution to the continuities 
in human existence. If my argument seems to err in the other direction 
then it must be understood in this context. 
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Television, in its rearticulation of a folk culture is not therefore 
ideologically neutral - I'll come to that in a moment - and it does 
confirm the present. The present consists in community, though not 
44 
a community of course, geographically united.' Time and place are 
homogenised at one remove - mediated by television and common by virtue 
of television. But this community,both product and producer of 
television, has by virtue of the consistency and the constraint of core 
culture a genuineness no less for its mediation. The viability of 
contemporary culture and as it were the guarantee of the effectiveness 
of television's messages, is to be found in the nearly visible structure 
of the mythic. Through these structures, of narration and of ritual 
passage, all of us who watch television participate in a common and 
transcendent experience, though the notion of transcendence must be 
understood in a particular way. We need not be in a state of ecstasy 
for example. It is transcendent because through television we are 
involved in a double perceptual movement; the strange, the different, 
is made familiar as I have often noted; but also the familiarity of our 
everyday existence is made strange. And it is transcendent because the 
processes by which this occurs unites it with identical processes in 
the societies and cultures of whom we have very little knowledge. 
The structures of the communication in television and in commonsense 
have therefore their own vitality and their own meaning. Through 
them the particularity of our historical experience is made intelligible 
to us, and through it, through all the various manifestations of the 
mythic, folktale, song, proverb, play and ritual, we live it. 
In this sense therefore television does not deny history or naturalise 
it, but makes it bearable. And not just history, but the whole range 
of life experiences, in their contradictions and their uncertainties, 
which in fact make up the 'history' of individuals in society. In 
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the exchange of meanings, an exchange contained but also made 
possible by these persistent structures, the individual is 
45 
integrated into the social world. And what is more that 
social world, the place of that integration, is itself reproduced. 
But that social world is no longer, if it ever was, a homogeneous 
consensual world of identity of interest and community of belief. 
And if television in the content and structure of its messages 
assumes or gives the impression that it is just such a world then 
it must become suspect. However, even in such a bland statement, 
a hornet's nest has been released. Let me quote illustratively, 
from the introduction to a recent reader to the field of mass 
communication studies: 
'The central concern of this Reader/with whole societies, 
their class structure and forms of class dominance and an 
exploration of the role of the media as ideological and 
signifying agencies within that whole. The concept of 
ideology is, therefore, of central concern. We would 
argue that dominant ideologies do not necessarily crudely 
and simply represent the interests of the ruling class but 
they always constitute the whole view of the world. As 
Hall suggests, "ideologies are one of the principal 
mechanisms which expand and amplify the dominance of 
certain class interests into a hegemonic formation" (Hall 
1974 p.270). Most importantly, dominant ideologies are 
not mere reflections of the social conditions of a dominant 
class but represent the political relationship between the 
dominant and subordinated classed in a specific social formation.' 
To quarrel with such an assessment is to quarrel not just with a 
particular expression of historical materialism but is in a sense to 
quarrel with historical materialism per se. And although this thesis 
is implicitly just such a quarrel, the relationship between the two 
forms of argument needs, perhaps, a little further consideration. 
As I suggested in the introductory chapter the site of such a quarrel 
can be defined by the relationship between ideology and culture. 
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A number of elementary observations can profitably be made. First 
48 
of all ideology is reflective whereas culture is constitutive. 
This distinction is, of course, an articulation of the materialism -
idealism dichotomy; ideology is seen as being those values and 
beliefs and forms of expression which are determined, albeit in the 
last instance, by the economic and material forces of society and 
as such ideological forms therefore reflect the interests of those, 
who by virtue of their position in the economic and material structure 
of society, have most to gain by it. Culture, on the other hand, 
is seen as the precondition, in the realm of values and beliefs, of 
any activity in the world, including economic and material. Indeed, 49 
in an evolutionary model, such as that of Talcott Parsons, 
culture which Is at the top of the cybernetic hierarchy gains its 
determining strength as societies become more complex and move away 
in their economic, social and political security from the limitation 
of having to satisfy basic survival needs. Culture is seen as 
superorganic as an operator as praxis as instrumental 
by those of otherwise very different persuasions who argue for a 
clear notion of culture. 
54 
Culture and ideology are also distinguished by their truth. 
Ideologies are false; they are false when measured against the 
reality of the world as it manifests itself in 'class, power, 55 
exploitation and interest'. Ideologies present the world in 
56 57 
'camera obscura' distorting, mystifying, manipulating, imaginary. 
The great challenge for a critique of contemporary, bourgeois society, 
is that unmasking which consists in the revelation of the noncoincidence 
between idea and reality and this holds even in the acknowledgement that 
58 
ideology itself may be the site of contradiction arid conflict. 
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Th e notion of cultu-" avoids such a measurement. The question of truth 
does not arise, for in language or in symbol all meaning is a construc-
59 
tion; and through that construction a world is created. All worlds 
are equivalent; and there is nothing objectively outside them. Or 
perhaps more accurately, the truth can consist either in the acknowledge-
ment of the relativity of and in culture, or in the search for something 
approaching a universal logic or grammar.^ 
The third dimension relates to the historical and spatial specificity of 
ideology and ideological formations. Even in the most advanced formulations, 
ideology consists in the manifestation of interest of a particular class in 
a particular society. And even in the acknowledgement of lag, as social 
structure changes so does ideology, in its dependence. It is this to which 
Louis Althusser refers when he argues, following Marx and Engels in The 
German Ideology that ideology, despite its specificity, has no independent 
history. 
'Ideology, then, is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), 
a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' 
from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete 
history of concrete material individuals materially producing 
their existence. It is on this basis that ideology has no history 
in the German Ideology since its history is outside it, where the 
only existing history is the history of concrete individuals.'61 
Culture is in a certain sense also outside history, and Althusser's 
distinction between ideologies, specific forms of ideology, and the generic 
concept of ideology, mirrors the distinction I wish to draw between 
ideology and culture. Culture is something that all men produce by virtue 
of their humanity: symbolic and material, it consists in the carving out 
of an order from nature, and in the preservation of that order against the 
exigencies of nature and other culture. It is, more or less, systemic; 
and it is, as I have said, what unites man rather than what divides him. 
Those who study culture tend towards considerations of the universal. 
Those who study ideology, Althusser perhaps apart, tend towards the concrete, 
the historical and the specific. For these the universal is itself an 
ideological category. 
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In their explanation, ideology and culture also differ. The 
study of ideology, quite obviously now, involves a reduction, 
though in a particular direction, and perhaps in the last instance, 
6 2 
to the material structure and productive forces of society. 
Ideas, beliefs and values are always dependent on, and in a 
significant degree determined by, the base; a study of ideology, 
of, in capitalism, the culture of the bourgeoisie, must always 
leave the realm of ideas for a more firm footing. 
Those who study culture can equally be involved in a reduction; 
through the analysis of symbolic coherence, of structure and of 
pattern, the semiologists and structuralists reduce the manifest 
complexity of belief and action to an abstraction. For them, as 
6 3 
for Karl Popper, in his notion of World 111, culture has an 
autonomy and a significant independence from material forces. This 
is sufficient, at least centrally, for them to ignore culture's 
relationship with, and dependence on, the equal complexity of 
social relations. 
If ideology is bourgeois, as it is tautologically, in a Marxist 
view of contemporary culture, that culture is elsewhere open to 
many other forms of classification: mass, popular, elite; 
professional, applied and amateur; refined, mediocre, brutal; 
traditional and modern, and so on.
6
^ 
Finally, and correlatively, ideologies are about power.
6
"* In 
its reflection and in its preservation an ideology is a manifesta-
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tion of a society of social, economic and political inequality. 
The notion of hegemony introduced and discussed by Antonio 
Gramsci is central to this perception of ideology.^ Gwyn A. 
Williams summarizes it in this way: 
'By hegemony, Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political 
situation, in his terminology a 'moment', in which the 
philosophy and practice of a society fuse and are in 
equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and 
thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is 
diffused throughout society in all its institutional 
and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all 
taste, morality, customs, religion and political principles, 
and all social relations particularly in their intellectual 
and moral connotation. An element of direction and 
control, not necessarily conscious, is implied. This 
hegemony corresponds to state power conceived in strict 
Marxist terms in the dictatorship of a c l a s s . ' 6 7 
The notion of hegemony, which in its cultural dimension is akin 
to a Marxian conscience collective - a blanketing culture in which 
all individuals (in their identity) find their representations and 
touchstones ready to hand, and which in its political dimension, 
has much in common with Max Weber's discussion of authority, and 
the central significance of the mechanisms involved in the creation 
and preservation of legitimation; this notion of hegemony has been, 
despite its difficulty, of great influence in contemporary Marxist 
studies, and the distinction between hegemony and domination seems 
to be reflected in Althusser's own distinction between repressive 
68 
state apparatus and ideological state apparatus. The notion 
of hegemony, also, it would appear, is the source of the notion of 
the relatively autonomous, wherein various levels of social 
experience, (formations), most significantly the ideological, 
are conceived of as being sufficient unto themselves, though still 
to be understood, finally, in the framework of a much mediated 
economy and a much weakened impression of the class structure. 
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Ideology is, in the notion of hegemony, that dimension of 
culture which is political and which has political significance. 
Not all culture, however, is political (not all politics is 
cultured), and we could well do here with the equivalent of Max 
Weber's discrimination in the realm of the economic, between the 
economically determined, the economically relevant and the 
69 
economic. Clearly the reduction of contemporary culture to 
the ideological in this sense is a mistake. On the other hand, 
not so to reduce it, inevitably brings with it all the problems 
faced currently in the sociology of knowledge, within and without 
Marxism. 
The following statement from Stuart Hall is only meaningful if 
it is assumed that culture and ideology are in essence, the same, 
and that political culture is the site of the albeit leaky, 
domination of one world view by another: 'the overall intention 
of "effective communication" must, certainly, be to "win the 
consent" of the audience to the preferred reading, and hence to 
get him to decode within the hegemonic framework. Even when 
decodings are not made, through a "perfect transmission", within 
the hegemonic framework, the great range of decodings will tend 
to be negotiations within the dominant codes - giving them a 
more situational inflexion - rather than systematically decoding 
them in a counter - hegemonic w a y . ' ^ 
We can grant that there is no guarantee in the communication of 
any message that it will be received in the intended way and we 
can grant also that the nature of the codes of a particular 
message will restrict the nature of the response, indeed I have 
already argued as much, but we do not need to accept that there 
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is such a thing as an unambiguous preferred reading or that the 
effect of a mass communicated message is necessarily skewed in 
favour of the producer of that message.'" 
The television message, in this case, is not necessarily then, the * 
site of a collision of competing definitions of reality, or in its 
capacity to exclude, the site of a triumph over the alternative 
or the unacceptable. It is rather the site of a collusion and 
that between the demands of the moment expressed through a given 
political structure and the demands of the persistent expressed 
through the culture as a whole. The former, in a real sense, is 
dependent on the latter. 
Narrative provides the motor for this blending and articulation. 
Through narrative and in particular through the mythic narratives 
I have been discussing in this thesis, the possibility for effective 
ideological communication is dependent on the presence and pre-
existence of other, perhaps universal, forms of communication. What 
is more, this communication, the communication through structure 
and affect, which is restricted in its codes, could well betray 
rather than only modestly support the messages that are transmitted 
on its back. 
Participation in the culture of television, a participation in which 
we are all involved, involves us, in turn, in a folk culture which 
is the very reverse of the one which has up to now supported the 
dominant institutions of our society. The crisis of capitalism; 
72 
sometimes seen in terms of a withdrawal of legitimation, can in 
part be understood as the result of the resurgence, through television, 
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of the oral and mythic - a resurgence which transforms the sig-
nificance of everyday experience and in a sense universalises it. 
The translation of particular and specialist types of knowledge, 
just as the presentation of the novel and the extraordinary in a 
familiar form, may well involve, among those who receive its message, 
both challenge and withdrawal. In television and in its narratives, 
culture comes to the people, but in a way which both transforms 
that culture and establishes popular authority over it. The forms 
of that transformation are those that have persisted by virtue of 
a persistence of core culture, of a limited range of solutions to 
identical problems expressed directly and ephemerally. The re-
assertion of these forms must alter the balance in political and 
social structure and make the dominance of, and by, the literary 
harder to achieve. Rather than be a blindfold for the uninitiated, 
television, in its contribution to culture, may make its novitiates 
progressively less easy to govern; the forms of its perceptual 
order contradicting rather than supporting the values of its 
supposed controllers. Beneath the manifestation of ideology, 
with its stress towards the maintenance of the status quo, lies the 
hidden myth, which in the communication of its narratives, undermines 
it. That the source of this challenge is in the deepest sense 
cultural makes it no less significant. 
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Appendix 1 
Analysis of Episode 6 of Intimate Strangers In terms of Christian Metz'8 
"Grande Syntagmatlque" 
TIME (minutes and seconds) 
00.00 00.30 CREDITS 
00.30 1. Sequence 
Early morning. Joan and Harry. Continuity of action; 
immediately before and after the act of eating breakfast. 
02.35 (Not entirely unproblematical: conceivably two scenes.) 
02.35 2. Scene 
Harry's arrival at work: a continuous action, despite 
Harry's disappearance from the image, and continuous in 
time: his reappearance is anticipated. A separation in 
space (inside/outside) but the continuity of time and action 
04.57 indicates a scene. 
04.57 3. Alternating Syntagm (2: Telephone)' ^  ^ 
The conversation between Joan and Kenyon: uneven but distinct. 
The slight extension of attention to Joan at the end does 
not disqualify the categorisation or indicate a separate 
06.30 segment. 
06.30 4. Scene 
07.40 Harry and Foster at work. 
07.40 5. Scene 
10.57 Harry and Joan at dinner. 
10.57 6. Scene 
12.44 Harry and Joan in the bedroom. 
12.44 7. Alternating Syntagm (1: Chase) 
Joan at home. Harry and Kenyon discuss the plans. 
The link is a comparative one. While there is only one 
alternation, the juxtaposition of Joan (minimum action/natural) 
and Harry (maximum action/cultural) suggests we should take 
14.24 this as one segment. 
14.24 8. Scene 
15.22 Kate and Joan. 
15.22 9. Connected Syntagm (Scene 2) ^ 
Harry's drive and minor accident. Cut to Joan and Kate 
awaiting him inside the house. Harry enters and new 
(inter-) action develops: but separation and linking action 
19.44 and space (inside/outside). 
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END OF PART ONE 
19.44 10. Connected Syntagm (Scene 2) 
Joan in garden: finishes work. Comes inside and meets 
Kate and Harry. Again continuity of time, but linked 
21.10 separation of action and space. 
21.10 11. Scene s 
Joan at Church. More than one shot. Clearly a 
21.57 separate segment. 
21.57 12. Connected Syntagm (Scene 2) 
Harry and Kate begin their row. Joan arrives outside the 
house. Stops and listens. Back inside for Joan's entrance. 
This is a borderline Scene/Connected Syntagm - the dependence 
is on the significance of Joan's arrival as a separate action 
24.54 (and indeed separate place: outside/inside again). 
24.54 13. Descriptive Syntagm 
Narratively both time and action are insignificant, though 
clearly not exorcised completely. Possibly Parallel -
depending precisely on a subjective determination of the 
passage of time. She looks up at the window: cut to 
25.09 Harry asleep. An indication of simultaneity. 
25.09 14. Scene 
25.45 Joan and Harry and Kate in the Kitchen. 
25.45 15. Scene 
27.07 Harry and Foster and Kenyon. The deal is agreed. 
27.07 16. Scene 
27.21 Dale, the apprentice, makes his plan. 
27.21 17. Scene 
27.33 Harry, Kenyon and Foster sign. 
27.33 18 Connected Svntagm (Scene 2) 
The explosion in the car: Kenyon and Harry rush to the 
exhaust. Foster joins them. Harry runs inside. Hand-held 
eye-view shot. Harry attacks Dale. Clearly a difficult 
segment to place. Linked but separate actions and places. 
28.26 Almost certainly a continuity of time. 
28.26 19. Scene 
37.17 Joan and Harry have it out. 
END OF PART TWO 
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37.17 20. Sequence 
Harry wakes up alone. Sees the empty bed. Cut to 
Joan walking alone in the garden: Harry appears, 
dressed, behind her. Then continuity of time, space 
and action. Basically continuity of action but a 
46.52 break in time. 
46.52 21. Scene 
47.57 Harry, Joan and Kate discuss the plans. 
47.57 22. Episodic Sequence 
A series of related but uncompleted actions 
49.05 summarisable under the heading 'Past
1
. 
4 9 , 0 5
 23. Scene 
Harry and Joan in the garden. The break from 
22 is indicated by their coming together, and 
51.53 their subsequent interaction. End Credits. 
Footnotes: 
(1) In two cases, this being one, it was found empirically necessary 
to refine the Metzian classification. Here»two different types 
of alternation are recognised, the one exemplified by the telephone 
conversation, the other, the alternation described by Metz, 
exemplified by the chase. Very simply what distinguishes them 
is their different quality of time and action: in the one, the 
telephone conversation, time is sequential during the action and 
actions within the alternation are linked but separate;. in the 
chase there is a clear indication of simultaneity of time - the 
police car and the getaway car are moving closer together - while 
the action is cumulative; it is likely that the two will meet. 
(2) The natural/cultural distinction is not one that intrudes or should 
intrude at this level of analysis; it is drawn upon here simply in 
order to specify or reinforce the nature of the contrast and the 
unity of the segment. 
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Footnotes (continued) 
(3) The second refinement occurs in the gap between the scene and the 
sequence. Here, using similar criteria of space, time and action, 
one can distinguish the connected syntagm from the scene. The 
latter defines a simple unity of space, time and action; the 
connected syntagm defines an autonomous segment in which a 
continuity of time holds together two spatially separate but 
linked actions. The paradigm is an articulation of inside/ 
outside actions. 
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Appendix 2 Vladimir Propp/s Narrative Functions 
(Abridged from Morphology of the Folktale pp. 149-155) 
Preparatory Section 






£ information received. 
^ deceit. 
9 submission to deceit. 
A Villainy. 
a Lack/insufficiency. 




B release: departure. 
4 
B announcement of misfortune. 
C Consent to counteraction. 
T
>
 Departure: dispatch of the hero from home. 
D The first function of the donor. 
E Reaction of the hero. 
F The acquisition of,,receipt of^a magical agent. 
G Transference to a designated place, guidance. 
H The hero struggles with the villain. 
I Victory over the villain. 
J Branding or marking the hero. 
K The liquidation of misfortune or lack. 
^ Return of the hero 
Pr Pursuit of the hero. 
Rs Rescue of the hero, 
o Uhrecognized arrival. 
L Claims of a false hero. 
M Difficult task 
N Solution (resolution) of the difficult task. 
Q Recognition of the hero 
Ex Exposure of the false hero. 
T Transfiguration. 
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U Rmishment of the false hero or villain. 
W Wedding and accession to the throne. 
£ connectives. 
The 31 functions exclude a and § and count A and a as one. Apart from B, 
which is a diffuse category, all functions have been noted only by their 
main headings in the Morphology of the Folktale. These are the classif-
ications which accord Propp's analysis its generality^ within each 
of these individual functions there may be as many as 19 variations which, 
of course, will be significantly more specific to the Russian folktakes 
Propp used for his analysis. 
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Appendix 3. A.J. Greimas' Structural Model of the Narrative 












Departure: it is not clear of whom 
The contract broken. 
Knowledge (recognition) denied. 
Power denied. 

























Agreement to act; a new contract. 
Departure of the hero 







Rapid journey: the arrival of the 
hero at the place of combat. 
The Main Test; the contract already 
entered into (A^ above). F^: combat 
c^ branding (potential recognition) 
non c^: receipt of object. 









ration and C^ 
Restoration A 













Power regained (transformation) 
Object regained (wedding). 
A new contract (with society) 
established and lack liquidated. 
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Footnotes to Appendix 3 
This table belies the very real difficulty of making the two sets of 
functions correlate. Some of the problems are discussed by A.J. Greimas 
himself: others result from his insufficient or ambiguous consideration. 
*1. Propp's 0 involves the absenting of the elders. It is one of the 
preparatory functions which are by no means mandatory to the narrative. 
It is not clear why Greimas should accept an opening journey here, 
except to balance the p structure. But since this function is 
repeated^its significance, structurally, is not clear. 
*2. There is no equivalent function in Propp's morphology. 
*3. As Greimas notes (Semantique Structurale 1970, Propp's treatment 
of the three tests is uneven. Strictly there is no function in 
this test for the equivalent of Greimas' F (affrontement/reussite) 
Propp talks of D (the first function of the donor) and E (the reaction 
of the hero). These two functions are assimilated into A , the contract 
in Greimas' formulation. 
*4. Here the contract A^ clearly has been established. The main test 
consists in the contract and victory (F^ " H.I), and resolution -
liquidation of the lack (non c^ • K). 
*5. F^ an unexplained function. 
*6. Similar to *3 above. In Greimas' view: 1. Propp only identifies 
half of his function A., failing to recognize the response of the 
hero to the setting of the task (M), and 2. Propp identifies only 
half of function F^, ignoring the combat and identifying only the 
success. (N). 
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Appendix 4. Series Morphology (following Vladimir Propp) 
a the initial situation: Joan and Harry established. 
Y the implicit violation of a prohibition. Harry's 'failure' 
5 revealed as a result of his heart attack, 
a The heart attack. 
B Information about Harry's recovery and its implications. 
C Harry'8 consent to counteract. 
D Harry with Bob, and to a lesser extent Joan, 
E as potential helper/opposers. 
^ Harry's journey to the city. 
F - His failure. 
-V His return. 
(K-) His lack of a job (cultural health) reaffirmed. 
(C) Harry and Joan together agree to act to find social and physical health 
Their journey to the Lake District. 
D Involved with the Lansons,Ruskin, the Church, 
E • the ghost of Peter, of Donald Campbell etc. and 
FJ with each other as potential helpers/opposers 
(K) Their lack of relationship, Harry's lack of job. 
^ Their return. 
C Harry's task: to find a job. 
His departure to the City. 
D His involvement with various potential helpers/opposers 
E ' (the publisher, the printer, the banker, Joan) 
F- in his search for employment. 
His return home 
(K-) empty handed. 
need) 
(C) Harry's desire) to do his job well. 
^ His departure from home to work. 
D Pat, as the potential helper/opposer, and his 
E • failure to find help outside the marriage. 
F- , 
(K-) His lack of cultural and social health restated. 
An implicit return. 
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(Episodes 2-5 manifest, at their most simple but also their most 
basic, a similar morphology and function in the series 
as a whole). 
(A/^a) The lack of a good job, and Foster's threats. 
C Harry's need to do well is reluctantly accepted, 
't His departure from home. 
D)(H His involvement with Kenyon and potential 









a neo-villain. Successful. 
Lack liquidated. Contract achieved . Job secured. 
His involvement with the apprentice Dale, and 
his failure to achieve final recognition. Harry is 
beaten and his job has gone. 
His return home. 
As false-hero, he is punished. 
As failed hero, his marriage is threatened. 











Information about the project. 
Harry's acceptance of the task. 
Movement of home. 
Information about Joan's lack, her house and her garden. 
Joan's begrudging acceptance of the. problem. 
Joan (and Harry's) involvement with her friends, the 
potential buyer of the house, Bob,as potential helper/ 
opposer . All fail. 
The lack, principally Joan's, remains. 
8. B Harry despatches Joan to the city. 
, C Joan agrees to go. 
She goes. 
D Her involvement with Lionel as potential helper/ 
E opposer (actual seducer). An ambiguous result. 
F
± 
-V Her return home. 
K- The lack remains. 
(o) Joan is unrecognized: her involvements unannounced. 
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Harry dispatches Joan to the doctor. 
She consents to go. 
She goes. 
The doctor gives advice. 
Joan accepts the advice and as a result... 
She gains some confidence; reinforced by her 
involvement with Harry's young friends. 
She returns home. 
The lack in the relationship liquidated. 
Intimations of the "wedding" in their love-making. 
Harry and Joan's departure and return from London to 
buy a double bed. 
Their testing as family leaders by Matt and Judith. 
This success and the recognition of it. 
Harry and Joan's departure to Portsmouth. 
Joan's involvement with the sale and their joint involvement 
with the old sailor. Each, although differently, leads to., 
their recognition of their own success and achievement. 
Their return home. 
Harry's departure to the City. 
His involvement with the tycoon, with Bob, but 
above all with the P,R, lady. 
His return. 
Their mutual recognition. 
The implicit restatement of. their success'. 
The 'punishment' of the "villain", Bob. 
Their transformation: in clothes, in spirit. 
The anniversary party ( wedding) and their new house. 
•-369-
Appendix 5 
Series: Structure (following Greimas) 
The negative statement of the initial situation: the 
implicit breaking of a contract (essentially but not 
exclusively with each other). 
The lack: loss of health. 
Loss of identity and of confidence (self-knowledge) 
Loss of power, ability to act. 





His involvements with various helpers/ 
opposers. 
His failures. 
His own, momentary success (Episode 6) 
His job success. Main 
The redemption of lack as a result: contract, jot" test. 
The involvement with apprentice Dale 
His reaction. 
His failure to achieve the confirmation of his heroic 
status. 
The general failure re-established. C^ the non recognition 
of his heroic status (Harry as anti-hero); y C^, His 
failure to act becomes his powerlessness; C^ -^C^ His failure 
at work reaffirms and over determines his total failure as 
a man. 
Harry and Joan begin again. 
Harry and Joan are involvfed in their various 1 Qualifying 
encounters with helpers/opposers. ' Tests. 
Their final success in gaining the right help/advice. 
The success in their relationship. ] Main 
The fruits of that success. > Test. 
Their mutual recognition: a success: rediscovery of each 
other. 
Their various tests, both jointly and separately 
which establish and confirm their heroic status 
That recognition of heroic status 
Their transfiguration/transformation. 
Marriage and Building. 





Analysis of the Morphology of Episode 6 using 
the categories of Vladimir Propp 
1. <5y DEF (-)/a The opening sequence. Harry's surreptitious 
early morning drink is already a violation, 6, 
of a warning, Y, implicit in Joan's look. Joan's 
offer of breakfast and lunch, D, is rejected, and 
this rejection, E, involves a denial of Joan's 
support and/or understanding, F-, This 'DEF' 
sequence of testing, of which there will be 
many examples, does in this case as a whole 
indicate the nature of the lack, a, of relation-
ship. Its identification here in fact demands 
knowledge of the series, knowledge which makes 
it more explicit than it otherwise would be. 
2. B*CaC This segment is concerned above all with 
Harry's lack of work, a. His response to the 
idle works, to open his letters, to ring the 
bursar and to take a drink, is indicated by C, 
consent to counteraction. The main problem 
4 
concerns the identity of B and of C , both of 
which refer to the provid.onof information, the 
former of information about the lack (lack of 
noise indicating lack of work); the latter of 
information about a villain. While, given the 
alternatives provided by Propp, the labelling 
is less arbitrary than it might be, in general 
the introduction of information into the narra-
tive is not well handled. Indeed this is of 
some significance for contemporary narratives 
which seem to rely, in their complexity, on the 
transmission of information of one sort or 
another as a fundamental part of the story-
telling. The second problem concerns the 
presence of the villain. In Intimate Strangers 
a villain as such rarely appears, though 
functions which, according to Propp, demand the 
presence of one are clearly identifiable. In 
this case the villain is Foster. 
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3. £ A segment involved in the provision of information. 
Kenyon tells Joan that he might have work for Harry 
(the is relevant to a:work) but also sows seeds of 
doubt in Joan's mind about Harry's recent trip to 
London (a:relationship). 
4. (5) B C ^ (<$) indicates the continuing violation of the warning 
not to drink. Foster now reveals himself as a 
functionally complex figure; in one sense it is clear 
that here he acts as a dispatcher, defining the task 
for Harry and supporting that definition with threats 
(hence Propp's B ), but maintains his position as at 
least an implicit villain, precisely because he has 
it in his power to thwart Harry's progress (by giving 
him the sack). C indicates Harry's consent to 
counteraction and indicates a more or less catch-all 
category (also concerned with the transmission of 
information) which Propp calls a connective - in this 
case the ringing of the phone and Harry's recognition 
of Kenyon'8 voice. 
drink. Two tests are involved here, both of which 
are incomplete. The first is the alienating test, 
basically a repetition of the one in 1; the other is 
Harry's subterfuge over hts trip to London. Joan 
is upset but her denial of support and/or her acceptance 
of Harry's story is still left open (to 6). (F+/-) 
indicates therefore an incomplete but complex conclusion. 
(Strictly F has to do with the provision or denial 
of a magical agent. Clearly in this context it 
is legitimate to demystify it slightly. We are 
concerned with the provision or denial of help with 
regard to the liquidation of the initial lack.) 
5
-





6. F/E(£C,)F-/A(a) A difficult and complex scene involving deception 
and the receipt of information. Joan comes close 
to villainy: F/E indicates Joan's response to 
» 
Harry's drunkenness; her provision of help, E, is 
at the same time her reaction, F, to the challenge 
of Harry's lie. (eC) indicates the nature of this 
response, i.e. E(e£), reconnaissance and receipt 
of information. F-/ indicates her negative reaction 
and the implicit denial of support for Harry (a). 
So, in all, this segment is both a summary and a 
clear statement of the lack in their relationship 
(a) overdetermined, as It were, by Harry's past 
villainy and Joan's present villainy, A. 
7. (F-) DE Joan is alone in the garden. Her solitude is to 
be seen as a reaffirmation of her implicit denial 
of Harry in 6, as well as a general statement about 
the lack of relationship. DE indicates Kenyon's 
promise of a contract which is his first function 
as a donor: Harry responds, E. The conclusion 
remains to be stated. Hence, even in a 'static' 
Proppian analysis we can recognise in the DE-^F 
sequence the dynamic possibility DE, definition (F) 
and the necessity of this interrelation. There is a 
sense in which D and E need to be completed (see 
below) and it is this necessity which provides one 
aspect of the dynamic in the narrative. 
8. d£ Joan and Kate: D indicates Kate's first function 
as donor (of a drink specifically), and we are 
aware, as she becomes aware, of the equivocality of 
the gift;% : Joan provides Kate with the information 
(and reminds us of the implications of Harry's situation). 
• - 3 7 3 -
Harry's altercation with the wheelbarrow is heavily 
symbolic, but otherwise narratively neutral. It 
provides in addition specific information about 
Harry's drunken state. The first EF indicates 
Harry's generally positive response to Kate's 
bottle, and the fragile interaction, F, which results. 
The second DEF (not+/not-) involves Harry's and 
Kate's confrontation over her income, F (not+/not-) 
suggests a central and open result that there is 
more to come, in other words that the offer/acceptance 
of the magical agent (support/understanding) is 
still held in abeyance. 
END OF PART ONE 
10. £ The suspense with regard to the resolution of the 
test in 9, maintained by a narratively neutral 
segment, providing only very general information: 
it is Sunday, Joan works separately and goes to 
church separately, Kate and Harry, the contestants 
in unfinished business, remain. 
11. j) Re-emphasis of Joan's separation. 
12. DEF(-) A complex segment; the DEF test involves Harry and 
Kate, the final negativity of F(-) being reinforced 
by Joan's appearance and involvement. Strictly 
both Harry and Kate act as separate donors: Harry 
of information, accepted by Kate as helpful in the 
pursuit of her particular tasks; and this in turn 
leads to the providing of information (about her 
relationship with Bob) which Harry finds objectionable. 
In both cases then, the first function of the donor is 
the provision of information. The end result is the 
denial of support for Harry, and his increasing 
isolation - he is getting further away and further 
away, it would seem, from the liquidation of lack 
(a: relationship) and the denial of help by Kate 
only adds another dimension (see 14). 
9. £ EFDEF (not+ 
not-) 
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A connecting segment emphasising lack of 
relationships (a; relationship). 
This concerns the neutralisation of 12, but of a 
limited kind. Harry apologises and has Kate's 
support in his pursuit of lack (a: work), but it 
is not a major event for the narrative, and Kate 
remains a fairly equivocal helper. (D): Harry's 
apology; E: Kate's friendly response; F: support 
for Harry: a 'magical agent' to take with him on 
his search. 
F in relation to DE in segment 7 above. H indicates 
the struggle with the villain - the beginning of the 
main test with reference to the lack, a; work. 
A multi-functionality is Involved. Kenyon agrees 
to the deal, F, and in so doing offers Harry the 
key to the eradication of the threat of the sack. 
It becomes part of the main test and the struggle 
with the villain because Foster is now all that 
separates him from achieving the fulfilment of the 
task. (6) once again refers to the drinking 
prohibition. 
Dale'8 announcement of his yet unspecified villainy. 
(Dale is Foster's apprentice - villainy at one remove 
indicates perhaps a recognition of the problem of 
villain/dispatcher.) 
The liquidation, apparently, of the lack, K, by 
virtue of Harry's victory, I, over the villain. 
Propp indicates that in the narrative there 
usually follows a further test, once the main test 
(with reference to the stated lack) has been completed. 
This test involves the hero once again, and involves, 
often, the necessity to prove his rightful title to 
the object of the search. It is possible, though 
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Propp does not indicate the possibility, that the hero 
can fail in this test. Here Harry fails. H, the 
difficult task (how to deal with the explosion). N(-), 
Harry's negative resolution (he attacks the apprentice). 
MN implicate Q(-) the (non)-recognitlon of the hero 
and U(—) the (non)-punishment of the false hero or 
villain. Harry goes unrecognised and he is punished 
as though he were a villain - by the very punishment 
which negates the previous success: his lack (of work) 
is reaffirmed. 
19. ^ The major scene of the episode and the series. 
DE(-)F(-)/ Its analysis depends partially on its place in 
HI(-)/ the series which makes the categorisation sug-
K(-)/ gested fairly safe. As a result of the negativity 
Q(-)/ of 18, Harry returns home. He reports (£. ) what 
W(—)/ happened. What follows is a final (qualifying) 
test for Harry from Joan - the test which has 
as its source his trip to London. This test fails; 
Harry responds negatively; they are still separated; 
no magic. DE(-)F(-); this test however is 
magnified in its narrative significance. The 
failure, F(-), explains what is at stake (ie the 
lack - a:relationship). H and I indicates the 
intensity of the struggle, the main test with 
regard to lack though without a clearly defined 
villain (is it Harry? Is it Joan, is it circum-
stance?). As a result the lack is unliquidated, 
K(-). Harry is unrecognised, Q(-) and the wedding which 
should follow a successful outcome is transferred to 
its near opposite, W(-), the threat of a split - in 
other words a re-emphasis of the initial lack (a: 
relationship). We can follow Propp here, in 
identifying the end of a move, which by virtue of its 
negativity indicates that a new move is to follow. 
END OF PART TWO 
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20 aBC If, as seems reasonable, the final function in 
19 is W(-), then the first part of the series
1 
narrative is complete, and indeed within the 
episode itself there is a clear break. There is 
no clear break like this in any other episode, 
and for this structural reason, as well as more 
obvious ones to do with context, Episode Six is 
seen to be pivotal. announces a new situation, 
and a new move. In the early explanation 
and discussion of the situation the following 
preparatory functions can be identified: 0 
absentation (of Joan);
 e
 reconnaissance (by Harry 
to find Joan); S information received by Harry 
about Joan (and vice-versa). What follows is 
the statement of the problem: the lack (a:rela-
tionship) ; its discussion B (what Propp calls 
the mediating incident); and C their joint 
consent to counteraction. 
21 DEF Harry and Joan test Kate, in search of support. 
They get it. 
22 £ This episodic sequence serves a basically 
connective function - memories, the past 
symbolised (incidentally an example of a complex 
signifier with a simple signified). 
A further connective - this time looking, with 




Analysis of the Structure of Episode 6 using the categories 
of A.J. Greimas 
The drink. Symbolic of, and essentially a 
summary of Harry's relations with the world. 





















The failure in the relationship. Harry is 
denied the power to affect his circumstances. 
He remains without support. 
<C, the lack of relationship.) 
Departure. 
At work. The reconnaissance and receipt of 
information. 
Announcement of lack/villainy. 
The acceptance of the challenge by Harry 
(A^) - not yet a new contract, strictly. 
A,F non 
2 2 
A question of double functionality. 
c
2
 indicates a repetition of the first qualif-
ying test, with the same result. That and the 
diary incident imply that Joan, moment-
arily, plays the villain. In other words, the 
link, recognised equally in the Proppian 
analysis, of reconnaissance, deceit and 
villainy. 
Kenyon. A successful encounter. It is through 
Kenyon's intercession that Harry is given the 







(+/-) Kate's complex, but ultimately neutral involvement 
in what is only another qualifying test. 
F^ non Cg Combat and victory: the liquidation of the 
lack. The contract for the printing has been 
signed, but ... 
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F 3 ( - ) 




The glorifying test: to establish the hero's 
rightful title. Harry fails it. He is not recog-
nised (he becomes momentarily the villain) -
and with the result (non c
3
(-)) the lack is 




He arrives home (in the dark). 
A^ The hero is unrecognised. The double tune-
rs tionality again. Joan and Harry's first con-
non c ^ - ) frontation is in the nature of both the last 
qualifying test (the generation of power in 
the relationship) and also a second main test, 
associated with the lack of relationship. The 
A associated with this lack is implicit (i.e. he 
has not stated his willingness to undertake 
the reparation of the relationship). It is 
assumed that he wants to. 











The branding: 'the failure' not removed. 
His revelation as a non-hero (without power). 
His 'negative' marriage: his punishment. 
The lack not liquidated. 
The violation of all the norms of responsible 
manhood. We have now reached a new re-
affirmation of an initial situation of alienation 
(a social heart attack). 
P 
C, 
Next morning: Harry's departure. 
He seeks out Joan: and they question each other 
(knowledge). 
They reveal the nature of the lack (goods/desire). 
They discover to some extent,the existence of their 
own inadequacy (power). 
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 The first joint qualifying test for Kate. Support 
given. They are encouraged to press ahead. 
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Appendix 8 
Morphology of Episodes 1 - 1 5 (excluding 6) 
Episode 1 
A. Morphology 
a Joan and Harry at home (and at work). 
Harry's departure. 


















Announcement by lawyer of the loss of 
holiday home. 
Harry's decision to find an alternative holiday. 
Request for support for his plans from Joan. 
A failure 
Kate's help; more successful, though not immediately. 
Joan's involvement: and the final acceptance of 
the holiday plans 
Holiday agreed: lack liquidated. 
B^ Information from work that something is wrong. 
G Harry's rapid departure. 
P The failure of Harry's delegate. 
H/M A test for an object (the remedy of the potential 
i/n loss) and for a restatement of Harry's heroic position. 
(K) ( Q N e i t h e r are conclusive. 
Pr. The first journey to meet the train. 
T- The Heart Attack. 
a (A) Lack - villainy. A loss of health. Why? 
B. Acting Units (Actants) 
Hero: Harry. 
Help/Opponents: Joan, Kate. Junior at work. 
Villain: ? 

















K - J 
( V ) 
o ( Q -) 
Harry is in hospital. 
The doctor informs Joan about Harry's condition and 
specifies the does and don'ts of recovery. The lack 
at this stage is his health. 
Harry comes home. 
His determination not to be considered an ivalid and 
to recover quickly. 
The ambiguous and inconsistent help from the family. 
Matt and Joan row about the seriousness of the affair. 
The lack of work discussed in the garden. 
The company accountant, Bob, as helper. In 
his planning for Harry's return to work, he 
villainously consults the doctor. 
9 
Harry's departure t'o work. 
Harry's failure at work : the job is a non-
job. The lack of work remains. 
His return. . 
Unrecognised. He is mot a hero, 
glorifying test. 
There is no 




Object of Search: 
Harry. 
The family (Joan, Kate, Judith and Matt). Bob. 
(Bob). 








Initial situation : on holiday. 
Their (departure and) arrival. 
Jane's prohibition : she tells Harry not to lift the case, 
(lack of health) and they row about his eating cresun calces. 
Harry's walk through Coniston. He discovers the presence 
of Ruskin. 
The past exumed in the recollection of Peter, Joan's 
dead brother. 
Harry's exercises: his acceptance of the need to do them, 
although equivocal. 














into a social health. A series of 'encounters' 
with 'memories of the past' : Ruskin, Peter (Joan's 
brother), Donald Campbell, Christ, etc. 
The involvement with the Lansonss an encounter which 
generates momentary closeness between Joan and 
Harry. 
Information received by Harry about Joan's deception. 
Joan becomes the villain momentarily as Harry 
argues with her about the implications of his 
heart attack; the content is work and health; the 
substance is their lack of relationship. 
They return home. 




Object of search: 
Harry: Harry and Joan. 
The Lansons, Ruskin, Peter, Campbell, Christ. 
Joan. 





















Information (letter and Joan's conversation with 
Judith: lack of a job: lack of money. 
the first of a series of encounters with potential 
helpers : this one is the Banker. The difficulty 
is averted. 
The publisher, Mancroft. This leads to his 
meeting with Daniels. 
Daniels is helper but also since he holds the key 
to Harry's cultural success, a potential villain. 
This first encounter is therefore doubly 
functional. Moderate success leads to a second test. 
The journey to the City to see 
The moneylender. Harry's failure to borrow the 
necessary capital. 
His return and meeting with Paul on the train. 
Lack liquidated. ) Harry's double failure. 
Hero nonrecognised ) Daniels calls off the deal. 
His weak counteraction. 




Object of search: 
Harry. 
Banker: Mancroft: Daniels: Moneylender. 
Daniels. 




The lack specified. M l understanding of it depends 
partly on previous a c q u a i n t s with the series, 
despatched by Joan. 
Journey to work. 
The lack of relationships at home (mirrored in the row 
of Judith and Matt). 






















Foster as despatcher but also as villain and therefore: 
in the context of work, and the lack of orders, the 
failure to produce work is a serious failure: Poster's 
opposition is fundamental. 
Pat. Potentially supporter, but in her guise as seducer 
also a villain. Harry's involvement with her therefore 
doubly functional lack and qualifying but also a main test: 
the main test (1) and (2), two 
aspects of an overdetermined failure. 
Harry returns home, momentarily, unrecognised, he leaves. 
He finds Pat and she attacks him, and then 
leaves herself. 
Harry is left dejected. 
B. Acting Units (Actants) 
Hero: Harry. 
Helper/Opponent: the Family. Pat. 
Villain: Poster. Pat. 
Dispatcher: Joan. Poster. 
Object of search: Harry. 
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Episode 6 
For fuller analysis see Appendix 6. 

























Harry and Joan at home. 
Information about the lack and the possible plan. 
Harry and Joan leave. Itself a consent to counteraction. 
The first contact with Mrs Temple, owner of the 
bookshop. Information and planning. 
Joan and Harry in their mutual testing about the 
sale of the house and the sale of the car. 
Joan's confrontation (3 in all) with her 
friend Marilyn. Joan's activities predominate in 
the narrative: they are increasingly negative. 
Harry successfully sells the car: money is 
gained towards the successful completion of the 
transaction of moving. 
The abortive sale of the house. Diana is 
potential helper - but in the failure suggests 
a serious threat to Joan's existence. 
Harry's work is the shop but most significantly his 
attempt to get his pension early. It fails 
His return 
M Harry and Joan's confrontation at the house. 
X JJ Doubly functional: a serious test for Joan, but 
K- following the actual failure of the house sale, 
Q_ J her identity is at stake. She fails both. His world 
is empty. 
^ They return 
B. Acting Units (Actants) 
Hero: Joan: Harry 
Helper/Opponent: Mrs. Temple: the buyer of the car: 
Villain: 
Dispatcher: 
Object of search: 
the buyer of the house, Marilyn. 
(Harry). 
Harry. 























Harry and Joan at home. 
Harry's despatch of Joan reveals the lack. 
Her departure signals her consent to counteraction. 
The effective purchase of clothes. The immediate 
lack redeemed without a struggle. 
This simple move complete. 
The meeting with Lionel. Information about each 
othertransferred. 
Lionel's deceit and Joan's deception through lunch 
and afterwards. 
Villainy: Joan is seduced. 
The subsequent incident with Lionel doubly 
functional. He is her helper, but also her opponent (as 
seducer.) 
The result is ambiguous: she has found something of 
herself, but at a price. 
Joan returns home. 
Unrecognized. 
Joan's failure to tell Harry what happened 
leads to 
a denial of her status as hero (or even anti-hero). 
The lack remains: she is punished and 
untransformed. 
B. Acting Units 
Hero: Joan. 
Helper/Opponent: Lionel. 
Villain (seducer): Lionel. 
Dispatcher: Harry. 
Object of search: Joan: Joan and Harry. 




























Harry and Joan at home. 
Joan's various tests: with Harry, with Marion, at the 
Saleroom etc. all amounting to a statement of her 
lack, her failure. 
That failure is recognized by Harry and leads to his 
dispatch of Joan. 
The visit to the doctor: Joan receives help (of a 
sort) in her struggle with herself. 
She goes to the hairdresser: a mark of potential/ 
actual success/determination. 
Her dinner, with Harry; of similar functional 
significance to her involvement with the doctor. 
Harry is helper: she struggles with herself. 
The narrative develops: her meeting with the 
young people suggests her increasingly successful 
struggle 
Harry and Joan together: the villain (Joan) from her test 
is the joint recognition of their heroic status. 
The lack is the relationship liquidated. 
The mark, recognized: though ironically in her nakedness, 
a nakedness symbolic of her transformation. 
They kiss. 





Object of search: 
Joan 
Harry. Doctor. Young people, 
Joan. 
Harry. 




(The morphology of Episode 10 is presented in two columns: 
it reflects the conflict within the narrative and the clarity 
with which two narrative threads are presented). 



















Joan and Harry decide to go to 
London and buy a bed. 
Information is received about Judith's 
and Matt's marriage and its tensions. 
Harry and Joan try and help, 
but fail. The lack 
defined. 
Information about Judith's pregnancy. 
Joan tells Judith to inform Matt. 
Joan and Harry go to London. 
They buy their bed. 
They enjoy their time together: 
as heroes. 
Judith consults her doctor 
about abortion. He refuses. 
Joan and Harry return to find 
Judith waiting with the news of 
their broken marriage. They 
successfully intercede. 
The lack (Judith and Matt's 
marriage) is decreased. 
Judith and Matt together again. 




Object of search: 
(Joan and Harry). Judith (and Matt). 
Joan and Harry : (Judith and Matt). 



















Harry and Joan leave for London and 
Remembrance Sunday. 
They remember their past together. 
Their lost pasts their surplus of memories. 
Harry suggests that Joan sells antiques. 
They meet Harry's friends in the pub again. 
They go to the party. 
The praise of their friends: and the 
mirror image of the arguing couple. 
Joan's first encounter with the saleroom. 
Joan and Harry's encounter with the old 
sailor: the past ressurected again, 
slightly ambiguous encounter. 
A 
Joan buys her first antiques. 
The lack: her confidence: her cultural identity 
redeemed. 
The praise of the boys who carry her purchases 
to the car, and of Harry. 
They return home. 
B. Acting Units (Actants) 
Hero: Harry and Joan: Joan. 
Helper/Opponent: Their friends, the old sailor. 
Villain: None. 
Dispatcher: Harry. 


























The departure of Joan and Harry to see accountant. 
They meet old colleague and obtain and receive 
information about Harry's old firm. 
Help, advice and information from the accountant. 
Harry's uncertain financial position revealed. 
Return home. 
Information from Bob leading to 
Harry's consent to counteraction. 
He goes to London. 
The involvement with Ramsey Bennett, and 
the offer of a jobs the first stage of his struggle 
with himself. 
The involvement with Anna (The P.R. lady) 
a similax struggle, though it develops beyond 
the initial interaction. 
The perfume on his shirt. 
His success! her denial of Anne is an assertion of 
his own completeness. 
Return. 
Initially unrecognized. 
(The struggle, through Joan, with himself: (p) the 
rejection of the job. His basic status manifest, 
especially in his traderstanding of Joan's 
information about her liaison with Lionel. 
They kiss. 
B. Acting Units. (Actants) 
Hero: Harry. 
Helper/Opponent: Joan: the accountant: R.B. Anna. 
Villain: (seducer) Anna. 




£ Information received about Harry's serious illness. 
B.C. Harry and Joan agree to go and see what can be done. 
(There is no distinct lack, rather a surplus to be defended... the 
subsequent tests are weak narratively). 
Their departure. 
The test with the past, symbolised by Harry's 
B
0



















The burden of the past liquidated. 
Harry's visit to the doctor; a warning but a 
recognition of his health, (natural health). 
Harry and Joan: Bob and Kate: (cultured health) working 
separately and together; the establishment of family life. 
(Social health). The bungalow. 
Their joint recognition of their heroic status and their 
triumph. The bungalow and its planning. The 
wedding. 
The openness to the future. 
B. Acting Units (Actants) 
Hero: Harry and Joan. 
Helper/Opponent: Harry's mother (part). Kate and Bob. "The famil; 
Object of search: Harry and Joan. 
